Distributive and partisan issues in agriculture policy in the 104th house

American Political Science Review

Volumn 95, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 911-922

  Hurwitz, Mark S ^a   Moiles, Roger J ^b   Rohde, David W ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^b GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035543625     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0003055400400092     Document Type: Article

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