The political economy of privatization: Empirical evidence from transition economies

Kyklos

Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 559-586

  Opper, Sonja ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL ECONOMY; PRIVATIZATION; PROPERTY RIGHTS; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EASTERN EUROPE; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 8744280714     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00269.x     Document Type: Article

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