Militarization and diplomacy in Europe before 1914

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 125-161

  Stevenson, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 21744447145     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.22.1.125     Document Type: Review

References (119)

1. This article uses the following abbreviations: BD: George P. Gooch and Harold W. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, 11 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1928-36); CGS: Chief of the General Staff; DDK: Maximilian Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926); EMA: Etat-major de l'armée (French General Staff); FO: Foreign Office; GGS: Grosser Generalstab (Prussian Great General Staff); GP: Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27); HHStA: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna; KAM: Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv-Militärarchiv, Munich; KAW: Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; PAAA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn; PRO: Public Record Office, London; and SHA: Service historique ae l'armée de terre, Vincennes, Paris.
2. This article uses the following abbreviations: BD: George P. Gooch and Harold W. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, 11 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1928-36); CGS: Chief of the General Staff; DDK: Maximilian Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926); EMA: Etat-major de l'armée (French General Staff); FO: Foreign Office; GGS: Grosser Generalstab (Prussian Great General Staff); GP: Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27); HHStA: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna; KAM: Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv-Militärarchiv, Munich; KAW: Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; PAAA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn; PRO: Public Record Office, London; and SHA: Service historique ae l'armée de terre, Vincennes, Paris.
3. This article uses the following abbreviations: BD: George P. Gooch and Harold W. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, 11 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1928-36); CGS: Chief of the General Staff; DDK: Maximilian Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926); EMA: Etat-major de l'armée (French General Staff); FO: Foreign Office; GGS: Grosser Generalstab (Prussian Great General Staff); GP: Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27); HHStA: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna; KAM: Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv-Militärarchiv, Munich; KAW: Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; PAAA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn; PRO: Public Record Office, London; and SHA: Service historique ae l'armée de terre, Vincennes, Paris.
4. The Austro-German alliance dated from 1879; the Franco-Russian from 1891-94. Britain had no contractual obligations to France and Russia, but cooperated with them diplomatically after compromising over extra-European disagreements in the "ententes" reached with France in 1904 and Russia in 1907. In 1882 Italy had concluded the Triple Alliance treaty with Austria-Hungary and Germany; but as it rarely aligned itself with them in the crises of 1905-14, I normally refer here to the Central Powers rather than the Triple Alliance.
5. Bethmann in Prussian Council of Ministers, July 30, 1914, DDK, Vol. 2, doc. 456. Cited David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 404.
6. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, Isabella M. Massey, trans. and ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
7. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1963), pp. 16-22; cf. Taylor's War by Timetable: How the First World War Began (London: MacDonald, 1969). The inadvertency thesis has clearly influenced Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), chap. 8.
8. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1963), pp. 16-22; cf. Taylor's War by Timetable: How the First World War Began (London: MacDonald, 1969). The inadvertency thesis has clearly influenced Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), chap. 8.
9. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1963), pp. 16-22; cf. Taylor's War by Timetable: How the First World War Began (London: MacDonald, 1969). The inadvertency thesis has clearly influenced Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), chap. 8.
10. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), and Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 Marian Jackson, trans. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975). See the qualification, in Fritz Fischer, "Twenty-Five Years: Looking Back at the 'Fischer Controversy' and Its Consequences," Central European History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 207-223.
11. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), and Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 Marian Jackson, trans. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975). See the qualification, in Fritz Fischer, "Twenty-Five Years: Looking Back at the 'Fischer Controversy' and Its Consequences," Central European History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 207-223.
12. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), and Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 Marian Jackson, trans. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975). See the qualification, in Fritz Fischer, "Twenty-Five Years: Looking Back at the 'Fischer Controversy' and Its Consequences," Central European History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 207-223.
13. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150. Reprinted with revisions in Trachtenberg's History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91) pp. 151-186.
14. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150. Reprinted with revisions in Trachtenberg's History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91) pp. 151-186.
15. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150. Reprinted with revisions in Trachtenberg's History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91) pp. 151-186.
16. Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Survival, Vol. 26, No. 5 (1984), pp. 223-234.
