The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 7, Issue , 2004, Pages 591-632

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EID: 85182200388     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/187574103x00112     Document Type: Chapter

References (179)

1. Preamble, para. 10 of the Rome Statute, reprinted in this Volume, see Annex.
2. As to the negotiation history of the relevant norms, see S.A. Williams, "Article 17", in: O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, 1999, MN 1 et seq.
3. Arts 9 (1) ICTY Statute and 8 (2) ICTR Statute.
4. Including courts, investigating authorities, prosecution and international co-operation in criminal matters, cf. I. Tallgren, "Completing the International Legal Order", Nord. J. Int'l L. 67 (1998), 107 et seq. (120).
5. M.A. Newton, "Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent With the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", Mil. L. Rev. 167 (2001), 20 et seq. (26).
6. "Complementarity" in the present context is thus understood in a "narrow" sense and does not reflect the wider complementary relationship between the Court and states in that, even where the Court exercises its jurisdiction, it will have to rely on the co-operation of national states to investigate under Part 9 of the Statue: cf. H. Duffy/ J. Huston, "Implementation of the ICC Statute: International Obligations and Constitutional Considerations", in: C. Krefi/ F. Lattanzi, The Rome Statute and Domestic Legal Orders, Vol. 1 {General Aspects and Constitutional Issues), 2000, 29 et seq.
7. To this see the article of M. Wagner in this Volume.
8. Cf. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, GAOR 51st Sess., Suppl. No. 22 (Doc. A/51/22), para. 153.
9. Cf. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, GAOR 50th Sess., Suppl. No. 22 (Doc. A/50/22), para. 29; W. Bourdon/ E. Duverger, La Cour penale internationale: Le statut de Rome, 2000, 94.
10. J.I. Charney, "International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Prosecutions", AJIL 95 (2001), 120 et seq. (120).
11. E. La Haye, "The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Controversies over the Preconditions for Exercising its Jurisdiction", NILR 46 (1999), 1 et seq. (8); B. Swart/ G. Sluiter, "The International Criminal Court and International Criminal Co-operation", in: H.A.M. von Hebel/ J.G. Lammers/ J. Schukking (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court, 1999, 91 et seq. (105).
12. 3l L. 69 (2000), 87 et seq. (96);
13. O. Solera, "Complementary jurisdiction and international criminal justice", Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 84 (2002), 145 et seq. (147).
14. Article 53 (l)(b) and Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
15. Cf. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Vol. 2, 1986,438-439.
16. J. T. Holmes, "Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC", in: A. Cassese/ P. Gaeta/ J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 2002, Vol. 1, 667 et seq. (672).
17. J. Crawford, "The drafting of the Rome Statute", in: P. Sands (ed.), From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice, 2003, 109 et seq. (147). Seen like this, the heading of article 12 of the Statute is strictly speaking a misnomer, since it does not concern the exercise of jurisdiction, but the existence of it.
18. Rule 58 (4): "The Court shall rule on any challenge or question of jurisdiction first and then on any challenge or question of admissibility".
19. The rules of interpretation codified in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are also valid under customary international law: G. Dahm/J. Delbriick/ R. Wolfrum, Volkerrecbt, 2002, 640.
20. The following discussion relates mainly to article 17 (l)(a) and (b) and the procedural scaffolding relating to these subparas; article 17 (c) and (d) operate within a somewhat different purview (see under IV. 6.). In essence, it is these two factors that are normally referred to when the "principle of complementarity" and its theoretical background are analysed.
21. Bergsmo, see note 12, 99; R.E. Fife, "The International Criminal Court - Whence It Came, Where It Goes", Nord. J. Int'l L. 69 (2000), 63 et seq. (72).
22. D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, "The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related Issues", Criminal Law Forum 10 (1999), 87 et seq. (117);
23. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Separate Opinion Judge Sidhwa, reprinted in: A. Klip/ G. Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. 1 {The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993-1998), 97 et seq. (121, para. 83).
24. This was also stressed during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Statute: Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, see note 8, para. 155.
25. Cf. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition, 1998, 289 and 303. See ibid, to the different bases on which states may exercise jurisdiction.
