Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012

German Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 21-52

  Wendel, Mattias ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85178031086     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S207183220000170X     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., Sept. 12, 2012 (Ger.) [hereinafter ESM & Fiscal Treaty case].
2. 2 See also Daniel Thym, Des Kaisers neue Kleider, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2012), http://verfassungsblog.de/deskaisers-neue-kleider/ and Christian Tomuschat, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012, 22 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1431 (2012).
3. 3 Thomas Darnstädt, Das überforderte Gericht, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kommentar-zum-esm-urteil-das-ueberforderte-gericht-a855377.html.
4. 5 See, e.g., Cerstin Gammelin et al., Vier Szenarien zur ESM-Entscheidung, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/vier-szenarien-zum-esm-urteil-karlsruhe-spricht-europa-zittert1.1464310-2.
5. 6 If one can rely on a survey carried out on behalf of the German Press Agency (dpa) by YouGov, even a majority of German voters—54 percent—held the view that the BVerfG should issue temporary injunctions, cf. Mehrheit der Deutschen hofft auf Erfolg für Eurogegner in Karlsruhe, YouGov Deutschland (July 9, 2012), http://yougov.de/news/2012/09/07/mehrheit-der-deutschen-hofft-auf-erfolg-fur-euroge/.
6. 7 Given the fact that Germany contributes slightly more than 27% of the capital, the ESM could not have entered into force without the ratification of Germany. See Article 48 in conjunction with Annex I and II TESM.
7. 9 European Council Decision, Mar. 25, 2011, EUCO 10/11, Annex II, at 21. Technically, this is a decision within the framework of the simplified revision procedure under Article 48 (6) TEU that only enters into force once approved by all (sic) Member States of the EU in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
8. 10 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, also known as the TSCG or the “Fiscal Compact”, signed on Mar. 2, 2012 by all EU Member States except the Czech Republic and the UK, available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_ en12.pdf.
9. 11 Declaration on the European Stability Mechanism, agreed on by the Contracting Parties to the TESM, Sept. 27, 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/132615.pdf.
10. 13 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155 paras. 58–63 (Ger.) [hereinafter Maastricht case]. For an early critique, see Christian Tomuschat, Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT (EuGRZ) 489 (1993).
11. 14 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08 et al., June 30, 2009, 123 BVERFGE 267 paras. 168–183, 210 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lisbon case]; see particularly Daniel Thym, In the name of Sovereign Statehood, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1795, 1796–1797 (2009); Roland Bieber, An Association of Sovereign States, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 391, 396 (2009).
12. 15 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 et al., Sept. 7, 2011, 129 BVERGE 124 at para. 101 (Ger.) [hereinafter Greece & EFSF case] even with explicit reference to the critique. For this particular aspect, see Matthias Ruffert, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht, 46 EUROPARECHT 842, 844–845 (2011).
13. 17 See already Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No 2 BvQ 1/73, June 4, 1973, 35 BVERFGE 193, 196 f. [Basic Treaty case]. Cf. Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 1432.
14. 19 This is a circumstance to be avoided particularly when a violation of the key principles protected by the eternity clause of Article 79 (3) of the German Basic Law is in question.
15. 21 See Alexander Lorz and Heiko Sauer, Ersatzunionsrecht und Grundgesetz, 65 DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 573, 575 (2012).
16. 22 On the transnational dimension of the national EU-related case law, see Mattias Wendel, Comparative Reasoning and the Making of a Common Constitutional Law—The Europe-Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in a Transnational Perspective, I-CON (2013), forthcoming.
17. 23 Cf. the legal opinion of the German Federal Government, summarized in ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 169.