17. The bulk of the new primary research on which this article is based is detailed in Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War. In addition, I draw on the reevaluation of the prewar decade in David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). I refer in the notes to these books where appropriate rather than giving extensive archival citations here. Stevenson's Armaments is a broad study of the role of competitive military preparedness in the origins of World War I. In this article I focus on the theme of extraordinary military measures in the pre-1914 international crises of 1905-14, and provide a more explicit framework for conceptualizing the phenomenon of militarization in international politics.
18. The bulk of the new primary research on which this article is based is detailed in Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War. In addition, I draw on the reevaluation of the prewar decade in David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). I refer in the notes to these books where appropriate rather than giving extensive archival citations here. Stevenson's Armaments is a broad study of the role of competitive military preparedness in the origins of World War I. In this article I focus on the theme of extraordinary military measures in the pre-1914 international crises of 1905-14, and provide a more explicit framework for conceptualizing the phenomenon of militarization in international politics.
19. I have excluded bilateral conflicts such as the Austro-Italian war scare of 1904, the Anglo-Russian Dogger Bank incident of the same year, and the Casablanca deserters incident (France versus Germany) of 1909. The Liman von Sanders incident of November 1913-January 1914 was more of an interbloc conflict, but was unaccompanied by extraordinary military measures. In examining the 1912-13 Balkan wars I have concentrated on the international tension in the winter of 1912-13 caused by the first Balkan war. I have not examined in detail the Scutari crisis (Austria-Hungary versus Montenegro) of April-May 1913 or the Albanian border crisis (Austria-Hungary versus Serbia) of October 1913, as these were more localized bilateral standoffs whose peaceful outcome was largely predetermined by the successful resolution of the initial conflict. Michael Brecher's International Crisis Behavior Project, which tabulates crises from 1929 to 1985, excludes pre-1914 crises. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict, and Instability (Oxford, U.K.: Pergamon, 1989). However, a major new study of nineteenth-century crises has just appeared: Jost Dülffer, Martin Kröger, and Rolf-Harald Wippich, Vermiedene Kriege: Deeskalation von Konflickten der Grossntächte zwischen Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg (1856-1914) [Avoided Wars: Deescalation of Great Power Conflicts between the Crimean War and the First World War (1856-1914)] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997).
20. I have excluded bilateral conflicts such as the Austro-Italian war scare of 1904, the Anglo-Russian Dogger Bank incident of the same year, and the Casablanca deserters incident (France versus Germany) of 1909. The Liman von Sanders incident of November 1913-January 1914 was more of an interbloc conflict, but was unaccompanied by extraordinary military measures. In examining the 1912-13 Balkan wars I have concentrated on the international tension in the winter of 1912-13 caused by the first Balkan war. I have not examined in detail the Scutari crisis (Austria-Hungary versus Montenegro) of April-May 1913 or the Albanian border crisis (Austria-Hungary versus Serbia) of October 1913, as these were more localized bilateral standoffs whose peaceful outcome was largely predetermined by the successful resolution of the initial conflict. Michael Brecher's International Crisis Behavior Project, which tabulates crises from 1929 to 1985, excludes pre-1914 crises. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict, and Instability (Oxford, U.K.: Pergamon, 1989). However, a major new study of nineteenth-century crises has just appeared: Jost Dülffer, Martin Kröger, and Rolf-Harald Wippich, Vermiedene Kriege: Deeskalation von Konflickten der Grossntächte zwischen Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg (1856-1914) [Avoided Wars: Deescalation of Great Power Conflicts between the Crimean War and the First World War (1856-1914)] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997).
21. I therefore distinguish between a militarization of diplomacy and a broader underlying militarization of international politics. Defense budgets rose, armies and navies moved to higher levels ot peacetime readiness, and governments and public opinion became more bellicose. The more specific and the broader trends toward militarization reinforced each other, but I concentrate on the former.
22. The main examples are the Kruger telegram affair (Britain and Germany) in 1895-96, the Fashoda crisis (Britain and France) in 1898, and the Dogger Bank incident (Britain and Russia) in 1904. In 1896 the British organized a naval "flying squadron"; in 1898 they readied the reserve fleet; and in 1904, after the Russian Baltic fleet shelled Hull trawlers, the British Gibraltar squadron shadowed it until Russia agreed to arbitration. Ronald Bobroff, "Diplomacy Enhanced: British Diplomacy and Military Measures after the Dogger Bank Incident, October-November 1904," unpublished Master of Science dissertation, London School of Economics, 1994.
23. Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), chaps. 7 and 10.
24. On the first Moroccan crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp 64-76, and Horrmann, Arming of Europe, chap. 2. Helpful on the military aspects are Pierre Guillen, L'Allemagne et le maroc de 1870 à 1905 [Germany and Morocco from 1870 to 1905] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der Ersten Morokkokrise [The Problem of Preventive War in German Policy during the First Moroccan Crisis] (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 1974); and Heiner Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik, 1904/06 [Between Power Politics and Imperialism: German Policy toward France, 1904/06] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976).
25. On the first Moroccan crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp 64-76, and Horrmann, Arming of Europe, chap. 2. Helpful on the military aspects are Pierre Guillen, L'Allemagne et le maroc de 1870 à 1905 [Germany and Morocco from 1870 to 1905] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der Ersten Morokkokrise [The Problem of Preventive War in German Policy during the First Moroccan Crisis] (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 1974); and Heiner Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik, 1904/06 [Between Power Politics and Imperialism: German Policy toward France, 1904/06] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976).
26. On the first Moroccan crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp 64-76, and Horrmann, Arming of Europe, chap. 2. Helpful on the military aspects are Pierre Guillen, L'Allemagne et le maroc de 1870 à 1905 [Germany and Morocco from 1870 to 1905] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der Ersten Morokkokrise [The Problem of Preventive War in German Policy during the First Moroccan Crisis] (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 1974); and Heiner Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik, 1904/06 [Between Power Politics and Imperialism: German Policy toward France, 1904/06] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976).
27. On the first Moroccan crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp 64-76, and Horrmann, Arming of Europe, chap. 2. Helpful on the military aspects are Pierre Guillen, L'Allemagne et le maroc de 1870 à 1905 [Germany and Morocco from 1870 to 1905] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der Ersten Morokkokrise [The Problem of Preventive War in German Policy during the First Moroccan Crisis] (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 1974); and Heiner Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik, 1904/06 [Between Power Politics and Imperialism: German Policy toward France, 1904/06] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976).
28. On the first Moroccan crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp 64-76, and Horrmann, Arming of Europe, chap. 2. Helpful on the military aspects are Pierre Guillen, L'Allemagne et le maroc de 1870 à 1905 [Germany and Morocco from 1870 to 1905] (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967); Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der Ersten Morokkokrise [The Problem of Preventive War in German Policy during the First Moroccan Crisis] (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 1974); and Heiner Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik, 1904/06 [Between Power Politics and Imperialism: German Policy toward France, 1904/06] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1976).
29. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 67-70. Herrmann, Arming, pp. 39-55, deals at length with the military balance in 1905.
30. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 67-70. Herrmann, Arming, pp. 39-55, deals at length with the military balance in 1905.
31. On the second phase of the crisis, see Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 70-76, and the sources cited there.
32. Grey to Tweedmouth and Lascelles, January 16 and 31, 1906, BD, Vol. 3, docs. 203 and 264.
33. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 73-74.
34. Ibid., p. 68, and Moritz, Präventivkrieges, p. 164.
35. Ibid., p. 68, and Moritz, Präventivkrieges, p. 164.
36. Bülow to Radolin, January 7, 1906, GP, Vol. 20, No. 1, doc. 6938, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 74.
37. Einem to Caemmerer, January 7, 1906, PAAA R 794. Stevenson, Armaments, p. 75.
38. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambriges, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1937) remains the best general account. See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 112-131, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 112-130.
39. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambriges, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1937) remains the best general account. See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 112-131, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 112-130.
40. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambriges, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1937) remains the best general account. See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 112-131, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 112-130.
41. Aehrenthal-Schönaich correspondence, October 21-22, 1908, KAW KM Präs (1908), 51-17. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 116-117.
