A Praxeology for Rational Negotiation

AAAI Fall Symposium - Technical Report

Volumn FS-01-03, Issue , 2001, Pages 79-88

  Stirling, Wynn C ^a   Moon, Todd K ^b  

^a Brigham Young University   (United States)

^b Utah State University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKERS; MULTI AGENT; PRAXEOLOGIES; RATIONAL NEGOTIATION; SATISFICING;

EID: 85169820661     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (55)

1. Axelrod, R. 1997. The Complexityof Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
2. Bergson, A. 1938. A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 52:310-334.
3. Cohen,P., and Levesque,H. 1990. Intention is choice with commitment. Artificial Intelligence 42:262-310.
4. Cohen,P.; Morgan,J.; and Pollack, M.E., eds. 1990. Intentions in Communication.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.
5. Durfee, E. H., and Lesser, V. R. 1989. Negotiatingtask decompositionand allocation using partial global planning. In Gasser, L., and Huhns,M. N., eds., Distributed Artificial Intelligence, volumeII. London:Pitman/MortanKaufmann. 229-244.
6. Ephrati, E., and Rosenschein, J. S. 1996. Deriving consensus in multiagentsystems. Artificial Intelligence 87(1-2):21-74.
7. Goodrich,M. A.; Stirling, W.C.; and Frost, R. L. 1998. Atheory of satisficing decision andcontrol. IEEETrans. Systems, Man,Cybernet. 28(6):763-779.
8. Kaufman,B. E. 1990. A new theory of satisficing. The Journal of Behavorial Economics19(1):35-51.
9. Krans, S., and Lchmann,D. 1999. Knowledge,belief and time. Theoretical ComputerScience 58:155-174.
10. Kraus, S., and Wilkenfeld, J. 1991a. The function of time in cooperative negotiations. In Proceedingsof AAAI-91, 179-184.
11. Kraus, S., and Wilkenfeld, J. 1991b. Negotiations over time in a mutiagent environment. In ProceedingsoflJCA1-91, 56-61.
12. Kraus, S., and Wilkenfeld, J. 1993. A strategic negotiations modelwith applications to an international crisis. IEEETransactions on Systems, Man,and Cybernetics 32(1):313-323.
13. Kraus, S.; Sycara, K.; and Evenchik, A. 1998. Reaching agreementsthourh argumentation: a logical modeland implementation. Artificial Intelligence Journal 104(1-2):1-69.
14. Kraus, S.; Wilkenfeld,J.; and Zlotkin, G. 1995. Multiagent negotiation undertime constraints. Artificial Intelligence 75(2):297-345.
15. Kraus, S. 1996. Beliefs, time and incomplete information in multiple encounter negotiations amongautonomous agents. Annalsof MathematicsandArtificial Intelligence 20(1-4): 111-159.
16. Kreps, D.M. 1990. GameTheory and Economic Mod-elling. Oxford:ClarendonPress.
17. Levi, I. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge.Cambridge, MA:MITPress.
18. Lewis, M., and Sycara, K. 1993. Reachinginformed agreement in multi-specialist cooperation. GroupDecision and Negotiation 2(3):279-300.
19. Luce, R. D., and Ralffa, H. 1957. Gamesand Decisions. NewYork: John Wiley.
20. Moon,T. K., and Stirling, W. C. 2001. Satisficing negotiation for resource allocation with disputed resources. In AAAI Symposiusm on Negotiation Methods for AutonomousCooperative Systems. (submitted).
21. Mullen, T., and Wellman, M. 1995. A simple computational marketfor networkinformation services. In Proc. of the First International Conferenceon Multiagent Systems, 283-289.
22. Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. 1994. Arational analysis of the selection task as optimaldata selection. Psychological Review101:608-631.
23. Pearce, D.W. 1983. Cost-Benefit Analysis. London: Macmillan,secondedition.
24. Raiffa, H. 1968. Decision Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
25. Rosenschein,J., andZlotkin, G. 1994. Rulesof Encounter. Cambridge, MA:MITPress.
26. Rubenstein, A. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1):97-109.
