The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant –Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 10, Issue , 2006, Pages 423-463

  Al Ali, Philipp Dannl Zaid ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85130795952     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/187574106x00100     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. R. Wolfrum, “International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations and Other International Actors”, Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 649 et seq.;
2. S. Chesterman, You, the People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, 2004.
3. A. von Bogdandy et al., “State-Building, Nation-Building and Constitutional Politics of Post-Conflict Situations”, Max Planck UNYB 9, see note 1, 579 et seq.
4. C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 2001.
5. N. Feldmann, “Imposed Constitutionalism”, Connecticut Law Review 37 (2004/5), 857 et seq.;
6. M. Sunder, “Enlightened Constitutionalism”, Connecticut Law Review 37 (2004/5), 891 et seq.
7. On the notion of the pouvoir constituant, see under Part I.1.
8. C. Möllers, “Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution – Constitutionalisation”, in: A. von Bogdandy/ J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2006, 183 et seq. (184-191);
9. H. Ahrendt, On Revolution, 1963;
10. H. Vorländer, Die Verfassung, 1999, 211/212.
11. This tradition is based on the examples of French and U.S. American history.
12. British and German history provides examples for this second tradition and concept.
13. Abbé Sieyes, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?, 1789;
14. E.W. Böckenförde, “Die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes”, in: E.W. Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 1992, 91 et seq. (93-98);
15. B. Ackerman, We, the People, 1991; also E. Zweig, Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constituant, 1905.
16. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 1928, 84-87;
17. A. Arato, “Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy”, Cardozo Law Review 17 (1995), 191 et seq.;
18. H. von Wedel, Das Verfahren der demokratischen Verfassungsgebung, 1976.
19. S.E. Finer, The History of Government, Vol. 3, 1997, 1503;
20. U. Preuß, Revolution, Fortschritt und Verfassung, 1994, 21-22.
21. N. Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft, 1993, 474-476;
22. R. Wahl, “Der Vorrang der Verfassung”, in: R. Wahl, Verfassungsstaat, Europäisierung, Internationalisierung, 2003, 121 et seq.
23. Böckenförde, see note 9, 99.
24. See for an early analysis, K. Löwenstein, Political Reconstruction, 1946;
25. more generally F. Schauer, “On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas”, Connecticut Law Review 37 (2004), 901 et seq.
26. Wolfrum, see note 1, 675-678.
27. B.O. Bryde, “Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts”, Der Staat 2003, 61 et seq.
28. H. Steiner/ P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context, 2nd edition 2000, 987 et seq.;
29. T. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, AJIL 86 (1992), 46 et seq., on the twin development of a constitutionalization of international law see J.A. Frowein, “Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts”, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 39 (2000), 421 et seq.;
30. C. Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance, GYIL 44 (2001), 170 et seq.;
31. B. Fassbender, “The U.N. Charter as a Constitution”, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 36 (1998), 530 et seq. (574-576).
32. K. Oellers-Frahm, “Reconstructing Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-falls”, Max Planck UNYB 9, see note 1, 179 et seq.;
33. S. Yee, “The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, EJIL 7 (1996), 176 et seq.
34. R. Spitz, The Politics of Transition: a hidden history of South Africa’s negotiated settlement, 2000;
35. also D.M. Davis, “Constitutional Borrowing: the influence of legal culture and local history in the reconstitution of comparative influence: the experience of South-Africa”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003), 181 et seq.
36. J. Elster, “Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe”, Public Administration 71 (1993), 169 et seq. (192-193). This is not to say that such influences are not organized and that constitutional assemblies are not lobbied by external actors (like the Venice Group). However, it is decisive that the ultimate control over process and substance remains in national hands.
37. For the example of India, G. Austin, The Indian Constitution, 1966, 321-323;
38. in a more general perspective Schauer, see note 14; L. Epstein/ J. Knight, “Constitutional borrowing and nonborrowing”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003), 196 et seq. and the other contribution in that volume.
