The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 79-119

  Cha, Victor D ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 9744227356     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108437857     Document Type: Article

References (154)

1. In this contribution, Asia will include both Northeast and South Asia. I will focus mostly on China, Japan, and the two Koreas in Northeast Asia; and Pakistan and India in South Asia.
2. This is admittedly less the case for China. On second-tier nuclear powers in the first nuclear age, see Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford UP 2000).
3. China remains the only power besides Russia with the ICBM capability to reach the United States and until a recent US-China non-targeting agreement (June 1998) was believed to have the majority of its long-range ICBM force of 20 missiles targeted on the US (it is believed to keep its missiles unfueled and without warheads separated).
4. The bomber leg of the triad are approximately 120 Hong-6 bombers (range of 3100km, each capable of delivering 1-3 bombs of 10KT-3MT); and 30 Qian-5A attack aircraft (range of 400 km, capable of delivering one nuclear bomb 10KT-3MT) deployed in 1965 and 1970 respectively. The sea-based leg consists of about 12 JL-1 SLBMs deployed in 1986 on one Xia-class submarine. Experts consider both the air- and sea-based legs of the triad less threatening. The bomber force is old, highly vulnerable to air defense, and incapable of reaching the US. The SLBM program has proved less successful despite the four decades of development invested in it. In addition, China is believed to possess about 150 tactical weapons made up of low-yield bombs, artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions and short-range missiles (although it does not officially acknowledge possession of tactical weapons). For a concise overview, see Robert Manning, Ronald Montaperto and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control (NY: Council on Foreign Relations 2000) pp.15-37.
5. China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. It exploded a hydrogen weapon in 1966 and began production of nuclear weapons in 1968 and thermonuclear weapons in 1974.
6. India's most capable operational missile, the Prithvi-150, has a 1000kg payload and a range of 150km, although it has tested and developed longer-range systems (e.g., Agni). Modernization plans include the acquisition of submarine-launch capabilities. India also possesses an ambitious space-launch vehicle program for which the ready availability of guidance sets and warheads give them additional recessed BM capabilities.
7. Pakistan's most capable missile, the Hatf 2, has a 500kg payload and range of 280 km, although it has test launched longer-range missiles (e.g. Ghauri). The SRBM industry includes rocket motor production and test facilities. Substantial support for the Half series has come in the past from China (M-11 equipment transfers in the early 1990s). More recently, Pakistan has concentrated its efforts on testing and development of 1300-3500km range of the Ghauri and Shaheen series largely based on transfers of the North Korean Nodong missile series (see Table 1). Neither country is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
8. Three operating reactors are under IAEA safeguards (KANUPP power reactor in Karachi, PARR I and PARR II research reactors near Islamabad) Chashma nuclear power plant also is under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan also operates un-safeguarded reactors that are capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium
9. Despite its dire material constraints, North Korea accomplished this progress largely through reverse-engineering of Scud-B missile technology acquired from the Soviet Union. North Korea's first indigenous operational missile, the Nodong series, derives from Scud technology. The Aug. 1998 test flight of the Taepodong 1 over Japan demonstrated an unexpected leap in IRBM technology (albeit a failed 3-stage payload launch). In defiance of MTCR norms and often described as the agent that could single-handedly undermine the entire regime. North Korea has been the most active producer and provider of Scud missiles and missile technology to Iran, Syria and Pakistan; concerns abound regarding future proliferation of longer-range systems (e.g., Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen series are derivative of Nodong technology). For further discussions, see Evan Medeiros, Northeast Asia in 1999: Current Threats to Nonproliferation Regimes, CNS Occasional Paper 3 (n.d.), Center for Nonproliferation Studies (see >http://cns.miss.edu/ pubs/opapers/op3/ medeiros.htm<, p.4.
10. A peaceful uses of atomic energy agreement with the Soviet Union enabled North Korea to develop a small nuclear research reactor and a basic understanding of nuclear physics, engineering, and reactor operations.
11. Concerns abound regarding possible reprocessing activities in 1989 and May-June 1994, that would have provided the DPRK with enough weapons-grade plutonium for several nuclear weapons.
12. This transfer capability largely occurs through the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium (for reactor use early in the fuel cycle), and to reprocess plutonium and/or accumulate plutonium from the spent fuel. The former material forms the core of the atom bomb (used at Hiroshima) and the latter the implosion bomb used at Nagasaki. Crude implosion bombs require no more than 10kg of plutonium, which is a fraction of what can be extracted from the spent fuel of a civilian nuclear reactor (for the general point, see Scott Sagan, 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?', International Security 21/3 (Winter 1996-97) pp.56-7).