26. Duffy/ Huston, see note 6, 31.
27. On this question see the article of A. Seibert-Fohr, in this Volume; A. Zimmermann, "Auf dem Weg zu einem deutschen Volkerstrafgesetzbuch - Entstehung, volkerrechtlicher Rahmen und wesentliche Inhalte", ZRP 35 (2002), 97 et seq. (98);
28. M.P. Scharf, "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", Cornell Int'l L. J. 32 (1999), 507 et seq. (514 et seq.);
29. J. Dugard, "Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions", in: Cassese/ Gaeta/ Jones, see note 15, 693 et seq. (698) who concludes that international law is moving towards a duty to prosecute.
30. The Preamble may indeed recognise this by using the term "international crimes", as opposed to "crimes within the jurisdiction of the court" contained in arts 14, 15 or 53 (1). "International crimes" may thus refer to those crimes for which a duty to prosecute exists under other instruments in international law.
31. P. Kirsch, "La Cour penale internationale face a la souverainete des Etats", in: A. Cassese/ M. Delmas-Marty, Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales, 2002, 31 et seq. (34);
32. D. Sarooshi, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court", ICLQ 48 (1999), 387 et seq. (395); Duffy/ Huston, see note 6, 31.
33. J. Meifiner, Die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof nach dem Romischen Statut, 2003, 68.
34. Preamble, paras 4 and 5.
35. M. Politi, "The Establishment of an International Criminal Court at the Crossroads: Issues and Prospects After the First Session of the Preparatory Committee", Nouvelles etudes penales 13 (1999), 115 et seq. (143) (emphasis added).
36. Nsereko, see note 22, 116.
37. Fife, see note 21, who also correctly points out that this does not mean that the work of the Court may not lead to an increased protection of human rights and that the Court is not obliged to respect human rights when operating itself (67).
38. Bourdon/ Duverger, see note 9, 98.
39. See arts 10 (2) ICTY Statute and 9 (2) ICTR Statute.
40. Bourdon/ Duverger, see note 9.
41. C. Van den Wyngaert/ T. Ongena, "Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issues of Amnesty", in: Cassese/ Gaeta/Jones, see note 15, 705 et seq. (725) in relation to article 20 (3)(b).
42. ICJ, LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ILM 40 (2001), 1069 et seq. (1088, para. 77). See K. Oellers-Frahm, "Die Entscheidung des IGH im Fall LaGrand - ein Markstein in der Rechtsprechung des IGH", in: T. Marauhn (ed.), Die Rechtsstellung des Menschen im Volkerreckt, 2003, 21 et seq.
43. In this context Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, reprinted in: ILM 35 (1996), 35 et seq. (50, para. 55), where the accused was held to have standing to challenge the jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunal on the grounds that it infringed state sovereignty.
44. ICJ, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 14 February 2002, Diss Op. Van den Wyngaert, reprinted in: ILM 41 (2002), 536 et seq. (639, para. 65).
45. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, see note 9, para. 31. The availability of evidence argument normally only applies to proceedings in the state of the commission of the crime(s) in questions.
46. J.E. Alvarez, "The N e w Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences", Tex. Int'l L. J. 39 (2003-2004), 405 et seq. (437);
47. similar: O. Triffterer, "Der lange Weg zu einer internationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit", Zeitschriftfur die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 114 (2002), 321 et seq. (362).
48. See R. Wolfrum, "The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National Courts", in: Y. Dinstein/ M. Tabory, War Crimes in International Law>, 1996, 233 et seq.
49. Meaning that a presumption of inadmissibility would have to be rebutted by the Prosecutor. Such presumptions do to a certain extent exist within the different factors of article 17 (a) to (d). See under IV. 5.
50. It does, however, by its choice of words, create a presumption in favour of action at the level of states: A. Cassese, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections", EJIL 10 (1999), 144 et seq. (158).
51. B. Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, 2003, 90; Meifiner, see note 29, 70; Solera, see note 12, 165.