18. 24 Christoph Herrmann, Griechische Tragödie—der währungsverfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für die Rettung, den Austritt oder den Ausschluss von überschuldeten Staaten aus der Eurozone, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 413, 415–416 (2010); Ulrich Häde, Die europäische Währungsunion in der internationalen Finanzkrise—An den Grenzen europäischer Solidarität?, EUROPARECHT 854, 859–860 (2010); Christian Calliess, Perspektiven des Euro zwischen Solidarität und Recht—Eine rechtliche Analyse der Griechenlandhilfe und des Rettungsschirms, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 270–274 (2011).
19. 25 Distinctly Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1613, 1629–1630 (2012).
20. 28 Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, Nov. 27, 2012 (not yet reported), paras. 45–76, 129–147, 184–185, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0370&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Lukas Oberndorfer, Fiskalvertrag und Unionsrecht, 66 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 9 (2013); Martin Nettesheim, Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus 66 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 14 (2013).
21. 34 While the TESM entered into force on 27 September 2012 with the deposition of the German ratification certificate, the amendment of Article 136(3) TFEU has not yet entered into force (as of Nov. 27, 2012).
22. 41 Cf. Christian Calliess and Christopher Schoenfleisch, Wie das ESM-Urteil umgesetzt werden kann, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2012), http://verfassungsblog.de/wie-das-esmurteil-umgesetzt-werden-kann.
23. 45 This cannot be dealt with in detail here. For further discussion see the comments of Matthias Ruffert, Ulrich Karpenstein and Oliver Sauer to Calliess & Schoenfleisch (note 41) and Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 1432.
24. 47 VCLT. See also the definition in the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (2011), at point 1.1 (“certain provisions of the treaty”).
25. 49 Cf. the comment of Ulrich Karpenstein to Calliess & Schoenfleisch, supra note 41 and Frank Schorkopf, “Startet die Maschinen”, 31 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 1273, 1275 (2012).
26. 50 On this criterion, see Malcolm N. Shaw and Caroline Fournet, Article 62, in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II paras. 4–5, 25–26 and 35 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, eds., 2011).
27. 51 For a critical assessment, see INGOLF PERNICE ET AL., A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS 100–103 (2012). For an in-depth analysis cf. Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, 37 E.L. Rev. 231 (2012).
28. 55 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 311 (DE, not translated into EN), referencing para. 32 of the French Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 54.
29. 61 See particularly the criticism by Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!”, 10 GERMAN L. J. 1241, 1249–1250 (2009);
30. Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea, 10 GERMAN L. J. 1201, 1208–1209 (2009); Martin Nettesheim, Die Karlsruher Verkündigung, EUROPARECHT-BEIHEFT 101, 112 et seq. (2010).
31. 62 See MATTIAS WENDEL, PERMEABILITÄT IM EUROPÄISCHEN VERFASSUNGSRECHT 85–91 (2011).
32. 71 In detail Mattias Wendel, Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 7 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 96, 114–120 (2011).
33. 79 See particularly Markus Kotzur, Demokratie als Wettbewerbsordnung, 69 VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 173, 192–193 (2010).
34. 81 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 4/11, June 19, 2012, 31 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 954 (2012), paras. 94 et seq., 107 (Ger.) [hereinafter ESM & Euro Plus Pact case].
35. 84 However the Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union [EUZBBG - Law on Cooperation Between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters Concerning the European Union], available at http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a21/legalbasis/euzbbg.html, was previously changed.
36. 85 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 280–299. (DE, not translated into EN).
37. 90 The concept of parliamentary responsibility was, from the beginning, connected to the possibility of constitutional review, cf., expressly, Lisbon case, supra note 14, at para. 236.
38. 99 However, see the Court of Justice, Pringle case, supra note 28, at para. 95, arguing that “the activities of the ESM do not fall within the monetary policy . . . .”
39. 110 Id. at paras. 133–153. On 27 October 2011, the Court had already issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the exercise of the Bundestag’s competences by the Sondergremium until the issuing of a decision in the main proceedings.
40. 119 The best translation would probably be “margin of appreciation.” However, as this term is specifically associated with the doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it shall not be used in this context.