13. For resource-poor countries in Asia, nuclear electricity is price competitive with coal-based electricity (assuming stable capital costs for plant construction). Some argue that nuclear electricity is actually cheaper than coal-based energy because coast calculations for the former include cautionary expenses related to disposal, safety, and radiation protection, while the latter do not factor in the cost of pollution and other negative externalities (see Michael May, Energy and Security in East Asia, A/PARC Working Paper (Stanford University, Jan. 1998) p.20)).
14. By contrast, the US is estimated to reduce by ten percent its nuclear energy capacity by 2010. South Korea stands out as likely to experience the largest relative increase in nuclear energy capacity in the next decade, more than doubling its current capacity (not including the additional power generation stemming from two 1000 MW reactors in North Korea as a result of the 1994 Agreed Framework implementation).
15. For further discussions, see Eiichi Katahara, 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', The Nonproliferalion Review 5/1 (Fall 1997); Selig Harrision (ed.) Japan's Nuclear Future (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1996); and 'Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Fueling Security', IGCC Policy Paper No. 35 (La Jolla, CA: IGCC 1998) pp.20-1. For more general concerns also see Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (NY: William Morrow 1996) pp.62-74.
16. For further discussions, see Eiichi Katahara, 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', The Nonproliferalion Review 5/1 (Fall 1997); Selig Harrision (ed.) Japan's Nuclear Future (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1996); and 'Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Fueling Security', IGCC Policy Paper No. 35 (La Jolla, CA: IGCC 1998) pp.20-1. For more general concerns also see Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (NY: William Morrow 1996) pp.62-74.
17. For further discussions, see Eiichi Katahara, 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', The Nonproliferalion Review 5/1 (Fall 1997); Selig Harrision (ed.) Japan's Nuclear Future (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1996); and 'Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Fueling Security', IGCC Policy Paper No. 35 (La Jolla, CA: IGCC 1998) pp.20-1. For more general concerns also see Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (NY: William Morrow 1996) pp.62-74.
18. For further discussions, see Eiichi Katahara, 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', The Nonproliferalion Review 5/1 (Fall 1997); Selig Harrision (ed.) Japan's Nuclear Future (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1996); and 'Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Fueling Security', IGCC Policy Paper No. 35 (La Jolla, CA: IGCC 1998) pp.20-1. For more general concerns also see Kent Calder, Pacific Defense (NY: William Morrow 1996) pp.62-74.
19. Regarding ballistic missiles, Japanese capabilities for ICBM arsenals deriving from their Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) program are well known, as are the normative and constitutional constraints to doing so. Gaining more recent attention have been ROK missile capabilities. These are modest based on a 1979 bilateral agreement with Washington that limited ROK missile ranges to 180km (the quid pro quo for this voluntary agreement was the transfer of US technology for the South's Nike-Hercules-2 missile). However, ROK intentions with the agreement's expiration (1999) and with the North's BM program have been for more independent development of longer-range missiles (pursuant to the DPRK Taepodong test flight in August 1998, the ROK tested a surface-to-surface missile [April 1999] demonstrating Seoul's capabilities and determination to develop a more advanced missile deterrent). US-ROK bilateral discussions center around an upgrading of ROK missile capabilities in line with MTCR guidelines, but Seoul's aspirations are for research and development of missile ranges in excess of this understanding. The South Koreans also have aspirations for an SLV program. While ROK BM capabilities are less advanced than Japan's, arguably they are also less 'recessed'. On the BM and SLV programs, see Victor Cha, 'The Economic Crisis, Strategic Culture, and the Military Modernization of South Korea', Armed Forces and Society (forthcoming).
20. See Sagan's 'security model', in Sagan (note 12); John Deutsch, 'The New Nuclear Threat', Foreign Affairs 71/41 (Fall 1992); and Goldstein (note 2).
21. See Sagan's 'security model', in Sagan (note 12); John Deutsch, 'The New Nuclear Threat', Foreign Affairs 71/41 (Fall 1992); and Goldstein (note 2).
22. Goldstein (note 2) p.57.
23. For further discussions on the relative advantages of nuclear over conventional deterrents, see Goldstein (note 2) pp.35-40, 54-5.
24. 19a. Goldstein (note 2) p.225.
25. Manning et al. (note 4) pp.15-16; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford UP 1988); Goldstein (note 2) ch.3, pp.62-7,250-1; Paul Godwin, 'China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment', Current History (Sept. 1999); and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1988).
26. Manning et al. (note 4) pp.15-16; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford UP 1988); Goldstein (note 2) ch.3, pp.62-7,250-1; Paul Godwin, 'China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment', Current History (Sept. 1999); and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1988).
27. Manning et al. (note 4) pp.15-16; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford UP 1988); Goldstein (note 2) ch.3, pp.62-7,250-1; Paul Godwin, 'China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment', Current History (Sept. 1999); and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1988).
