The Fight against Impunity under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 6, Issue , 2002, Pages 301-344

  Seibert Fohr, Anja ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84906015188     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/18757413-00601006     Document Type: Article

References (184)

1. 2 Agreement for setting up the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945 between the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Russia, AJIL 39 (1945), Suppl., 257.
2. 3 Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides that perpetrators "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December 1948, A/RES/260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, UNTS Vol. 78 No. 1021 (hereinafter "Genocide Convention").
3. 4 The Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the Rwanda Tribunal was established by S/RES/955 (1994) of 8 November 1994.
4. 5 Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in ILM 37 (1998), 999 et seq.
5. 6 Pursuant to Article 5 para. 1 of the Rome Statute "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined by the Statute are the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, contrary to the principle of complimentarity of the Rome Statute (article 17 of the Statute), provides for concurrent jurisdiction with primacy of the International Tribunal over national courts (article 9). The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (article 3), genocide (article 4) and crimes against humanity (article 5).
6. John Bolton the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security sent a letter to the UN Secretary General on 6 May 2002 stating that "the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty", and that "[accordingly, the United States has no legal obligation arising from its signature on December 31, 2000." Available under www.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm
7. Article 12 para. 2 preconditions the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction on its acceptance by the territorial state or state of nationality. The US delegation ascertained that both the territorial state and the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrator must have accepted the Court's jurisdiction as a precondition to its exercise, Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90 (1998).
8. For a detailed account of the objections to the ICC and a reply see M. Bergsmo, "Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns about the Jurisdictional Reach of the International Criminal Court, and Their Possible Implications for the Relationship between the Court and the Security Council," Nord. J. Int'l L. 69 (2000), 87 et seq. For the objections and recent proposals by the United States in the PrepCom see R. Wedgwood, "The Irresolution of Rome", Law & Contemp. Probls 64 (2001), 193 et seq.
9. The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in its Preamble declares that punishment is an important element in the prevention of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by A/RES/2391 (XXIII) of 26 November 1968; entry into force 11 November 1970; UNTS Vol. 754 No. 10823.
10. See note 3.
11. Pursuant to Article 4 para. 1 "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law." Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature A/RES/39/46 of 10 December 1984, Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in ILM 23 (1984), 1027 et seq., (hereinafter "Torture Convention").
12. Article 6 of the Slavery Convention provides that "[t]hose of the High Contracting Parties whose laws do not at present make adequate provision for the punishment of infractions of laws and regulations enacted with a view to giving effect to the purposes of the present Convention undertake to adopt the necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be imposed in respect of such infractions", UNTS Vol. 212 No. 2861.
13. Article 3 para. 1 prescribes that certain acts, like the conveying of slaves to another country, shall be "a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties" and that "persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties", Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by E/RES/608 (XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956, UNTS Vol. 266 No. 3822. The duty to punish offenders is provided for by arts 1 and 2. Convention approved by A/RES/317 (IV) of 2 December 1949, UNTS Vol. 96 No. 1342.
14. Article IV requires domestic legislation "to punish persons guilty" of acts of apartheid. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by A/RES/3068 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973, UNTS Vol. 1015 No. 14861.
15. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, UNTS Vol. 75 No. 970; article 50 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, UNTS Vol. 75 No. 971; article 129 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, UNTS Vol. 75 No. 972; article 146 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, UNTS Vol. 75 No. 973; arts. 85, 86 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). These Articles provide in cases of international armed conflicts for a duty to enact criminal legislation and to bring perpetrators of "grave breaches" of the Conventions before domestic courts or to hand them over for trial to another State party concerned. But see article 6 para. 5 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) providing:
16. "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained."
17. Some of them are even considered to be part of customary international law. See D. F. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime", Yale L. J. 100 (1991), 2537 et seq., (2582-2595); N. Roht-Arriaza (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, 1995, 39 seq.; K. Ambos, Straflosigkeit von Menscbenrechtsverletzungen, 1997, 176 seq.
