Market-Augmenting Government: How, Why, and When States Support Markets

Market-Augmenting Government: The Institutional Foundations for Prosperity

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-24

  Azfar, Omar ^a   Cadwell, Charles A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85164997464     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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