28. Manning et al. (note 4) pp.15-16; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford UP 1988); Goldstein (note 2) ch.3, pp.62-7,250-1; Paul Godwin, 'China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment', Current History (Sept. 1999); and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1988).
29. Manning et al. (note 4) pp.15-16; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford UP 1988); Goldstein (note 2) ch.3, pp.62-7,250-1; Paul Godwin, 'China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment', Current History (Sept. 1999); and Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1988).
30. India was roundly defeated in the 1962 war over territorial disputes that remain unresolved today. As Hagerty claims, 'The national security roots of India's nuclear weapon programme lie in the 1963 [sic] defeat, and in China's 1964 nuclear explosive test. The programme's raison d'être is to deter another attack by China, which, while considered highly unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out by any future leader.' Devin Hagerty, 'South Asia's Big Bangs', Australian Journal of International Affairs 53/1 (1999) pp.20-1; Muthiah Alagappa, 'International Response to Nuclear Tests in South Asia: The Need for a New Policy Framework', Asia-Pacific Issues 38 (15 June 1998) East-West Center, p.5.
31. India was roundly defeated in the 1962 war over territorial disputes that remain unresolved today. As Hagerty claims, 'The national security roots of India's nuclear weapon programme lie in the 1963 [sic] defeat, and in China's 1964 nuclear explosive test. The programme's raison d'être is to deter another attack by China, which, while considered highly unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out by any future leader.' Devin Hagerty, 'South Asia's Big Bangs', Australian Journal of International Affairs 53/1 (1999) pp.20-1; Muthiah Alagappa, 'International Response to Nuclear Tests in South Asia: The Need for a New Policy Framework', Asia-Pacific Issues 38 (15 June 1998) East-West Center, p.5.
32. Indian requests for such guarantees were raised at the UN Disarmament Conference (and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war) as a quid pro quo for British and American efforts to halt further proliferation in the aftermath of the Chinese test. The issue came up again in 1968 when the US, UK and Soviets sought India's accession to the NPT without offering credible guarantees to non-nuclear weapons. One could attribute at least partially the delay between Indian threat perceptions in 1965 and the decision to test in 1974 to Indira Gandhi's Aug. 1971 treaty of peace with the Soviet Union which Ganguly argues has been underestimated in terms of the security guarantees provided to India by Moscow (Sumit Ganguly, 'India's Pathway to Pokhran II, International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999) pp. 153-7, 159).
33. Ganguly (note 22) pp. 162-4; Alagappa (note 21) p.7.
34. Alagappa (note 21); Sandy Gordon, 'Capping South Asia's Nuclear Programs', Asian Survey 34/7 (July 1994) pp.662-73; and Hagerty (note 21) pp.20-1.
35. Alagappa (note 21); Sandy Gordon, 'Capping South Asia's Nuclear Programs', Asian Survey 34/7 (July 1994) pp.662-73; and Hagerty (note 21) pp.20-1.
36. Alagappa (note 21); Sandy Gordon, 'Capping South Asia's Nuclear Programs', Asian Survey 34/7 (July 1994) pp.662-73; and Hagerty (note 21) pp.20-1.
37. Indian perceptions with regarding to closing windows of opportunity with passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 discussed below.
38. As Hagerty puts it, the 1971 war was for Pakistan what the 1962 war was for India. The core aim of Pakistani nuclearization from then on was to avoid a repetition of the humiliating defeat in 1971 (where Indian superior conventional capabilities enabled a successful intervention in the Pakistani civil war). See Hagerty (note 21) p.22; Samina Yasmeen, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International Determinants', Australian Journal of International Affairs 53/1 (1999) pp.43-4; also see Mohammad Aslam, Dr. A.Q. Khan and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme (Rawalpindi: Diplomat Publications 1989).
39. As Hagerty puts it, the 1971 war was for Pakistan what the 1962 war was for India. The core aim of Pakistani nuclearization from then on was to avoid a repetition of the humiliating defeat in 1971 (where Indian superior conventional capabilities enabled a successful intervention in the Pakistani civil war). See Hagerty (note 21) p.22; Samina Yasmeen, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International Determinants', Australian Journal of International Affairs 53/1 (1999) pp.43-4; also see Mohammad Aslam, Dr. A.Q. Khan and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme (Rawalpindi: Diplomat Publications 1989).
40. Proponents of this view also pointed to Secretary Albright and Undersecretary Pickering's visits to New Delhi in Oct. 1997 and Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's April 1998 visit as evidence of America's new embedding of South Asia policy in the larger Sino-American context. The US offered a variety of incentives to Islamabad not to respond to the Indian test (e.g., a high-level visit to Washington; repeal of the Pressler Amendment and release of previously suspended purchase of 28 F-16s; and $5 billion in World Bank and IMF loans over 5 years), but provided no concrete assurances against an Indian use of nuclear weapons (see Yasmeen (note 26) pp.43-4, 46; Samina Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices', International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999) pp. 180-90; and Hagerty (note 21) p.22).