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done 16 December 1966, UNTS Vol. 999 No. 14668, ILM 6 (1967), 368 et seq.,(hereinafter ICCPR or Covenant).
19. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights there were 148 States parties to the ICCPR and 101 States parties to its First Optional Protocol as of 8 February 2002.
20. For a detailed analysis of the requirements for domestic implementation see A. Seibert-Fohr, "Domestic Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Pursuant to its article 2 para. 2", Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), 399 et seq.
21. For a description of the HRC's functions and its legal nature, see below Chapter II.
22. General Comment 20 on Article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 32, para.13. But see the analysis of C. Tomuschat, "The Duty to Prosecute International Crimes Committed by Individuals", in: H.J. Cremer, T. Giegerich, D. Richter, A. Zimmermann (Hrsg.), Tradition und Weltoffenbeit des Rechts, Festschrift fur Helmut Steinberger, 2002, 317 et seq., (322-324).
23. See M.P. Scharf, "Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?," Tex. Int'l. L. J. 31 (1996), 26 et seq.
24. E. Klein, "General Comments - Zu einem eher unbekannten Instrument des Menschenrechtsschutzes," in: J. Ibsen/ E. Schmidt-Jorzig, Recht-Staat-Gemeinwohl: Festschrift fur Dieter Rauschning, 2001, 301 et seq., (302).
25. See the Committee's views on the purpose of General Comments, Doc.
26. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.3, 2 et seq. (1997).
27. I. Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee, 1999, 300.
28. For a detailed account of the reporting system, Boerefijn, see above. This will be shown in the analytic part of this article. See also the analysis of Concluding Observations in Seibert-Fohr, see note 21.
29. According to Buergenthal the use of the word "views" in article 5 para. 4 of the Optional Protocol is designed to indicate that they are "advisory rather than obligatory in character." T. Buergenthal, "The U.N. Human Rights Committee," Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), 341 et seq., (397).
30. For a detailed outline of the communication procedure, see M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1993, 647 et seq.
31. Professor Buergenthal argues: "After all, by ratifying the Optional Protocol the States parties have recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether a state has violated a right guaranteed in the Covenant. ...A Committee determination that a state has violated a right guaranteed in the Covenant therefore enjoys a normative and institutional legitimacy that carries with it a justifiable expectation of compliance," Buergenthal, see note 30, 397.
32. Scharf, see note 24, 26; Klein, see note 25, 302.
33. Buergenthal, see note 30, 396.
34. General Comment No. 24 (52) on Reservation, HRI/GEN/l/Rev.2, 42, para. 11(1994).
35. Observations by the United States of America on General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to reservations (1995), reprinted in HRLJ 16 (1995), 422 et seq.
36. cc[t]here is a qualitative distinction between decisions judicially arrived at after full legal argument and determinations made without the benefit of a judicial process," Observations by the United Kingdom on General Comment No. 24 relating to reservations (1995), [1994-95] HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/50/40), Vol. 1, paras 1, 12, reprinted in HRLJ 16 (1995), 424 et seq.
37. Nowak, see note 31, 710; Klein, see note 25, 307.
38. Klein, see note 25, 308.
39. A/RES/56/144 of 6 February 2002, para. 13.
40. See article 28, para. 3.
41. See article 38. The Committee has adopted guidelines to enhance the independence of its members.
42. Nowak calls the Committee a "quasi-judicial organ". Nowak, see note 31, 507. For further references as to the qualification of the Human Rights Committee, see ibid., there note 4. There have been differences between members of the Committee as to its nature and purpose. See D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996, 54.
43. See article 28 para. 2. According to this provision consideration shall also "being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience."
44. To abrogate any binding effect of the Committee pronouncements would run counter to the meaning of the term decision.
45. McGoldrick, see note 43, 504.
46. 47 Doc. CCPR/C/SR.721, para. 8 (1987).