52. It should be mentioned, however that, where a state refrains from instituting investigative proceedings since it is clear that a (e.g. procedural) bar to such proceedings exists and initiation of such proceedings would consequently be futile under national law, this "inaction" is to be measured against article 17 (l)(b). In this case, it should be enough that the authority dealt with the matter at least in terms of considering whether to initiate proceedings. The bar to the proceedings should then be analysed under the terms of "unwillingness" and "inability". Broomhall (see note 49, 91) refers to this scenario as falling out of the scope of article 17 (l)(a) to (c) altogether and thus treats it as always admissible without any further qualifications.
53. D. Robinson, "Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court", EJIL 14 (2003), 481 et seq. (500).
54. Cf. Seibert-Fohr, see note 26; J.J. Llewellyn, "A Comment on the Complementary Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Contexts?", Dalhousie Law Journal 24 (2001), 192 et seq.; Robinson, see note 51.
55. Dahm/ Delbriick/ Wolfrum, see note 19, 1155.
56. Meifiner, see note 29, 75; C. Hall, "Article 19", in: Triffterer, see note 2, MN11.
57. It is interesting to observe that this formulation has found its way into article 1 (3) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, reprinted in: R. Dixon/ K.A.A. Khan/ R. May (eds), Archbold, International Criminal Courts, Practice, Procedure and Evidence, 2003,1182 et seq.
58. aThe Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court (Part II, Articles 11-19)", European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 6 (1998), 29 et seq. (43).
59. M. Politi, "The Rome Statute of the ICC: Rays of Light and Some Shadows", in: M. Politi/ G. Nesi (ed.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity, 2001, 7 et seq. (15).
60. C. Stahn, "Zwischen Weltfrieden und materieller Gerechtigkeit: Die Gerichtsbarkeit des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (IntStGH)", EuGRZ 25 (1998), 577 et seq. (589). L. Caflisch, "Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof: Straftatbestande, Schutz der Menschenrechte, kollektive Sicherheit", Liechtensteinische Juristen-Zeitung 24 (2003), 73 et seq. (75). The rule of exhaustion of local remedies regulates the admissibility of proceedings before international courts, be it in relation to classical proceedings of diplomatic protection or international human rights remedies. In both areas, the base of the rule is that the state having allegedly committed a breach of international (human rights) law is the first place where the individual should seek a remedy for this breach (proximity argument) and gives the state in question the opportunity to examine and, if necessary, redress, the violation before an international body deals with the matter (safeguard of sovereignty aspect). At the same time, the principle finds its limits where the implementation of quick and efficient justice or the effective and peaceful settlement of disputes take precedence over state sovereignty. The rule is consequently a manifestation of the attempt to reconcile state sovereignty with these values. It should be added that the rule, in addition to relating to procedural law, may also have a substantive aspect, see: Report of the ILC, GAOR 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (Doc. A/56/10), Chapter IV (State Responsibility),.304 et seq. (commentary on article 44).
61. Report of the ILC on the work of its 46th Sess. (2 May - 22 July 1994), GAOR 48th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (Doc. A/49/10), 44, third preambular paragraph.
62. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, see note 9, para. 41;
63. compare also Holmes, see note 15, 674; Williams, see note 2, MN 18;
64. A. Bos, "The Role of an International Criminal Court in the Light of the Principle of Complementarity", in: E. Denters/ N. Schrijver (eds), Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries, 1998, 249 et seq. (257). See however article 17 (3), which mentions "unavailability" as one example of inability.
65. Holmes, see note 15, 674.
66. P. Benvenuti, "Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal Jurisdictions", in: F. Lattanzi/ W. Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1, 1999, 21 et seq. (42).
67. 5 Max Planck UNYB 2 (1998), 169 et seq. (220, note 184).
68. Holmes, see note 15, 675; Meiftner, see note 29, 72.
69. Robinson, see note 51, 500.
70. J.T. Holmes, "The Principle of Complementarity", in: R.S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, 1999, 41 et seq. (53-54).
71. Holmes, see note 69, 54. The original order and context seems to have been "preserved" in article 20 (3)(c), where "due process" only applies to the terms "impartially" and "independently".