41. Proponents of this view also pointed to Secretary Albright and Undersecretary Pickering's visits to New Delhi in Oct. 1997 and Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's April 1998 visit as evidence of America's new embedding of South Asia policy in the larger Sino-American context. The US offered a variety of incentives to Islamabad not to respond to the Indian test (e.g., a high-level visit to Washington; repeal of the Pressler Amendment and release of previously suspended purchase of 28 F-16s; and $5 billion in World Bank and IMF loans over 5 years), but provided no concrete assurances against an Indian use of nuclear weapons (see Yasmeen (note 26) pp.43-4, 46; Samina Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices', International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999) pp. 180-90; and Hagerty (note 21) p.22).
42. This interpretation assumes some degree of deterrence-motivation with regard to DPRK intentions. An alternative interpretation that saw DPRK intentions as aggressive and revisionist would not assign such defensive motivations to North Korea's proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. For a discussion of revisionist intentions behind North Korea's proliferation, see Victor Cha, 'Making Sense of the Black Box: Hypotheses on Strategic Doctrine and the DPRK Threat', in Samuel Kim (ed.) The North Korean System (Palgrave, forthcoming).
43. Also see Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers (Princeton UP 1998).
44. See Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford UP 2000) Ch.3.
45. On additional discussions regarding the link between the forward presence in Japan and Korea and attitudes toward the nuclear umbrella, see Narushige Michishita,'Alliances After Peace in Korea', Survival 41/3 (Fall 1999) pp.68-83.
46. The exception that proves the rule here is Japan.
47. Hagerty (note 21) pp.21-2.
48. Paul Bracken, 'Asia's Militaries and the New Nuclear Age', Current History 98/632 (Dec. 1999) pp.415-21.
49. See George Percovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (Berkeley: Univ. of California 1999); and Bracken (note 26).
50. Yasmeen (note 26) p.44.
51. For examples of such contradictions in the US Secretary of Defense Annual Report 2000 and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, see Daniel Plesch, 'Anarchy in Action: Western Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction', Global Beat (April 2000) >wwvv.nyu.edu/ globalbeat/nuclear/plesch0400.html<. Also see Hagerty (note 21) pp.27-8.
52. For examples of such contradictions in the US Secretary of Defense Annual Report 2000 and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, see Daniel Plesch, 'Anarchy in Action: Western Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction', Global Beat (April 2000) >wwvv.nyu.edu/ globalbeat/nuclear/plesch0400.html<. Also see Hagerty (note 21) pp.27-8.
53. Goldstein (note 2) pp.228, 234-5.
54. On the latter point as an impediment to Japan's leading role in nonproliferation efforts, see Eiichi Katahara, 'Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation', The Nonproliferation Review 5/1 (Fall 1997).
55. Alagappa (note 21) p.3.
56. Samina Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program', International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999) p. 185.
57. Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', Foreign Affairs 77/5 (Sept.-Oct. 1998) pp.41-52.
58. Ganguly (note 22) p. 158.
59. Hagerty (note 21) p.27-8; and Singh (note 41) p.41.
60. Such concerns prompted Prime Minister Rao to begin preparations for an Indian test at the end of 1995 on the grounds that it was 'now or never' (see Ganguly, note 22, p. 168). The test was never carried out.
61. See Victor Cha, 'Engaging North Korea Credibly', Survival 42/2 (Summer 2000) pp. 136-55.
62. These quotations come from Yasmeen (note 26) p.54. Similarly, when Pakistan realized that the implicit threat of nuclear action succeeded in deterring India from transversing the Line of Control in the 1990 Kashmir conflict, '… the success of the nuclear bluff reinforced the leadership's belief in the value of nuclear weapons both as a deterrent and as a tool of diplomatic bargaining…this became enshrined as an article of faith'. (Ahmed, note 40, pp. 189-90).
63. Yasmeen (note 26) p.44. For example, the IRBM Ghauri test in April 1998 was hailed as enabling Islamabad to negotiate with India from a position of parity and strength (p.48).
64. Sisir Gupta, 'The Indian Dilemma', in Alastair Buchan (ed.) A World of Nuclear Powers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1966) p.62, cited in Ganguly (note 22) p. 152.
65. Sisir Gupta, 'The Indian Dilemma', in Alastair Buchan (ed.) A World of Nuclear Powers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1966) p.62, cited in Ganguly (note 22) p. 152.