47. 48 Doc. CCPR/C/37/Add.8, para. 47 (1988).
48. 49 Doc. CCPR/C/SR.658, para. 25 (1986). For further examples see C. A. Cohn, "The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", HRQ 13 (1991), 298 et seq.
49. 50 For example, Japan changed its legislation on nationality after the Human Rights Committee's criticism that children of male Japanese enjoyed preferential treatment over children of female Japanese.
50. Communication No. 213/1986, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 Doc.
51. A/44/40), 267, 270, para. 5.3 (1989).
52. Ibid., 270, para. 5.3.
53. Ibid., 272, para. 9.3.
54. Communication No. 717/1996 (1999), Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/717/1996, para. 3.3 (1999).
55. The Committee held "that the Covenant does not provide for the right to see another person criminally prosecuted." Communication No. 213/1986, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/44/40), 267, 273, para. 11.6 (1989). See also Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 6.4 (1994); S.E. v. Argentina, Communication No. 275/1988 (1990), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/45/40), Annex X.J, para. 5.5, (1990).
56. Even if the punishment has among others the effect of furnishing satisfaction to the victim, the redress to the person injured is the objective of civil litigation. The meaning of article 14 for the right to demand prosecution needs to be distinguished from its exigencies in case of an amnesty, see below Chapter IV. l.a.
57. They further ascertained that the failure to investigate the victims' deaths amounted to a violation of article 16, i.e. a failure to recognize the victims as persons before the law. Communication No. 717/1996 (1999), Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/717/1996, paras 3.2, 3.4 (1999).
58. Docs. E/CN.4/365 (Philippines), A/C.3/L.1166 Japan). Black's Law Dictionary, 1996, 536.
59. In Mbenge v. Zaire the Committee criticized that the adverse effects of the death sentences violating arts 6 para. 2 and 14 para. 3 of the Covenant against the victim could not be deemed to have ceased and therefore held that the victim had not been provided with an effective remedy in accordance with article 2 para. 3 of the Covenant. See Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2, CCPR/C/OP/2, 76, para. 18 (1990).
60. Communication No. 213/1986, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/44/40), 273, para. 11.6. (1989). See also Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 6.4 (1994); S.E. v. Argentina, Communication No. 275/1988 (1990), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/45/40), Annex X.J., para. 5.5, (1990).
61. Communication No. 328/1988, Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988, para. 9.2 (1994).
62. Communication No. 322/1988, Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 14 (1994).
63. 64 Related duties are discussed in detail in Chapter III. 6.
64. 65 Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, para. 8.2 (1995).
65. 66 Ibid., at para. 10.
66. 67 Summary record of the 1398th Mtg.: Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1398 (1995). Another reason could be the rehabilitation of victims, which may be achieved through the prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations.
67. See Barbato v. Uruguay», Communication No. 84/1981, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/38/40), 124, (124), para. 11 (1983); Quinteros v. Uruguay', Communication No. 107/1981, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2, CCPR/C/OP/2, 138 et seq., (143), para. 15 (1983); Baboeram et al. v. Suriname, Communications Nos. 146/1983, 148 to 154/1983, ibid., 172 et seq., (176 para. 16); Miango Muiyo v. Zaire, Communication No. 194/1985, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/43/40), 218, para. 11 (1988).
68. Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 7/30 (1978), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/37/40), 130, para. 15 (1982). In Tshitenge Muteba v. Zaire the Committee was of the view that the State party was under an obligation "to punish those found guilty of torture." Communication No. 124/1982 (1983), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/39/40), 182, para. 13 (1984).
69. Isidore Kanana Tshiongo a Minanga v. Zaire, Communication No. 366/1989, Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/366/1989, para. 7 (1993).
70. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 42, para. 16 (1994).
71. Bozize v. Central African Republic, Communication No. 428/1990, Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/428/1990, para. 7 (1994); Hylton v. Jamaica, Communication No. 407/1990, Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/407/1990, para. 11.1 (1994). Concluding Observations on Mexico, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l09, para. 9 (1999).