72. J. Gurule, "United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?" Cornell IntH L. J. 35 (2001-2002), 1 et seq. (16 (note 61) and 26). Gurule even suggests deleting the passage from the Statute (29 in fine). In relation to article 20 (3) which uses similar words, see Van den Wyngaert/ Ongena, see note 38, 725.
73. Gurule, see note 71, 26; I. Tallgren, "Article 20", in: Triffterer, see note 2, MN 29; implicitly also: O. Triffterer, "Legal and Political Implications of Domestic Ratification and Implementation Processes", in: Krefi/ Lattanzi, see note 6,1 et seq. (14 and 16).
74. W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2001, 68.
75. Gurule, see note 71, 26.
76. R.B. Philips, "The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility", Criminal Law Forum 10 (1999), 61 et seq. (79); Nsereko, see note 22,116; Meiftner, see note 29, 82.
77. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodriguez case, 29 July 1988, reprinted in: ILM 28 (1989), 291 et seq. (324, para. 166) (emphasis added).
78. As to the uncertainties generally pertaining to this question see: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Independence of the Judiciary, Administration ofJustice, Impunity, Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/43, by Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Doc. E/CN.4/1999/65, 8 February 1999, especially paras 18 et seq.
79. C. Tomuschat, "Human Rights and National Truth Commissions", in: P.R. Baehr (ed.), Innovation and Inspiration, 1999, 151 et seq. (158);
80. A. Seibert-Fohr, "The Fight against Impunity under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", Max Planck UNYB 6 (2002), 301 et seq. (312 et seq.).
81. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 578/1994 (L. de Groot v. The Netherlands), 14 July 1995, Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994.
82. See, however, the revised final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.l, para. 26.
83. European Court of Human Rights, Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, para. 107; also: D.P.&J.C. v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 10 October 2002, para. 107 (emphasis added).
84. C. Droge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europaischen Men-schenrechtskonvention, 2003, 331.
85. In relation to a possible extension to human rights infringements by private actors pursuant to article 13 ECHR cf. Droge, see above, 59.
86. Gurule, see note 71, 26. See also: S. Rosenne, "The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2 (1999), 119etseq. (131).
87. U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.
88. Cf. DeFrancia, "Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters", Va. L. R. 87 (2001), 1381 et seq. The same goes for the French version "proces equitable": A. La Rosa, "Reflexions sur l'apport du Tribunal penal international pour Pex-Yougoslavie au droit a un proces equitable", RGDIP 101 (1997), 945 et seq. In relation to fair trial before the ICTY see also: C. Hofi, "Das Recht auf ein faires Verfahren und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof fur das ehemalige Jugoslawien: Zwischen Sein und Werden", ZaoRV 62 (2002), 809 et seq.
89. B. Broomhall, "The International Criminal Court: A Checklist for National Implementation", Nouvelles etudes penales 13 (1999), 113 et seq. (145), suggests that the Court take into account "all the circumstances, including the factors taken into account in making a decision not to prosecute, and the manner in which an investigation or prosecution was being undertaken".
90. L.N. Sadat/ S.R. Carden, "The New International Criminal Court: An Un-
91. easy Revolution", Geo. L. J. 88 (2000), 381 et seq. (418).
92. Holmes, see note 15, 676; Zimmermann, see note 65, 222.
93. This, however, again raises the question of comparability of the rationale of these rules which is different from the specific situation in which article 17 operates; see the discussion on the "due process" phrase under III. l.a.
94. Similar: Holmes, see note 15, 677. Rule 51 reads: "Information provided under article 17: In considering the matters referred to in article 17, paragraph 2, and in the context of the circumstances of the case, the Court may consider, inter alia, information that the State referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, may choose to bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, or that the State has confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor that the case is being investigated or prosecuted."
95. Just as with the undue delay exception to the exhaustion of local remedies rule: C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, 1990, 205. Such peculiarities may be, inter alia, the complexity of the facts or the availability of evidence.