66. Bracken (note 33) pp.417-18.
67. Sagan (note 12).
68. Bracken (note 33) p.420.
69. Richard Belts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Calder (note 15); and Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (NY: HarperCollins 1999).
70. Richard Belts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Calder (note 15); and Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (NY: HarperCollins 1999).
71. Richard Belts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Calder (note 15); and Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (NY: HarperCollins 1999).
72. Richard Belts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993-94); Calder (note 15); and Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (NY: HarperCollins 1999).
73. See discussion in Robert Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) Ch.6. As Jervis notes, when the weapon is so powerful that the two can destroy each other, then necessarily power converts to outcomes not through military clashes but by indirect processes and subjective assessments (p. 182).
74. As Sagan notes, 'The belief that nuclear power and nuclear weapons were deeply linked to a state's position in the international system was present as early as 1951 when France's first five-year plan saw the links between nuclear weapons and France as a powerful country' (Sagan, note 12, p.78).
75. Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: the Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics and Arms Control', in Mark Hoffman (ed.) UK Arms Control in the 1990s (NY: Manchester UP 1990) p.36;
76. and Stephen Pullinger, 'A Role for UK Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War?' ISIS Briefing 41 (Jan. 1994) p.2.
77. As Hagerty observed, 'Indian leaders noted the symbolic bestowal of great-power status on China and the fact that the membership of the Security Council and the nuclear club were now identical' (Hagerty, note 21, p.21); also see for concurring arguments Lawrence Scheinman, 'Challenges in South Asia to Nonproliferation Regimes', CNS Occasional Papers 3 (n.d.). Center for Nonproliferation Studies >http://cns/miss.edu/pubs/opapers/ op3/schein.htm<. Or as another expert put it, 'Although New Delhi doublless has genuine cause for concern about China's nuclear program,… India's program is also driven by the desire for the prestige and international standing that New Delhi has observed being accorded in the international system to substantial nuclear weapons powers, including China' (Sandy Gordon, 'Capping South Asia's Nuclear Programs', Asian Survey 34/7 (July 1994) pp.666-7.
78. Cited in Strobe Talbott, 'Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia', Foreign Affairs 88/2 (March-April 1999) p. 116.
79. Yasmeen (note 26) pp.43-56, 44; Ahmed (note 40) pp. 179, 3; Gordon (note 56) p.667.
80. Goldstein (note 2) pp.271-2.
81. For related discussions, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (NY: Zed Books 1998); and Sumit Ganguly, 'Explaining India's Nuclear Policy', Current History 98/632 (Dec. 1999) pp.438-40.
82. For related discussions, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (NY: Zed Books 1998); and Sumit Ganguly, 'Explaining India's Nuclear Policy', Current History 98/632 (Dec. 1999) pp.438-40.
83. Gordon (note 56) p.669.
84. Goldstein (note 56) p.254.
85. It is granted that the sanctions against India after the 1974 test were quite severe. The US cut off all nuclear cooperation with India. The 1976 Symington amendment to the annual foreign aid bill proposed suspending economic and military assistance to countries without IAEA safeguards (Ganguly, note 22, pp.160-1).
86. Tariq Rauf, 'Learning to Live with the Bomb in South Asia: Accommodation Not Confrontation', The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Jan.-Feb. 1999) pp.14-16.
87. Yasmeen (note 26) p.50; and Ahmed (note 40) p.190. This assessment was informed by previous US one-time waivers of the Pressler amendment to sell $360m in military hardware to Pakistan.
88. Agreed Principles ; and Rauf (note 64) p.2.
89. The implications of these findings for nonproliferation regimes are discussed below. 68. See David Karl, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers', International Security 21/3 (Winter 1996-97).
90. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
91. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
92. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
93. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
94. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
95. Karl (note 68) pp.90-3. Also see Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1982); Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS 1991); Karl Kaiser, 'Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival 31/2 (March-April 1989); Steven Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993); and Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1994).
96. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United Stales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1992); Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1994); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995); and Bracken (note 52).
97. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United Stales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1992); Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1994); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995); and Bracken (note 52).
98. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United Stales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1992); Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1994); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995); and Bracken (note 52).
99. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United Stales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1992); Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1994); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995); and Bracken (note 52).
100. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United Stales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1992); Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1994); Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NY: Norton 1995); and Bracken (note 52).
101. On preemption and nuclear proliferation, see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 19-48-72 (Stanford UP 1990); Gordon Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', Journal of American History, 74/4 (March 1988); Karl (note 68) pp.966-7; Scott Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107; and William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, 'Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64', International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000-01).
102. On preemption and nuclear proliferation, see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 19-48-72 (Stanford UP 1990); Gordon Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', Journal of American History, 74/4 (March 1988); Karl (note 68) pp.966-7; Scott Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107; and William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, 'Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64', International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000-01).