39. For a concise analysis of the historical background as well as the international intervention see M. Benzing, “Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor”, Max Planck UNYB 9, see note 1, 295 et seq. (302-305).
40. J. Morrow/ R. White, “The UN in Transitional East Timor: International Standards and the Reality of Governance”, Austr. Yb. Int’l L. 22 (2002), 1 et seq.; Chesterman, see note 1, 60-64 with further references.
41. S/RES/1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, para. 1.
42. UNTAET/REG/1999/1 of 27 November 1999.
43. On the constitutional process Benzing, see note 22, 363-365;
44. Morrow/ White, see note 23, 33-43.
45. UNTAET/REG/2001/2 of 16 March 2001, available at: ;
46. on the internal discussions, Morrow/ White, see note 23, 34-36.
47. UNTAET/REG/2001/2 was complemented by UNTAET/REG/2001/11 of 13 July 2001, which defined the rules of electoral offences and thus aimed to ensure the free, fair, safe and secret ballot.
48. Morrow/ White, see note 23, 36-39.
49. See also Section 5 and the detailed regulations for the elections.
50. Chesterman, see note 1, 216.
51. UNTAET/Dir/2001/3 of 30 March 2001, Directive on the Establishment of District Constitutional Commissions.
52. Benzing, see note 22, 365;
53. Morrow/ White, see note 23, 40-42;
54. Chesterman, see note 1, 140-142.
55. Morrow/ White, see note 23, 37/38, Footnote 155.
56. Morrow/ White, see note 23, 41.
57. See H. Charlesworth, “The Constitution of East Timor”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003), 325 et seq. (327/328);
58. also Chesterman, see note 1, 141/142.
59. ‘Draft constitution gained, but an important opportunity was lost’, United States Institute of Peace, October 2005, available at: .
60. See generally, R. Wolfrum, “Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 1, 1 et seq.
61. S/RES/1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003.
62. L.E. Halchin, “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities”, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 6 June 2005, 5, available at: .
63. L. Diamond, Squandered Victory, 2005, 41.
64. Feldman, see note 4, 857, footnote 2.
65. See The Political Transition in Iraq: Report of the Fact-finding Mission, United Nations Security Council, 23 February 2004, Doc. S/2004/140 available at: .
66. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004, available at: .
67. ‘Overview: The Governing Council’, BBC News, available at: .
68. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, see note 44.
69. Diamond, see note 41, 177.
70. S/RES/1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004.
71. ‘President Bush discusses early transfer of Iraqi sovereignty’, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 28 June 2004, available at: .
72. ‘Shia majority for Iraq parliament’, BBC News, available at: .
73. ‘Parliament, Sunnis reach deal on Iraq’s constitutional process’, USA Today, available at: .
74. “The constitutional committee starts with the Sunni members ‘from zero’ – Attacks are driving away diplomats from Iraq”, Al-Safir, 6 July 2005.
75. Interview with Khalid Ahmed, Legal Officer, Office of Constitutional Support, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 18 November 2005 (according to whom there were at least three officials from the U.S. embassy that were directly implicated in drafting particular provisions); ‘Draft constitution gained, but an important opportunity was lost’, see note 37.
76. See, for example, ‘President Welcomes Iraqi Prime Minister Jaafari to the White House’, The White House, June 24, 2005, available at: .
77. Representatives of the Sunni community complained that they were excluded from the negotiations and that they were not being made aware of the substance of the discussions, which caused them to officially withdraw from the negotiations on 28 August 2005 (see International Crisis Group, “Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry”, Middle East Briefing, Number 19, 26 September 2005, 4, available at: );
78. number of other Constitutional Committee Members also expressed their bewilderment that the negotiations were proceeding in a secretive and restrictive manner (see International Crisis Group, ibid., 3).
79. See also International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Don’t rush the constitution”, Middle East Report, Number 42, 8 June 2005, 7.
