The question of committee bias revisited

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 431-440

  Parker, Glenn R ^a   Parker, Suzanne L ^a   Copa, Juan C ^b   Lawhorn, Mark D ^b  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744272549     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700308     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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