103. On preemption and nuclear proliferation, see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 19-48-72 (Stanford UP 1990); Gordon Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', Journal of American History, 74/4 (March 1988); Karl (note 68) pp.966-7; Scott Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107; and William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, 'Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64', International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000-01).
104. On preemption and nuclear proliferation, see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 19-48-72 (Stanford UP 1990); Gordon Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', Journal of American History, 74/4 (March 1988); Karl (note 68) pp.966-7; Scott Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107; and William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, 'Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64', International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000-01).
105. On preemption and nuclear proliferation, see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 19-48-72 (Stanford UP 1990); Gordon Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', Journal of American History, 74/4 (March 1988); Karl (note 68) pp.966-7; Scott Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107; and William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, 'Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64', International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000-01).
106. Bracken (note 33) p.420.
107. Bracken (note 52) pp.112-13; also see Brookings Institution/Council on Foreign Relations, After the Tests: US Policy Toward India and Pakistan (NY: CFR Press 1998) pp.2-3; and Calder (note 15).
108. Bracken (note 52) pp.112-13; also see Brookings Institution/Council on Foreign Relations, After the Tests: US Policy Toward India and Pakistan (NY: CFR Press 1998) pp.2-3; and Calder (note 15).
109. Bracken (note 52) pp.112-13; also see Brookings Institution/Council on Foreign Relations, After the Tests: US Policy Toward India and Pakistan (NY: CFR Press 1998) pp.2-3; and Calder (note 15).
110. Again quoting Bracken, '… the sources of instability in Asia are ones that cannot be eliminated through hot lines and high-tech locking devices to prevent the unauthorized launch of weapons. It may be better to have these safety measures in place than not to have them, but they divert attention from the more primitive animosity that lies below the surface and can be inflamed …' (Bracken, note 33, p.420; also see Friedberg, note 52).
111. David Kang, 'Asian Bandwagons' in John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (Columbia UP 2002).
112. For critiques of ethnocentrism in the proliferation debate, see Waltz's arguments in Sagan and Waltz (note 70); Peter Feaver, Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp.754-72; and Ahmed Hashim, 'The State, Society, and the Evolution of Warfare in the Middle East', Washington Quarterly 18/4 (Autumn 1995) pp.53-76.
113. For critiques of ethnocentrism in the proliferation debate, see Waltz's arguments in Sagan and Waltz (note 70); Peter Feaver, Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp.754-72; and Ahmed Hashim, 'The State, Society, and the Evolution of Warfare in the Middle East', Washington Quarterly 18/4 (Autumn 1995) pp.53-76.
114. Thanks to Avery Goldstein for raising this point.
115. Goldstein (note 2) pp.8-9.
116. Ibid, pp.276-9.
117. See Canberra Commission, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra, Australia: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1996); and National Academy of Sciences, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington DC: National Academy Press 1997).
118. See Canberra Commission, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra, Australia: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1996); and National Academy of Sciences, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington DC: National Academy Press 1997).
119. For the classic statement, see Thomas Schellinc, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1960) Ch.9.
120. Hagerty (note 21) pp.24-6; Devin T. Hagerty, 'Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis', International Security 20/3 (Winter 1995-96) pp.79-114.
121. Hagerty (note 21) pp.24-6; Devin T. Hagerty, 'Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis', International Security 20/3 (Winter 1995-96) pp.79-114.
122. Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Security 10/1 (1985)pp.l37-63,139; also see McGeorge Bundy, 'Existential Deterrence and its Consequences', in Douglas MacLean (ed.) The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1984) pp.3-13; and Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998) p.26.
123. Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Security 10/1 (1985)pp.l37-63,139; also see McGeorge Bundy, 'Existential Deterrence and its Consequences', in Douglas MacLean (ed.) The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1984) pp.3-13; and Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998) p.26.
124. Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Security 10/1 (1985)pp.l37-63,139; also see McGeorge Bundy, 'Existential Deterrence and its Consequences', in Douglas MacLean (ed.) The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1984) pp.3-13; and Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998) p.26.
125. Goldstein (note 2) pp.44-6.
126. Hagerty (note 21) pp.23-4; Hagerty, 'Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia' (note 82).
127. Hagerty (note 21) pp.23-4; Hagerty, 'Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia' (note 82).
128. Alagappa (note 21) p.6.
129. Sumit Ganguly, 'Explaining Indian Nuclear Policy', Current History (Dec. 1999) p.440; and Yasmeen (note 26) p.49. For additional arguments on how crisis stability and strategic stability conditions deriving from first-strike uncertainty are reinforcing for India and Pakistan, see Ganguly (note 22) p. 177. For the draft nuclear doctrine, see Embassy of India website >http://www.indianembassy.org/polic…/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html<. For reaffirmations of India's minimum credible deterrent arguments, see Clinton-Vajpayee joint vision statement March 2000, 'US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century' at >http://usinfor.state.gov/regional/nea/mena/indial.htm<.