27. Russell, S., and Wefald, E. 1991. Principles of metareasoning. Artificial Intelligence 49:361-395.
28. Samuelson,P. A. 1948. Foundationsof EconomicAnalysis. Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press.
29. Sandholm, T., and Lesser, V. 1997. Coalitions among computationally boundedagents. Artificial Intelligence 94(1):99-137.
30. Sandholm,T. W.1999. Distributed rational decision making. In Weiss, G., ed., Multiagent Systems. Cambridge, MA:MITPress. chapter 5,201-258.
31. Sen, A. K. 1979. Collective Choiceand Social Welfare. Amsterdam:North-Holland.
32. Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. 1984. Involuntary unemploymentas a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica52(6): 1351-1364.
33. Shoham,Y. 1993. Agentoriented programming.Artificial Intelligence60(1): 51-92.
34. Shubik, M. 1982. GameTheory in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA:MITPress.
35. Simon,H. A. 1955. A behavioral modelof rational choice. Quart. J. Econ. 59:99-118.
36. Simon, H.A. 1990. Invariants of human behavior. Annu.Rev. Psychol. 41:1-19.
37. Simon, H. A. 1996. The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA:MITPress, third edition.
38. Slote, M. 1989. Beyond Optimizing. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniv. Press.
39. Stahl, I. 1977. Ann-person bargaining gamein an extensive form. In Henn, R., and Moeschlin, O., eds., Lecture Notes in Economicsand Mathematical Systems No. 141. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
40. Stirling, W. C., and Goodrich, M.A. 1999. Satisficing games. Information Sciences 114:255-280.
41. Stirling, W.C., and Morrell, D. R. 1991. Convexbayes decision theory. IEEETrans. Systems, Man, Cybernet. 21(1):173-183.
42. Stirling, W.C.; Goodrich,M.A.; and Packard, D.J. 2001. Satisficing equilibria: Anon-classical approachto games and decisions. AutonomousAgents and Multi-Agent Systems Journal. Forthcoming.
43. Sycara, K. 1990. Persuasive argumentationin negotiation. Theory and Decision 28:203-242.
44. Sycara, K. 1991. Problem restructuring in negotiation. Management Science 37(10): 1248-1268.
45. Thomas, B.; Shoham, Y.; Schwartz, A.; and Kraus, S. 1991. Preliminary thoughts on an agent description lauguage. International Journal of Intelligent Systems 6(5):497-508.
46. Wangermann, J. P., and Stengel, R. F. 1999. Optimization and coordination of multiagent systems using principled negotiation. J. Guidance, Control, and Dynamics 22(1):43-50.
47. Weibull, J. W.1995. Evolutionary GameTheory. Cambridge, MA:MITPress.
48. Wellman,M., and Doyle, J. 1991. Preferential semantics for goals. In Proceedingsof AAAI-91,698-703.
49. Wellman,M. 1993. A market-oriented programmingenvironmentand its application to distributed multicommodity flow problems.Journalof Artificial Intelligence Research 1:1-23.
50. Zeng, D., and Sycara, K. 1997. Benefits of learning in negotiation. In Proceedingsof AAAI-97,36-41.
51. Zeng, D., and Sycara, K. 1998. Bayesian learning in negotiation. In Int J. HumanComputerSystems, volume48, 125-141.
52. Zilberstein, S. 1998. Satisficing and boundedoptimality. In Proceedings of the 1998 AAAI Symposium, 91-94. March 23-25, Stanford California. Technical Report SS-98-05.
53. Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. S. 1996a. Compromise in negotiation: Exploiting worthfunctions over states. Artificial Intelligence 84(1-2): 151-176.
54. Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. S. 1996b. Mechanism design for automatednegotiation and its application to task oriented domains.Artificial Intelligence 86(2): 195-244.
55. Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein,J. S. 1996c. Mechanisms for automatednegotiation in state oriented domains. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research5:163-238.