42. Goschen to Grey, October 19, 1908, BD, Vol. 5, doc. 397.
43. Stevenson, Armaments, p. 119.
44. Moltke to Bülow, January 29, 1909, PAAA R. 995, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 130.
45. On Agadir, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Jean-Claude Allain, Agadir, 1911: Une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc [Agadir, 1911: An Imperial Crisis in Europe for the Conquest of Morocco] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976); and Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir: die deutsche Politik während der zweiten Marokkokrise 1911 [The Panther's Leap on Agadir: German Policy during the Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste 1981). Cf. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 180-195, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 147-161.
46. On Agadir, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Jean-Claude Allain, Agadir, 1911: Une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc [Agadir, 1911: An Imperial Crisis in Europe for the Conquest of Morocco] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976); and Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir: die deutsche Politik während der zweiten Marokkokrise 1911 [The Panther's Leap on Agadir: German Policy during the Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste 1981). Cf. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 180-195, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 147-161.
47. On Agadir, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Jean-Claude Allain, Agadir, 1911: Une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc [Agadir, 1911: An Imperial Crisis in Europe for the Conquest of Morocco] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976); and Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir: die deutsche Politik während der zweiten Marokkokrise 1911 [The Panther's Leap on Agadir: German Policy during the Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste 1981). Cf. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 180-195, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 147-161.
48. On Agadir, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Jean-Claude Allain, Agadir, 1911: Une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc [Agadir, 1911: An Imperial Crisis in Europe for the Conquest of Morocco] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976); and Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir: die deutsche Politik während der zweiten Marokkokrise 1911 [The Panther's Leap on Agadir: German Policy during the Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste 1981). Cf. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 180-195, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 147-161.
49. On Agadir, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Jean-Claude Allain, Agadir, 1911: Une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc [Agadir, 1911: An Imperial Crisis in Europe for the Conquest of Morocco] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976); and Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir: die deutsche Politik während der zweiten Marokkokrise 1911 [The Panther's Leap on Agadir: German Policy during the Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste 1981). Cf. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 180-195, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 147-161.
50. Grey to Nicolson, September 17, 1911, PRO FO/350. Lloyd George to Grey, September 1, 1911, BD, Vol. 7, doc. 642.
51. Zimmermann to chief of admiralty staff, January 26, 1912, GP, Vol. 29, doc. 10673. Stevenson, Armaments, p. 192.
52. Wilhelm II to Bethmann, August 28, 1911; Heeringen memorandum, August 31, 1911, GP, Vol. 29, docs. 10724 and 10726, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 192.
53. Gebsattel to Bavarian war ministry, September 3, 1911, KAM MKr. 41, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 194.
54. Moltke circular to frontier corps, September 1, 1911, KAM Gstb 164, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 194-195.
55. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
56. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
57. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
58. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
59. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
60. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
61. On the crisis caused by the first Balkan war, see Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, reprint (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Albertini, Origins, Vol. 1; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations during the Balkan Wars," in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds., East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1986); and Samuel R. Williamson's Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 231-260, and Herrmann, Arming, pp. 173-180.
62. An unofficial contemporary estimate calculated peacetime army strengths in 1912 (officers and men) as: Russia 1.33 million, Germany 0.65 million, France 0.61 million, Austria-Hungary 0.39 million, Italy 0.26 million, and Britain 1.19 million. Herrmann, Arming, p. 234.
63. Laguiche to French war ministry, December 16, 1912, SHA 7.N. 1478, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 237.
64. Wehrlin and Laguiche reports, December 6 and 9, 1912, SHA 7.N.1478, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 241.
65. V.I. Bovykin, Iz istorii vozniknovenniya pervoi mirovoi voiny: otnosheniya Rossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg [From the History of the Origins of the First World War: Russo-French Relations in 1912-1914] (Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1961), pp. 136-137.
66. Vladimir N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 345ff; Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the Two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 17ff; and Leonard C.F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilisation in 1914," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1974 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 254-256.
67. Vladimir N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 345ff; Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the Two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 17ff; and Leonard C.F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilisation in 1914," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1974 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 254-256.