130. Sumit Ganguly, 'Explaining Indian Nuclear Policy', Current History (Dec. 1999) p.440; and Yasmeen (note 26) p.49. For additional arguments on how crisis stability and strategic stability conditions deriving from first-strike uncertainty are reinforcing for India and Pakistan, see Ganguly (note 22) p. 177. For the draft nuclear doctrine, see Embassy of India website >http://www.indianembassy.org/polic…/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html<. For reaffirmations of India's minimum credible deterrent arguments, see Clinton-Vajpayee joint vision statement March 2000, 'US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century' at >http://usinfor.state.gov/regional/nea/mena/indial.htm<.
131. Sumit Ganguly, 'Explaining Indian Nuclear Policy', Current History (Dec. 1999) p.440; and Yasmeen (note 26) p.49. For additional arguments on how crisis stability and strategic stability conditions deriving from first-strike uncertainty are reinforcing for India and Pakistan, see Ganguly (note 22) p. 177. For the draft nuclear doctrine, see Embassy of India website >http://www.indianembassy.org/polic…/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html<. For reaffirmations of India's minimum credible deterrent arguments, see Clinton-Vajpayee joint vision statement March 2000, 'US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century' at >http://usinfor.state.gov/regional/nea/mena/indial.htm<.
132. On the 1990 crisis, see Sumit Ganguly, 'Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kashmir', International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996) pp.76-107. Nevertheless, two problems sit on the horizon. First, if first-strike uncertainty and the fear of escalation stabilize conflict at the nuclear level, then instability at lower levels of violence may eventually result. On the stability-instability paradox, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1985) p.31; and Glenn Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror', in Paul Seabury (ed.) The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler 1965). Second, where existential deterrence is the most problematic potentially is with the Sino-Indian dyad. Beijing has the capabilities to inflict a high level of damage on India, although at current levels, it could not be assured of a successful first strike. However with growth in Chinese capabilities (and India's inability to develop ballistic missiles to target Chinese assets with confidence), first-strike uncertainty could be undermined.
133. On the 1990 crisis, see Sumit Ganguly, 'Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kashmir', International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996) pp.76-107. Nevertheless, two problems sit on the horizon. First, if first-strike uncertainty and the fear of escalation stabilize conflict at the nuclear level, then instability at lower levels of violence may eventually result. On the stability-instability paradox, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1985) p.31; and Glenn Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror', in Paul Seabury (ed.) The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler 1965). Second, where existential deterrence is the most problematic potentially is with the Sino-Indian dyad. Beijing has the capabilities to inflict a high level of damage on India, although at current levels, it could not be assured of a successful first strike. However with growth in Chinese capabilities (and India's inability to develop ballistic missiles to target Chinese assets with confidence), first-strike uncertainty could be undermined.
134. On the 1990 crisis, see Sumit Ganguly, 'Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kashmir', International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996) pp.76-107. Nevertheless, two problems sit on the horizon. First, if first-strike uncertainty and the fear of escalation stabilize conflict at the nuclear level, then instability at lower levels of violence may eventually result. On the stability-instability paradox, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1985) p.31; and Glenn Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror', in Paul Seabury (ed.) The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler 1965). Second, where existential deterrence is the most problematic potentially is with the Sino-Indian dyad. Beijing has the capabilities to inflict a high level of damage on India, although at current levels, it could not be assured of a successful first strike. However with growth in Chinese capabilities (and India's inability to develop ballistic missiles to target Chinese assets with confidence), first-strike uncertainty could be undermined.
135. Bruce Russett, 'The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony', in Czempiel and Rosenau (eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989) pp.177-93, 185; T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts', Journal of Conflict Resolution 39/4 (Dec. 1995) pp.696-717.
136. Bruce Russett, 'The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony', in Czempiel and Rosenau (eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989) pp.177-93, 185; T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts', Journal of Conflict Resolution 39/4 (Dec. 1995) pp.696-717.
137. Nina Tannenwald, 'The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use', International Organization 53/3 (Summer 1999) pp.433-68; and Amy Sands, The Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk', CNS Occasional Paper 3 (n.d.). Center for Nonproliferation Studies, >http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op3/sands.htm<.
138. Nina Tannenwald, 'The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use', International Organization 53/3 (Summer 1999) pp.433-68; and Amy Sands, The Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk', CNS Occasional Paper 3 (n.d.). Center for Nonproliferation Studies, >http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op3/sands.htm<.
139. Tannenwald (note 90) p.437.
140. Ganguly (note 87) p.440; and Alagappa (note 21) p.6.
141. Domestic groups who counseled against the May 1998 tests, held little sway prior to the tests (see Yasmeen, note 26).