80. See Z. Al-Ali, Iraq: A Constitution to Nowhere, OpenDemocracy, 14 October 2005, available at: .
81. L. Baker/ M. Georgy, “US concedes ground to Islamists on Iraqi law”, Reuters, 20 August 2005, available at: .
82. The article that was eliminated provided that: “All individuals shall have the right to enjoy all the rights mentioned in the international treaties and agreements concerned with human rights that Iraq has ratified and that do not contradict with the principles and provisions of this constitution”.
83. Z. Al-Ali, The Evolution of the Iraqi Constitution – From the Constitutional Committee to the Leadership Council, 2007 (forthcoming).
84. D. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s civil wars, 2003; International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic the War in Sudan, 2002, 3-33 (available at: ).
85. A. el-Gaili, “Federalism and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic Federalism in Sudan”, Harv. Int’l L. J. 45 (2004), 503 et seq. (531);
86. on the background briefly A. Loyd, “The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession”, Colum. J. Transnat’ L. 32 (1994), 448 et seq. and extensively L. Lauro /P. Samuelson, “Toward Pluralism in Sudan”, Harv. Int’l L. J. 37 (1996), 65 et seq. and A. El-Affendi, Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, 1991.
87. B. Kuol Deng, “The Legal Implications of the Sudan Peace Process”, in: K.G. Adar (ed.), Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, 2004, 102 et seq. (103).
88. International Crisis Group, see note 61, 153-177; H. Elliesie, “Quo vadis Bilad as-Sudan? The Contemporary Framework for a National Interim Constitution”, Recht in Afrika 2005, 63 et seq. (64/65).
89. It is available at:
90. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 and superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which had been founded in 1986. Members of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea. For further information, see under .
91. On IGAD’s role, International Crisis Group, see note 61, 155-160.
92. Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, US President Bush sent a Special Envoy (Senator John C. Danforth) to the Sudan in order to bring the negotiations back on track, see International Crisis Group, “Sudan, Capturing the Moment”, Africa Report No. 42, 3 April 2002; also E. Rogier, “No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace”, Security Working Paper No. 1, Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005, 45-57.
93. See Joint Communiqué Issued on the First Session of the Political Committee Task Force for Sudan, available at: ), on this declaration, International Crisis Group, see note 61, 155.
94. Kuol Deng, see note 63, 103/104.
95. A. Al-Madhi, “The Peace Agreement of January 2005 and the draft Constitution of May 2005”, available at: ; also A.M. Flacks, “Sudan’s Transitional Constitution”, The Journal of International Policy Solutions 3 (2005), 8 et seq.
96. F.A. Kornegay, “Regional and International Implications of the Sudanese Peace Agreement”, in: K.G. Adar (ed.), Sudan Peace Process, 2004, 58 et seq.
97. These countries are Members of the IGAD Partners Forum, which is a consortium of western countries interested in supporting IGAD and its regional efforts.
98. For details on the Sudan Peace Project on this so-called Heidelberg Dialogue, see under: .
99. Interview with Nicholas Haysom, Process Adviser to the IGAD Facilitator, 14 June 2006 (Madrid, Spain).
100. Interview with N. Haysom, see note 75;
101. see also, Kornegay, see note 72, 59-61.
102. One example could be the stress on the respect for the legal obligation flowing from the signing of international human rights treaties, PSP article 1.6.1; article 2.9.11;
103. another example could be the federal structure, even though this has taken on a highly innovative form, see R. Wolfrum, “Föderalismus als Beitrag zur Friedenssicherung: Überlegungen zu einer Verfassung für Zypern und den Sudan”, in: M. Brenner (ed.), Der Staat des Grundgesetzes, 2004, 1245 et seq. (1261-1262);
104. also Ellisie, see note 64, 78-79;
105. for the Sudanese quest see the contributions in H.M. Salih (ed.), Federalism in the Sudan, 1995.
106. Interview with Nicholas Haysom, see note 75.
107. There was only some minor and informal international involvement in the (secretive) preparation of a Draft Constitution which would serve as basis for deliberations in the constitutional assembly.