96. The author owes this thought to Ms. Tatjana Maikowski.
97. Report of the ILC on the work of its 46th Sess. (2 May - 22 July 1994), GAOR 48th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (Doc. A/49/10), 119. The Commission comments on draft article 42 (2)(b) which includes impartial or independent proceedings, as follows: "[PJaragraph 2(b) reflects the view that the Court should be able to try an accused if the previous criminal proceeding for the same acts was really a 'sham' proceeding, possibly even designed to shield the person from being tried by the Court." It thus seems that proceedings not impartial or independent are the generic term for "shielding", which would be a specifically severe form of partial proceedings.
98. European Court of Human Rights, Morris v. United Kingdom, App. no. 38784/97, Judgment of 26 February 2002, para. 58;
99. see N. Jayawickrama, TheJudicialApplication ofHuman RightsLaw, 2002, 514.
100. Morris v. United Kingdom, see above; European Court of Human Rights, Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. no. 22107/93, Judgment of 25 February 1997, para. 76;
101. also compare European Court of Human Rights, Castillo Algar v. Spain, App. no. 79/1997/863/1074, Judement of 28 October 1998, paras 43 et seq.
102. .
103. I. Tallgren, see note 72, MN 28; Broomhall, see note 85, 145; Meifiner, see note 29, 86.
104. M.M. El Zeidy, "The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law", Mich. J. Int'l L. 23 (2002), 869 et seq. (903); Benvenuti, see note 64, 44.
105. Zimmermann, see note 65, 220.
106. M.H. Arsanjani, "Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the ICC", in: von Hebel/ Lammers/ Schukking, see note 11, 57 et seq. (70).
107. Meifiner, see note 29, 86.
108. Since "partial" was rejected as a standard at the Rome Conference, cf. Holmes, see note 15, 677.
109. Third preambular paragraph: "where such trial procedures may not be available or ineffective" (emphasis added).
110. CF. N.J. Udombana, "So far, so fair: The local remedies rule in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights", AJIL 97 (2003), 1 et seq. (22).
111. As to a definition of the category of "ordinary crimes", see ILC Report, see note 98, 118: "The Commission understands that the term 'ordinary crimes' refers to the situation where the act has been treated as a common crime as distinct from an international crime having the special characteristics of the crimes referred to in article 20 of the Statute [crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court]".
112. L. Condorelli, "La Cour penale Internationale: Un pas de geant (pourvu qu'il soit accompli...)", RGDIP 103 (1999), 7 et seq. (21); Meifiner, see note 29, 83.
113. Prosecutor v. Tadic, see note 40, 51, para. 58.
114. See also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993, Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, reprinted in: V. Morris/ M.P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Vol. 2, 1995, 3 et seq. (15, para. 66).
115. Benvenuti, see note 64, 45; Condorelli, see note 113, 19; J. Kleffner, "The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law", Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), 86 et seq. (89). Kleffner contends that the Statute, together with subsequent state practice, imposes a duty on states to implement the substantive law of the Statute into their domestic system.
116. Different in that he only sees a political pressure, as opposed to a legal duty, on states to that effect: H. Satzger, "Das neue Volkerstrafgesetzbuch - Eine kritische Wurdigung", Neue Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht 22 (2002), 125 et. seq. (127);
117. Zimmermann, see note 26, 98, who sees an "Obliegenheit" (non-enforceable legal duty) to incorporate the crimes under article 5 into domestic law; Broomhall, see note 85, 148: no express obligation and id.,
118. see note 49, 86: only an "indirect effect on State practice"; W. Schabas, "Follow up to Rome: Preparing for the Entry Into Force of the International Criminal Court Statute", HRLJ 20 (1999), 157 et seq. (160).
119. M.A. Newton, see note 5, 70.
120. Van den Wyngaert/ Ongena, see note 38, 726.
121. Cf. Holmes, see note 69, 59, who refers to the negotiations within the Preparatory Committee, where the majority of states did not agree with the necessity to try crimes as international crimes. Tallgren, see note 72, MN 22 remarks that the notion "ordinary crimes" was rejected because it was not known to many legal systems; Newton, see note 5, 71; Meifiner, see note 29, 83.