68. Vladimir N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 345ff; Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the Two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 17ff; and Leonard C.F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilisation in 1914," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1974 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 254-256.
69. Moritz von Auffenberg-Komarów, Aus Österreichs Höhu und Niedergang: eine Lebensschilderung [From Austria's Peak and Decline: Portrayal of a Life] (Munich, Germany: Drei Masken, 1921), p. 208,
70. and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 255.
71. Berchtold in Joint Council of Ministers, October 8 and 9, 1912, HHStA 310 PA XL, and Stevenson, Armaments, p. 255.
72. Ibid., p. 256.
73. Ibid., pp. 258-259.
74. Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, 2 vols. [Leopold Count Berchtold: Noble Lord and Statesman] (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 360-365. Berchtold diary, December 20 and 27, 1912, HHStA Berchtold MSS 2, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 259-260.
75. Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, 2 vols. [Leopold Count Berchtold: Noble Lord and Statesman] (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 360-365. Berchtold diary, December 20 and 27, 1912, HHStA Berchtold MSS 2, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 259-260.
76. Stevenson, Armaments, p. 247.
77. Wenninger to von Stetten, October 25, 1912, KAM MKr. 44; Kiderlen to Pourtalès, November 23, 1912, PAAA Pourtalès MSS, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 247-248.
78. Ernst C. Helmreich, "An Unpublished Report on Austro-German Military Conversations of November 1912," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1933), pp. 197-207.
79. Kinderlen to Lichnowsky, November 26, 1912, GP, Vol. 33, doc. 12437, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 250-251 (emphasis added).
80. Documentation on the war council is printed in John C.G. Röhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: eine Dokumentation über den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912," [On the Threshold of World War: Documentation on the 'War Council' of December 8, 1912] Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1977) pp. 77-134. For conflicting interpretations, see inter alia Fischer, Illusions, chap. 5; Röhl's Die Generalprobe: Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung des 'Kriegsrates' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Dress Rehearsal: On the History and Significance of the 'War Coucil' of December 8, 1912], in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter Christian Witt, eds., Industrielle Gesellschaft und Politiches System: Beiträge zur Politischen Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift für Fritz Fischer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag .(Industrial Society and Political System: Contributions to Political Social History: Festechrift for Fritz Fischer on His Seventieth Birthday] (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); Egmont Zechlin, "Die Adriakrise und der 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Adriatic Crisis and the "War Council" of December 8, 1912], in Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegsrisiko: zur deutschen Politik im ersten Weltkrieg (War and Risk of War: On German, Policy in the First World War] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1979), pp. 113ff; and Bernd F. Schulte, "Zu der Krisenkonferenz vom 8. Dezember 1912 in Berlin" (On the Crisis Conference of December 8 1912 in Berlin], Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 102 (1982), pp. 183-197.
81. Documentation on the war council is printed in John C.G. Röhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: eine Dokumentation über den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912," [On the Threshold of World War: Documentation on the 'War Council' of December 8, 1912] Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1977) pp. 77-134. For conflicting interpretations, see inter alia Fischer, Illusions, chap. 5; Röhl's Die Generalprobe: Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung des 'Kriegsrates' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Dress Rehearsal: On the History and Significance of the 'War Coucil' of December 8, 1912], in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter Christian Witt, eds., Industrielle Gesellschaft und Politiches System: Beiträge zur Politischen Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift für Fritz Fischer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag .(Industrial Society and Political System: Contributions to Political Social History: Festechrift for Fritz Fischer on His Seventieth Birthday] (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); Egmont Zechlin, "Die Adriakrise und der 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Adriatic Crisis and the "War Council" of December 8, 1912], in Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegsrisiko: zur deutschen Politik im ersten Weltkrieg (War and Risk of War: On German, Policy in the First World War] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1979), pp. 113ff; and Bernd F. Schulte, "Zu der Krisenkonferenz vom 8. Dezember 1912 in Berlin" (On the Crisis Conference of December 8 1912 in Berlin], Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 102 (1982), pp. 183-197.