72. Communication No. 321/1988, Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/321/1988, para. 11 (1993).
73. Communication No. 161/1983 (1987), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/43/40), 190, para. 12 (1988). See also Nqalula Mpandanjila et al v. Zaire, Communication No. 138/1983 (1986), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/41/40), 121, para. 10 (1986). In its Comments on Argentina the Committee urged the State party to fully investigate and "to take action on the findings," Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 16(1995).
74. 76 General Comment 11 on Article 20 (1983), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 12, para. 2.
75. 77 General Comment 6 on Article 6 (1982), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 6, para. 3.
76. 78 General Comment 20 on Article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 32, para. 13.
77. 79 Ibid.
78. 80 Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, para. 8.6 (1995). The punishment of extrajudicial executions was asked for by the Human Rights Committee in its Comments on Niger, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l7, para. 7 (1993).
79. 81 Comments on Nigeria, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65, para. 32 (1996). See also Comments on Senegal, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.lO, para. 5 (1992). Regarding the punishment of arbitrary deprivation of life and abusive treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, and violations of the right to a fair trial, see Comments on Yemen, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, para. 13 (1995).
80. Comments on El Salvador, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.34, para. 13 (1994). However, not every human rights violation requires criminal prosecution. For the feasible sanction see Chapter III. 4.
81. General Comment 6 on Article 7 (1982), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 7-8, para. 1.
82. Nqalula Mpandanjila et al. v. Zaire, Communication No. 138/1983 (1986), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/41/40), 121, para. 10 (1986).
83. Concluding Observations on Peru, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER, para. 9 (2000).
84. Scharf, see note 24, 26.
85. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950).
86. For a detailed analysis of the drafting history see Orentlicher, see note 18, 2569-2571.
87. An alternative ground could be seen in article 2 para. 3. So far the HRC has only once given an indication that the duty to prosecute could be derived from article 2 para. 3, that is in Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, paras 8.2, 10 (1995). For the interpretation of this provision, see above.
88. Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.56, para. 15 (1995).
89. Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 10 (1995). The cited laws were repealed in 1998.
90. Comments on Nigeria, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65, para. 32 (1996). In Rodriguez v. Uruguay the Committee noted with concern that impunity may give rise to further grave human rights violations. Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 2.4 (1994).
91. Summary records of the 1365th Mtg., Morocco, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1365, para. 54 (1994).
92. Comments on Burundi, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.41, para. 4 (1994).
93. Concluding Observations on Colombia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75, para. 42 (1997).
94. Comments on Paraguay, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.48, para. 25 (1995).
95. Comments on Yemen, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, para. 19 (1995).
96. Summary record of the 1519th Mtg., Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1519, para. 44 (1997).
97. Summary record of the 1520th Mtg., Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1520, para. 31 (1996).
98. The Human Rights Committee has derived from article 2 para. 2 the obligation to make the Covenant directly applicable, to accord to it a status superior to domestic legislation and to ensure its conformity with the Constitution. However, there is no corresponding individual right to claim a specific status of the Covenant. For a detailed account of the obligations under article 2 para. 2, see Seibert-Fohr, see note 21.
99. Orentlicher, see note 18, 2573, 2576; Scharf, see note 24, 27.
100. Comments on the Dominican Republic, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l8, para. 10 (1993).
101. 103 In its Comments on Romania the Committee criticized "that penalties prescribed by law are not commensurate with the gravity of the crimes committed. " Comments on Romania, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.30, para. 10 (1993).
102. 104 Seibert-Fohr, see note 21, 462.
103. 105 Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, para. 8.2 (1995). See also Tomuschat, see note 23, with further references in note 30 there.
104. 106 Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, para. 8.6 (1995).
105. 107 Comments on Romania, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.30, para. 15 (1993).
106. 108 Comments on Brazil, Doc. DDPR/C/79/Add.66, para. 20 (1996); Comments on Guatemala, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63, para. 26 (1996); Con-eluding Observations on Colombia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75, para. 32 (1997).