122. Tallgren, see note 72, MN 27 gives the example of an atrocity amounting to genocide being charges as an assault.
123. Similar, Meifiner, see note 29, 83.
124. It should be noted that article 20 (3) does not envisage an "inability" option as elaborated in article 17 (3). However, the general considerations are similar.
125. Tallgren, see note 72, MN 29.
126. Meifiner, see note 29, 89.
127. Zimmermann, see note 65, 221; Meifiner, see note 29, 83; Tallgren, see note 72, MN 22.
128. See under II. 2.
129. See the example given by J.D. van der Vyver, "Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", Emory International Law Review 14 (2000), 1 et seq. (95-96).
130. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non-Bis-in-Idem, Case IT-94-1-T, 14 November 1995, reprinted in: Klip/ Sluiter, see note 22, 143 et seq.
131. This may be due to the fact that the negotiators had in mind that in case of inability there would be no judgment of a national court at all.
132. Preambular para. 4 (emphasis added).
133. L. Sadat Wexler, "A First Look at the 1998 Rome Statute for a Permanent International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, Structure and Referrals to the Court", in: M.C. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, Vol. 3, 2nd edition, 1999, 655 et seq. (677).
134. Bourdon/ Duverger, see note 9, 96.
135. Sadat Wexler, see note 139, with reference to the chapeau of article 8.
136. ccArticle 5", in: Triffterer, see note 2, MN 9.
137. Arts 18, 19 and Rules 51 to 62 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
138. Compare Holmes, see note 15, 681-682.
139. Bergsmo, see note 57; Holmes, see note 15; C. Kreft, "Romisches Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs - Vorbemerkungen", in: H. Griitzner/ P.G. Potz (eds), Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 2nd edition, 2002, Vor III 26, MN 22 et seq.; Meifiner, see note 29, 89 et. seq.
140. I.e. the Chambers of the Court.
141. Cf. Dahm/ Delbriick/ Wolfrum, see note 19, 1155; G.S. Goodwin-Gill, *Crime in International Law: Obligations Erga Omnes and the Duty to Prosecute", in: Goodwin-Gill/ S. Talmon, The Reality of International Law, Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, 1999, 199 et seq. (221); Kreft, see note 149, MN 23; Fife, see note 21, 68; Meaner, see note 29, 69.
142. Cf. Broomhall, see note 49, 88.
143. It is not applicable for Security Council referrals under article 13 (b). The duty to inform arises as soon as the Prosecutor has concluded that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under article 53 (1), or, in the case of an initiation proprio motu, when the Pre-Trial Chamber has authorised such commencement under article 15 (4), see S. Fernandez de Gurmendi/ H. Friman, "The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court", Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 (2000), 289 et seq. (295).
144. Cassese, see note 48, 159; El Zeidy, see note 103, 907; E. David, "La Cour penale Internationale: une Cour en liberte surveille?", International Law Forum du droit international 1 (1999), 20 et seq. (26); S. Rosenne, "The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2 (1999), 119 et seq. (131).
145. The question is governed by article 36 (1) and (2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which makes the coming into existence of a right dependent on the express or presumed assent of the third state in question.
146. Stahn, see note 59, 589.
147. Schabas, see note 116, 160. A particularly topical case is Belgium: see . See also National Prosecution of International Crimes from a Comparative Perspective, Project of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, .
148. Krefi, see note 149, MN 25; implicitly: G. Palmisano, "The ICC and Third States", in: Lattanzi/ Schabas, see note 64, 391 et seq. (399, note 18).
149. One may also ask what "available" information means, i.e. whether it only refers to information that is already in the possession of the Prosecutor or whether he or she has to make further inquiries. In order to give effect to the protection of state sovereignty accorded by article 18, the Prosecutor must make a reasonable effort to determine whether such links exist. This should be less onerous than to require the Prosecutor to establish whether a state has provided for universal jurisdiction under its national legal system.
150. This differs from the other criteria in that it is not per se a requirement for jurisdiction under international law; however, it has been used in national law to regulate the exercise of universal jurisdiction. For Germany, see C. Hofi/ R. Miller, "German Federal Constitutional Court and Bosnian War Crimes: Liberalizing Germany's Genocide Jurisprudence", GYIL 44 (2001), 576 et seq. (596 et seq.).