108. Ellisie, see note 64.
109. The constitution is called an “Interim Constitution” because the CPA envisages that after 6 years there shall be a referendum on the final status of the South and its relationship to the north, see Chapter I, article 2.2, 2.5 CPA. This does not limit the text’s current status as fully applicable fundamental law in any way.
110. An example of what kind of questions were left open by the CPA could be the question of how the Members of the second chamber (the Council of States) should be elected, c.f. Chapter II, article 2.2.3.2 CPA and article 85 Interim Constitution Sudan.
111. At the same time, Security Council Resolutions can require individual states to refrain from exerting influence on the internal political processes of other states. For example, S/RES/1559 (2004) of 2 September 2004 relating to the Lebanon, demanded “a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence”.
112. Wolfrum, see note 38, 4-7;
113. A. Roberts, “What is a military occupation?”, BYIL 55 (1984), 249 et seq.;
114. C. McCarthy, “The Paradox of the International Law of Occupation: Sovereignty and the Occupation of Iraq”, Journal of Conflict & Security Laws 10 (2005), 43 et seq.
115. See e.g. Franck, see note 17. See also in this respect the discussion in the article of J. Leininger in this Volume.
116. See in this respect Article 76 (b) UN Charta; H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 1990.
117. S. Hobe/ O. Kimminich, Einführung in das Völkerrecht, 8th edition 2004, 184; see also Franck, note 17, 51.
118. See under Part II. 1. a.
119. See under Part II. 2. b.
120. Article 63(b) of the 1970 Iraqi Constitution, which is the text that was in force when the war broke out, provided that “[t]his Constitution shall not be amended except by the Council of Revolutionary Command through the majority of two third [sic] of its members” [official translation], Iraqi Gazette No. 10, 13/3/1971; this body was swept away during the war, and the majority of its Members were arrested by the U.S. and the U.K.
121. S/RES/1511 (2003) of 16 October 2003 operative paras. 7, 10, 11.
122. The president of the Iraqi parliament, in a letter dated 18 May 2005, invited the United Nations to “provide technical assistance, including technical and logistical public affairs expertise that can help promote national dialogue […] and build consensus nationwide”, letter from Hajim M. Al-Hasani, President of the Iraqi National Assembly, to Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, (unpublished).
123. See under Part II. 2. c .(i), especially note 55.
124. Ibid., see note 55.
125. See under Part II. 2. c, note 58 and 59.
126. M. Weber, Economy and Society, 1968, 33 et seq.;
127. also Schmitt, see note 10, 87-91;
128. R. Fallon, “Legitimacy and the Constitution”, Harv. L. Rev. 118 (2005) 1787 et seq.
129. J. Habermas, “Legitimationsprobleme im modernen Staat”, in: P. Graf Kielmansegg, (ed.), Legitimationsprobleme politischer Systeme, PVS Son-derheft 7 (1976), 39 et seq.;
130. D. Copp, “The Idea of a Legitimate State”, 28 Philosophical & Public Affairs 28 (1999), 43 et seq.
131. International Crisis Group, see note 55, 3-4.
132. See, for example, N. Haysom, “Summary and Critical Review of the Draft Constitution Presented to the TNA on 28 August 2005”, The United Nations’ Office of Constitutional Support, 15 September 2005, Unpublished quoted by Newsweek, available under: ; also Al-Ali, see note 57.
133. However, it has to be noted also that international institutions with particular missions, such as the IBRD and the IMF, can at times intervene in order to impress upon the constitution-making process legal and economic mechanisms that would be more advantageous to their membership than to the constitution-making society in question. For example, when constitutional drafters are considering what economic model they should adopt in relation to the exploitation of their national resources, or whether to allow for a system to let foreign investors freely enter into their domestic market, it can be possible for individual nations outside the constitutional process to secure an economic interest in that constitution-making society through advice given by such institutions.
134. See under Part II.1. c. and Part II. 3.b.
135. Feldman, see note 4.
136. Sunder, see note 4.