82. Documentation on the war council is printed in John C.G. Röhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: eine Dokumentation über den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912," [On the Threshold of World War: Documentation on the 'War Council' of December 8, 1912] Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1977) pp. 77-134. For conflicting interpretations, see inter alia Fischer, Illusions, chap. 5; Röhl's Die Generalprobe: Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung des 'Kriegsrates' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Dress Rehearsal: On the History and Significance of the 'War Coucil' of December 8, 1912], in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter Christian Witt, eds., Industrielle Gesellschaft und Politiches System: Beiträge zur Politischen Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift für Fritz Fischer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag .(Industrial Society and Political System: Contributions to Political Social History: Festechrift for Fritz Fischer on His Seventieth Birthday] (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); Egmont Zechlin, "Die Adriakrise und der 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Adriatic Crisis and the "War Council" of December 8, 1912], in Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegsrisiko: zur deutschen Politik im ersten Weltkrieg (War and Risk of War: On German, Policy in the First World War] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1979), pp. 113ff; and Bernd F. Schulte, "Zu der Krisenkonferenz vom 8. Dezember 1912 in Berlin" (On the Crisis Conference of December 8 1912 in Berlin], Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 102 (1982), pp. 183-197.
83. Documentation on the war council is printed in John C.G. Röhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: eine Dokumentation über den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912," [On the Threshold of World War: Documentation on the 'War Council' of December 8, 1912] Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1977) pp. 77-134. For conflicting interpretations, see inter alia Fischer, Illusions, chap. 5; Röhl's Die Generalprobe: Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung des 'Kriegsrates' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Dress Rehearsal: On the History and Significance of the 'War Coucil' of December 8, 1912], in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter Christian Witt, eds., Industrielle Gesellschaft und Politiches System: Beiträge zur Politischen Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift für Fritz Fischer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag .(Industrial Society and Political System: Contributions to Political Social History: Festechrift for Fritz Fischer on His Seventieth Birthday] (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); Egmont Zechlin, "Die Adriakrise und der 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912" [The Adriatic Crisis and the "War Council" of December 8, 1912], in Egmont Zechlin, Krieg und Kriegsrisiko: zur deutschen Politik im ersten Weltkrieg (War and Risk of War: On German, Policy in the First World War] (Düsseldorf, Germany: Droste, 1979), pp. 113ff; and Bernd F. Schulte, "Zu der Krisenkonferenz vom 8. Dezember 1912 in Berlin" (On the Crisis Conference of December 8 1912 in Berlin], Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 102 (1982), pp. 183-197.
84. For fuller discussions of the July crisis, see Albertini, Origins, Vols. 2 and 3; Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 366-408; Herrmann, Arming, chap. 7; Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization"; and Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices." Very helpful are the documents edited by Immanuel Geiss in Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 2 vols. [July Crisis and Outbreak of War, 1914] (Hanover, Germany: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1963-64),
85. For fuller discussions of the July crisis, see Albertini, Origins, Vols. 2 and 3; Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 366-408; Herrmann, Arming, chap. 7; Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization"; and Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices." Very helpful are the documents edited by Immanuel Geiss in Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 2 vols. [July Crisis and Outbreak of War, 1914] (Hanover, Germany: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1963-64),
86. For fuller discussions of the July crisis, see Albertini, Origins, Vols. 2 and 3; Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 366-408; Herrmann, Arming, chap. 7; Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization"; and Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices." Very helpful are the documents edited by Immanuel Geiss in Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 2 vols. [July Crisis and Outbreak of War, 1914] (Hanover, Germany: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1963-64),
87. For fuller discussions of the July crisis, see Albertini, Origins, Vols. 2 and 3; Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 366-408; Herrmann, Arming, chap. 7; Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization"; and Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices." Very helpful are the documents edited by Immanuel Geiss in Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 1914, 2 vols. [July Crisis and Outbreak of War, 1914] (Hanover, Germany: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1963-64),
88. also available in an abridged English edition, July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York: Norton, 1967).
89. The issue is still controversial. See Norman Stone, "Die Mobilmachung der Österreich-Ungarischen Armee 1914" [The Mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914], Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1974), pp. 67-95.
90. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (New York: Berg, 1991), pp. 298-300.