142. Positing the conditions for nuclear rollback is beyond the scope of this study. As Sagan argues, the likelihood of rollback increases when security threats moderate and/or security guarantees are forthcoming from other interested parties. Thus, South Africa publicly disposed of its program of six disassembled weapons in 1991 after the Soviet threat in Angola and Namibia ended. Argentina and Brazil in 1990 abandoned their programs because they did no longer saw each other as threats. And Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus all gave up the arsenals they inherited from the Soviet Union because of security assurances from the US (Sagan, note 12, pp.60-2). However, as Goldstein argues, such optimistic predictions from the security model for proliferation have to be tempered by the technological considerations, i.e., as long as nuclear weapons remain the dominant technological innovation in military strategy, '[T]he presence of nuclear weapons, regardless of polarity, drives a strategic logic that weakens confidence in security as a collective good supplied through international alliances and encourages the pursuit of an independent deterrent capability as the ultimate guarantee of national security' (Goldstein, note 2, p.222).
143. Alagappa (note 21) pp.2-3.
144. China is a member of the NPT and signed the CTBT but has transferred nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. India and Pakistan are not members of NPT, CTBT, or MTCR and actively oppose some of these conventions because they see these as freezing permanent gaps in capabilities between established powers and themselves (Daniel Plesch, 'Anarchy in Action: Western Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction', Global Beat (April 2000)>www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/plesch0400.html<).
145. Sands (note 90).
146. Evan Medeiros, 'Northeast Asia in 1999: Current Threats to Nonproliferation Regimes', CNS Occasional Paper 3 (n.d.), Center for Nonproliferation Studies >http://cns.miis.edu/ pubs/opapers/op3/medeiros.htm<; Alistair lain John, 'Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control', The China Quarterly (June 1996).
147. Evan Medeiros, 'Northeast Asia in 1999: Current Threats to Nonproliferation Regimes', CNS Occasional Paper 3 (n.d.), Center for Nonproliferation Studies >http://cns.miis.edu/ pubs/opapers/op3/medeiros.htm<; Alistair lain John, 'Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control', The China Quarterly (June 1996).
148. France was dropped as a Dialogue partner in 1995 after its tests but was reinstated in 1996. Parties to the Zone are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa (Dialogue partners: Canada, China, EU, Japan, ROK, UK, US, and France). In addition, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty is even more stringent than Rarotonga, requiring negative security assurances from the NWS and extending the nuclear-free zone among the seven ASEAN members continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (no NWS have signed yet; the US and France object to the unequivocal nature of treaty's security assurances). In addition, the 1997 Almaty Declaration has called for a Central Asia NWFZ endorsed by Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. See Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes 1996-1997 (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Inst. of Int. Studies, May 1997) pp.52-60;
149. and Tariq Rauf, 'Successes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime' (8 Oct. 1999) at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, >cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/ionp/iaea.htm< pp.5-8.
150. See work by the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at Georgia Tech's Northeast Asia Cooperative Regional Security Initiative since 1992 at >http://www.cistp.gatech.edu/programs/lnwfz-nea.html<; also see the Funabashi Commission for Disarmament and Arms Control. This development might also garner Chinese support as Beijing has expressed interest in NWFZs and announced in July 1999 that it would sign the SEANWFZ protocols (which would make it the first NWS to do so).
151. Parties agree to refrain from direct or indirect actions aimed at undermining any nuclear installation or facility and agree to provide lists and descriptions of nuclear facilities and locations annually and whenever there is a change to the status quo. Both sides claim the other's lists are not complete. (See Inventory, note 99, pp.63-4).
152. Established in 1985 to promote the welfare of South Asia and collective self-reliance. In the past, proposals for South Asian nuclear weapons ban and disarmament have been raised in this venue (Pakistan in 1987).
153. >http://usinfo.state.gov.regional.new/mena/indial.htm<. Past Chinese behavior indicates that they, too, might be positively inclined to a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone. Beijing more so than the United States (because of extended deterrence commitments) has proposed multilateral NFU and NSA agreements among P-5 countries. It has a bilateral NFU with Russia (Sept. 1994); an NSA with Ukraine (Dec. 1994) and with Kazakhstan (Feb. 1995) (Jozef Goldblat, 'The State of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: Reversing Negative Trends', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 44 >www.acronym.org.uk/ 44neg.htm<).
154. In the former case, all the countries in the region have supported in principle starting Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations on the banning of further production of weapons-usable fissile material as barrier to further nuclear proliferation - in conjunction with this agreement might be the development of a comprehensive register of highly enriched uranium and plutonium stockpiles. In the latter case, membership for this new entity would consist of four current groups: the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and MTCR. Outstanding countries like the two Koreas, India, and Pakistan have committed in principle to these groups.