Optimal commitment in monetary policy: Credibility versus flexibility

American Economic Review

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 1992, Pages 273-286

  Lohmann, Susanne ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85016721127     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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