151. F. Lattanzi, "Competence de la Cour penale internationale et consentement des Etats", RGDIP 103 (1999) 425 et seq. (430-431).
152. Rule 53, from its text, applies both to States parties and non-States parties.
153. Holmes, see note 15, 683; Bourdon/ Duverger, see note 9, 106.
154. Dixon/ Khan/ May, see note 55, 30, § 2-41; Newton, see note 5, 49.
155. Holmes, see note 15, 683; Benvenuti, see note 64, 41; Cassese, see note 48, 159;
156. M.H. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", AJIL 93 (1999), 22 et seq. (28);
157. F. Hoffmeister/ S. Knoke, "Das Vorermittlungsverfahren vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof - Priifstein fur die Effektivitat der neuen Gerichtsbarkeit im Volkerstrafrecht", ZaoRV 59 (1999), 785 et seq. (798); Sadat/ Carden, see note 87,417.
158. G.H. Oosthuizen, "Some preliminary remarks on the relationship between the envisaged International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council", NILR 46 (1999) 313 et seq. (326).
159. Cf. article 16 and the ongoing discussions on the crime of aggression.
160. P. Gargiulo, "The Controversial Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council", in: Lattanzi/ Schabas, see note 64, 67 et seq. (84).
161. R.H. Lauwaars, "The Interrelationship Between United Nations Law and the Law of Other International Organizations", Mich. L. Rev. 82 (1983-1984), 1604 et seq. (1605-1606).
162. As to the situation of non-member states see generally R. Bernhardt, "Article 103", in: B. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edition, Vol. 2, 2002, 1292 et seq. (1298).
163. Cf. E. de Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and its Implications for the International Court of Justice", NILR 47 (2000), 181 et seq. (194).
164. Ibid. The question raises complex questions of the law of international institutions which are beyond the scope of this article. See also: P. Sands/ P. Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, 2001, 460 et seq.
165. Newton, see note 5, 49.
166. Oosthuizen, see note 168, 328.
167. Cassese speaks of a "presumption in favour of action at the level of states", see note 48.
168. In the context of inability, it should be noted that, even though the concept of "unavailability" of national systems may be interpreted with reference to the unavailability of domestic remedies in the exhaustion of the local remedies rule, the burden of proof still lies on the Prosecutor to show that the national system is not available, as opposed to human rights law, cf. Velasquez Rodriguez case, see note 76, 305, para. 59.
169. Holmes, see note 15, 677; Bergsmo, see note 57, 43; id., see note 12, 96; Philips, see note 75, 77; Stahn, see note 59, 589; Llewellyn, see note 52, 202.
170. Bourdon/ Duverger, see note 9, 100; Ntanda Nsereko, see note 22, 117.
171. Holmes, see note 15, 682.
172. In the light of the pacta tertiis rule, this can only apply to States parties. It is furthermore questionable whether the suspect or accused should bear the consequences of a failure of a state to comply with its obligations to inform where he or she initiates the admissibility proceedings under article 19 (l)(a).
173. H.P. Kaul, "Towards a Permanent International Criminal Court, Some Observations of a Negotiator", HRLJ 18 (1997), 169 et seq. (172).
174. , 4, last paragraph.
175. Section 28 of the German law on co-operation with the International Criminal Court. Cf. C. Kreft, "Gesetz iiber die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen StrafgerichtshoP, in: Griitzner/ Potz, see note 149, III 26, MN15.
176. Solera, see note 12, 159; Newton, see note 5, 68-69; G Seidel/ C. Stahn, "Das Statut des Weltstrafgerichtshofs, Ein Uberblick liber Entstehung, In-halt und Bedeutung", Jura 21 (1999), 14 et seq. (16). A waiver of rights is generally recognised under international law: Ch. Rousseau, Droit internationalpublic, Vol. 1, 1970, 428 et seq.
177. L.N. Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law', 2002, 125-126.
178. A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2003, 319 et seq.
179. Cf. Seibert-Fohr, see note 26, and Robinson, see note 51.