91. Bethmann's motives are disputed. See the contributions by Jack S. Levy and Marc Trachtenberg in "Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 189-194, 197-203.
92. Wenninger to Bavarian war ministry, July 29, 1914, KAM Militärische Bevollmächtiger Bd.I, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 403-404.
93. Bethmann draft telegram, July 30, 1914, DDK, Vol. 2, doc. 451, in Stevenson, Armaments, p. 403.
94. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 97.
95. This paragraph summarizes a huge body of controversial evidence. For contrasting recent assessments, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 49-57, and John C.G. Rol's chapter on Germany in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (London: University College Press, 1995).
96. This paragraph summarizes a huge body of controversial evidence. For contrasting recent assessments, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 49-57, and John C.G. Rol's chapter on Germany in Keith M. Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (London: University College Press, 1995).
97. Contribution by Christensen to "Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 194-197.
98. Text in SHA 7. N. 134.
99. Text of the regulations in Gunther Frantz, ed., Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg: der Ausbau der russischen Weltmacht und ihr Einsatz beim Kriegsausbruch [Russia's Entry into the World War: The Development of Russian World Power and Its Deployment at the Outbreak of War] (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924), pp. 55-63.
100. Bethmann to Pourtalès, July 26, 1914, DDX, Vol. 1, doc. 219, in Stevenson, Armaments, p. 400.
101. Russian foreign ministry logbook, July 30, 1914, Geiss, ed., July 1914, doc. 147 (emphasis added).
102. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 76-80.
103. On intelligence, Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Ulrich Trumpener, "War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914," Central European History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 58-85, are fundamental, and also conclude that pre-1914 intelligence was relatively accurate. 64. In 1904 there was a war scare between Austria-Hungary and Italy, in which Rome called up reservists (D1). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 83-84, 87.
104. On intelligence, Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Ulrich Trumpener, "War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914," Central European History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 58-85, are fundamental, and also conclude that pre-1914 intelligence was relatively accurate. 64. In 1904 there was a war scare between Austria-Hungary and Italy, in which Rome called up reservists (D1). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 83-84, 87.
105. On intelligence, Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence before the two World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Ulrich Trumpener, "War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914," Central European History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 58-85, are fundamental, and also conclude that pre-1914 intelligence was relatively accurate. 64. In 1904 there was a war scare between Austria-Hungary and Italy, in which Rome called up reservists (D1). See Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 83-84, 87.
106. On the psychology of risk-taking, see Avner Offer, "Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honour," Politics and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 213-241.
107. This little-known episode is known as the Urmia dispute.
108. On the von Sanders affair, see Robert J. Kerner, "The Mission of Liman von Sanders," Slavonic Review, Vol. 6, No. 16 (June 1927), pp. 12-27, No. 17 (December 1927), pp. 344-363, No. 18 (March 1928), pp. 543-560, and Vol. 7, No. 19 (June 1928), pp. 90-112.
109. Leonard C.F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilization in 1914", in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), chap. 11.
110. A common finance minister in Vienna was responsible for the Dual Monarchy's central affairs, in addition to finance ministers in the governments of the Austrian and Hungarian "halves" of Austria-Hungary.
111. On the 1913 Balkan crises, see Williamson, Austria-Hungary, pp. 135-156, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 266-278.
112. On the 1913 Balkan crises, see Williamson, Austria-Hungary, pp. 135-156, and Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 266-278.
113. Niall Ferguson, "Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War Revisited," Past and Present, No. 142 (February 1994), pp. 141-168.
114. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "The Topos of Inevitable War in Germany in the Decade before 1914," in Volker R. Berghahn and Martin Kitchen, eds., Germany in the Age of Total War (London: Croom Helm, 1981).
115. On the land arms race, see Stevenson, Armaments, chaps. 3-5, and Herrmann, Arming, chaps. 4-6.
116. On the land arms race, see Stevenson, Armaments, chaps. 3-5, and Herrmann, Arming, chaps. 4-6.
117. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107, and Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146.
118. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107, and Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146.
119. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914 (London: Thornton Ruttworth, 1923), p. 55.