Regulation and third-party discrimination in the German electricity supply industry

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 203-220

  Brunekreeft, Gert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Discrimination; Electricity; Regulation; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000079417     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014718416616     Document Type: Article

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