107. 109 Concluding Observations on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 9 (2000).
108. 110 Summary record of the 1397th Mtg., Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1397/Add. 1 (1995).
109. 111 Scharf, see note 24,27.
110. Comments on Morocco, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.44, D. (1994).
111. A State party is also responsible for acts committed by private parties if its failure to prevent a violation is systematic and therefore amounts to complicity or condonation.
112. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.90, 8-10, 12. Other examples for the requirement to take positive measures to protect against private interference are arts. 17, para. 2;
113. 23, 24, 26 and 27. See Nowak, see note 31, 38. Nowak, see above.
114. This is why the Human Rights Committee asks for the punishment of deprivation of life by criminal act regardless whether committed by public officials or private individuals. See General Comment 6 on article 6 (1982), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 6, para. 3.
115. In the case of Yemen the Committee criticized equally the amnesty granted to civilian and military personnel for human rights violations, Comments on Yemen, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, para. 11 (1995).
116. General Comment 20 on Article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 32, para. 13.
117. 119 See Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 7/30 (1978), HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/37/40), 130, para. 15 (1982); Barbato v. Uruguay, Communication No. 84/1981, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/38/40), 124 et seq., (124, para. 11) (1983); Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2, CCPR/C/OP/2, 138 et seq., (143, para. 15) (1983); Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, Communication No. 540/1993, Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, para. 10 (1996).
118. 120 Communication No. 328/1988, Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988, para. 10.6 (1994). See also Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, paras 12.3, 12.4 (1994).
119. 121 Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 6.3 (1994).
120. 122 For example, if other sanctions are more adequate, see Chapter III. 4.
121. 123 General Comment 20 on Article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 32, para. 14.
122. 124 HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/43/40), 190, paras 11-12 (1988).
123. 5 Comments on Senegal, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.lO, para. 5 (1992). In its General Comment No. 6 (16) concerning article 6 the Committee held it to be mandatory to establish effective facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly cases of missing and disappeared persons.
124. 126 Concluding Observations on Chile, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l04, para. 10 (1999).
125. 127 Concluding Observations on Cambodia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l08, paras 6, 10 (1999).
126. 128 Comments on Uruguay, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l9, para. 7 (1993).
127. 129 Comments on Tunisia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.43, para. 14 (1994).
128. 130 See Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 7/30 (1978), HRC Report GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/37/40), 130, para. 15 (1982); Barbato v. Uruguay, Communication No. 84/1981, HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (A/38/40), 124, para. 11 (1983); Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2, CCPR/C/OP/2, 138, 143, para. 15 (1983); Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, Communication No. 540/1993, Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, para. 10 (1996).
129. 131 Thomas v. Uruguay, Communication No. 321/1988, Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/ 321/1988, para. 11 (1993). See also Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 15 (1995).
130. 132 Summary records of the 1365th Mtg. Morocco, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1365, para. 54 (1994).
131. 133 Unfortunately this systems has not been used so far.
132. 134 The answer to the question whether an amnesty is permissible under the Covenant ultimately depends on whether one thinks that respect for human rights can be re-established by means of and despite the impunity for human rights violations. See Chapter IV. 1. b.aa.
133. 135 See e.g. Orentlicher, see note 18, 2599; Roht-Arriaza, see note 18, 57; Ambos, see note 18, 209; Tomuschat, see note 23, 343 et seq. Article 6 para. 4 provides that amnesty may be granted in case of the death penalty. However this does not require or permit a general amnesty for all serious human rights violations.
134. 136 Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 8.3 (1994).
135. Ibid., para. 8.5.
136. In its observations on the fourth periodic report of Ecuador the Committee "welcomes the information that article 23 of the Constitution prohibits the enacting of amnesty legislation or granting pardons for human rights violations; that torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions have no statute of limitations," HRC Report, GAOR Suppl. No. 40 (Doc. A/53/40), Vol. I, para. 280 (1998).
137. Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 2.2 (1994).
138. Ibid., para. 12.4. In order to ensure that victims of past human rights violations have an effective remedy the Committee recommended adopting legislation to correct the effects of Uruguay's Expiry Law in its Comments on Uruguay's third periodic report, See Comments on Uruguay, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l9, para. 11 (1993).
139. Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 10 (1995).
140. Concluding Observations on Chile, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l04, para. 7 (1999).
141. Comments on El Salvador, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.34, paras 12 et seq. (1994).
142. Mr. Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen in his Dissent, Communication No. 717/1996, Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/717/1996 Appendix (1999). See also Christine Chanet, ibid.
143. 146 Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 15 (1995).
144. 147 Comments on Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67, para. 9 (1996).
145. 148 Communication No. 540/1993, Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, para. 10 (1996).
146. 149 Concluding Observations on Colombia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.76, para. 32 (1997).
147. 150 Concluding Observations on Chile, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l04, para. 6 (1999).
148. 151 Ibid.
149. 152 Comments on Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67, para. 9 (1996). See also Comments on Yemen, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, para. 11 (1995); Comments on Paraguay, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.48, para. 9 (1995).
150. 153 Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 12.4 (1994). See also Comments on Uruguay, Doc. CCPR/C/79/ Add.19, para. 7 (1993); Comments on Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.49, para. 8 (1995).
151. 154 Summary record of the 1397th Mtg. Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1397/Add.l (1995).
152. 155 Mr. El Shafei, Mr. Ban and Mr. Bruni Celli, Summary record of the 1520th Mtg. Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1520, paras 9, 21, 54 (1996). Mr. Bruni Celli ascertained that "impunity encouraged the continued commission of human rights abuses."
153. 156 Summary record of the 1940th Mtg., Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1940, para. 51 (2001).
154. 157 Concluding Observations on Colombia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75, para. 30, 32 (1997); Comments on Guatemala, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63, para. 25 (1996).
155. 158 Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, paras 4.3, 12.4 (1994).
156. 159 This argument had been made by the State party as a justification, Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 4.3 (1994).
157. 160 Summary record of the 1519th Mtg. Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1519, para. 73 (1997).
158. 161 Comments on Guatemala, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63, para. 4 (1996).
159. 162 Comments on El Salvador, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.34, paras 7,12 (1994).
160. In its Concluding Observations on Guatemala of 2001 the Committee recommended that the State party should "[sjtrictly apply the National Reconciliation Act, which explicitly excludes crimes against humanity from amnesty." Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM, para. 12 (2001). During the consideration of Peru's third periodic report Mr. Pocar, a former member of the Committee held it very disturbing if even those guilty of crimes against humanity could be granted amnesty. Summary record of the 1519th Mtg. Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1519, para. 79 (1997). In its Concluding Observations on Cambodia the Committee recommended to bring the alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity to trial, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l08, para. 6 (1999).
161. Comments on Burundi, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.41, para. 12 (1994).
162. Comments on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46, para. 10 (1995). Accordingly, in its latest Concluding Observations on Argentina the Committee welcomed that perpetrators of the most serious human rights violations were being brought to trial, Concluding Observations on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 5 (2000).
163. Concluding Observations on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 9 (2000).
164. Concluding Observations on Croatia, Doc. CCPR/CO/71/HRV, para. 11 (2001). The Committee criticized that the exception of the Croatian Amnesty Law for "war crimes" was not defined leaving the danger that the law will be applied so as to grant impunity to persons accused of serious human rights violations.
165. 168 General Comment 20 on Article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 31, para. 15.
166. 169 Comments on Nigeria, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l7, para. 7 (1993).
167. 170 Comments on Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67, para. 22 (1996); Comments on Senegal, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.lO, para. 5 (1992).
168. 171 In its Comments on Haiti the Committee urged the State party to exclude the perpetrators of past human rights violations from the scope of the amnesty, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.49, para. 13 (1995).
