The jurisdictional régime of the international criminal court (part II, articles 11 - 19)

European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 29-47

  Bergsmo, Morten ^a  

^a ICTY   (Norway)

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EID: 84856427873     PISSN: 09289569     EISSN: 15718174     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/15718179820518601     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. See, 'Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Ceremony Held at Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court', p. 2.
2. Professor Theodor Meron thinks that 'the ad hoc tribunals and the prospects for the establishment of the ICC have had some deterrent effect on violations', See 'War Crimes Law Comes of Age', 92 American Journal of International Law (1998), p. 463.
3. See Ruth Wedgwood: 'Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court' in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6, p. 22: 'In another effort to allay US fears, the Rome treaty protects all bilateral agreements exempting US troops stationed abroad from local criminal justice systems. Terms can now be added to these 'status of forces' agreements to protect US troops from international turnovers as well.' And she continues, confidently: 'The odds are good that US partners will agree to such codicils if the matter is handled quietly'.
4. See ICTY Appeals Chamber, 'Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction', Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Tadic case), 2 October 1995, para. 36: 'the establishment of the International Tribunal falls squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41'. For a general consideration on the constitutionality of the Security Council's decision to establish the ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, See paras. 26-48.
5. This is cited from the unofficial 'Explanation of vote by India on the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, July 17, 1998' which the author obtained from the Indian delegation after its presentation, and it should thus be checked against the official United Nations transcript of the relevant session.
6. And she continued: 'Domestically, the general assumption is that enforcement is universal, i.e., that all crimes beyond the de minimis range will be prosecuted, subject to the determination by the Prosecutor that a charge is appropriate based on a preliminary examination of the facts of the case. In the international context, particularly in a system based on complementary with state jurisdiction, the discretion to prosecute is considerably larger, and the criteria upon which such Prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised are ill-defined, and complex. In my experience, based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real challenge posed to a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for international intervention, rather than to weed out weak or frivolous ones. Our experience to date suggests that we can dispose quickly of even large quantities of unsubstantial allegations. In any event, an appropriate process of vigorous internal indictment review, such as we presently have in place at the two Tribunals, confirmation by a competent judge, and the inevitable acquittal that would result from an unfounded prosecution, should alleviate any fear that an overzealous or politically-driven Prosecutor could abuse his or her powers', See 'Statement by Justice Louise Arbour to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 8 December 1997', pp. 7-8.
7. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 'Response to US Concerns Regarding the Proposal for a Proprio Motu Prosecutor', 24 June 1998, pp. 1-3.
8. See the unofficial 'Explanation of vote by India on the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, July 17, 1998', op. cit., p. 3.