169. 172 The Committee urged "to bring those alleged to have violated Covenant rights to trial," Concluding Observations on Cambodia, Doc. CCPR/C/ 79/Add.l08, paras 6, 11 (1999).
170. 173 Comments on Senegal, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.lO, para. 5 (1992).
171. 174 Concluding Observations on Chile, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l04, para. 7 (1999).
172. Concluding Observations on Chile, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l04, para. 7 (1999). See also Concluding Observations on Congo, Doc. CCPR/C/79/ Add. 118, para. 12 (2000). However, under the individual complaint procedure the Committee has been reluctant to expressly condemn the Chilean amnesty law of 1978. It avoided a statement on the compatibility of the amnesty law with the Covenant in the communication regarding the "Banos de Chihuio" incident by holding them inadmissible ratione temporis. The State party, however, had not explicitly challenged the admissibility of the communication. According to the dissent the Committee should have declared the communication admissible ratione temporis. See Communication No. 717/1996 (1999), Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/717/1996, para. 7 and Appendix (1999); see also Communication No. 718/1996 (1999), Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/718/1996/Rev.l, para. 7 (1999); Communication No. 746/1997 (1999), Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/746/1997, para. 7 (1999).
173. General Comment 20 on article 7 (1992), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.l, 31, para. 15.
174. 177 Inter-American Court H.R. Series C No. 4, para. 166 (1988). This case is not to be confused with the afore mentioned case Rodriguez v. Uruguay before the Human Rights Committee.
175. 178 Ibid, para. 181. The Court, however, did not address the legality of Honduras' amnesty laws.
176. 179 See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-93, 41 Report No. 28/92 -Argentina- paras 32-37, 40 (1992); Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-93, 154 Report No. 29/92 -Uruguay- (1992); Massacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Report No. 26/92 (1992), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-93, 83.
177. 180 Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375 against Uruguay, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1992-93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 14 Corr. 1 (1993), 154-165, para. 38.
178. Ellen Lutz argues that this may be due to political and institutional considerations of the Inter-American Commission. E. Lutz, "Responses to Amnesties by the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights", in: D.Harris/ S. Livingston (eds), The Inter- American System of Human Rights, 1998, 345 et seq., (361). According to Juliane Kokott, who analysed the evaluation of impunity under the Inter-American system, "[t]here may be situations where states have a margin of appreciation as to whether, under exceptional circumstances, the country is better served by granting an amnesty to the supporters of a past dictatorial regime." J. Kokott, "No Impunity for Human Rights Violations in the Americas," HRLJ14 (1993), 153 et seq., (156).
179. In Rodriguez v. Uruguay the Committee held an investigation and a final report imperative for the pursuit of civil remedies, Communication No. 322/1988 (1994), Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, para. 6.3 (1994).
180. Concluding Observations on Argentina, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 9 (2000); Comments on Brazil, Doc. DDPR/C/79/Add.66, para. 20 (1996); Comments on Guatemala, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63, para. 26 (1996); Concluding Observations on Colombia, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75, para. 32 (1997).
181. The essential requirements in dealing with past human rights violations were pointed out in the Committee's Comments on Haiti of 1995 where it emphasized "the importance of investigation of human rights violations, determination of individual responsibility and fair compensation for the victims." Comments on Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.49, para. 9 (1995). According to Professor Buergenthal this constitutes a retroactive ratification of the offences committed, Summary record of the 1519th Mtg. Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1519, para. 44 (1997).
182. Mr. Ban, Summary record of the 1520th Mtg. Peru, Doc. CCPR/C/ SR.1520, para. 21 (1996).
183. See Comments on Haiti, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.49, para. 10 (1995). In its Concluding Observations on Argentina the Committee recommended the removal from office of perpetrators of gross human rights violations, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 9 (2000).
184. In its Concluding Observations on Argentina the Committee welcomed the Historical Reparation Programme, the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons and the National Commission for the Right to an Identity, Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 4 (2000).