Restructuring Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-Falls

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 9, Issue , 2005, Pages 179-224

  Oellers Frahm, Karin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 66349132319     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/187574105x00066     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. For the history see more in detail S. Oeter, “Yugoslavia, Dissolution”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 4 (2000), 1563 et seq.;
2. A. Herdina, “Bosnia and Herzegovina between Separation and Integration, The Historical Dimension of the Problem”, Revue des Affaires Européennes 7 (1997), 383 et seq.
3. Cf. in this context C. Giersch, Konfliktregulierung in Jugoslawien 1991-1995, 1998, passim.
4. Cf. P.W. Galbraith, “Washington, Erdut and Dayton: Negotiating and Implementing Peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Cornell Int’l L. J. 30 (1997), 643 et seq.
5. Decision of the EC-Council of 16 December 1991, ILM 31 (1992), 1485 et seq.
6. The Arbitration Commission was originally established in the framework of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia at the Brussels meeting on 7 August 1991, ILM 31 (1992), 1488. In 1993 the Commission agreed on terms of composition and reference as well as on its Rules of Procedure, ILM 32 (1993), 1573 et seq.; cf. also M.C.R. Craven, “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia”, BYIL 66 (1996), 323 et seq.
7. Text of the Opinion in ILM 31 (1992), 1494 et seq.
8. Opinion No. 4 of 11 January 1992, text in ILM 31 (1992), 1501 et seq.
9. See in this context the very critical remarks of M. Barutciski, “Politics Overrides Legal Principles: Tragic Consequences of the Diplomatic Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1992)”, Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 11 (1995/96), 767 et seq.
10. Cf. B. de Rossanet, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 1996.
11. Cf. Docs S/24795, Annex VII, S/25050, Annexes VI-VII, and S/25479, Annexes I-IV; ILM 31 (1992), 1584 et seq.
12. Cf. Oeter, see note 1, 1580; P.C. Szasz, “Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict Study of Bosnia”, Cornell Int’l L. J. 28 (1995), 685 et seq.; B. Ashton, “Making Peace Agreements Work: United Nations Experience in the Former Yugoslavia”, Cornell Int’l L. J. 30 (1997), 769 et seq.
13. S/RES/713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.
14. S/RES/757 (1992) of 30 May 1992.
15. S/RES/776 (1992) of 14 September 1992 which was not explicitly based on Chapter VII; cf. in this context Szasz, see note 11.
16. Cf. C. Kreß, “Friedenssicherung durch Vereinte Nationen und NATO”, AVR 35 (1997), 213 et seq.
17. For more details see P.C. Szasz, “The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement”, Cornell Int’l L. J. 30 (1997), 759 et seq. (763 et seq.).
18. Text in ILM 35 (1996), 75 et seq.
19. These are the following Annexes: Annex 1-A, with regard to cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of armed forces, deployment of a NATO-organized Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the Establishment of a “Joint Military Commission”. The Annex is accompanied by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between BiH and NATO, a SOFA between Croatia and NATO, an agreement between the FRY and NATO; Annex 1-B concerns an “Agreement on Regional Stabilization” providing inter alia for “Confidence-and Security-Building Measures” calling in particular for a limitation of defined heavy weapons; Annex 5 concerns the Arbitration on the disputed region of Brcko; Annex 10 contains the centre piece of international involvement, namely the “Agreement on Civilian Implementation” providing for a “High Representative” to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement and to co-ordinate the many civilian organizations performing functions in this connection, and Annex 11 concerning an “Agreement on International Police Task-Force” requesting the establishment of the “IPTF” to assist the parties in “maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards”.
20. S/RES/1021 (1995) and 1022 (1995) of 22 November 1995; S/RES/1026 (1995) of 30 November 1995, S/RES/1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, 1034 and 1035 of 21 December 1995 and 1037 (1996) of 15 January 1996. Many of these actions were reported and coordinated at the London “Peace Implementation Conference” of 8-9 December 1995, the “Conclusions” of which are reported to the Security Council, Doc. S/1995/1029), text in ILM 35 (1996), 223.
21. See under VI. 1.
22. For more details see under VI. 2.c.
23. See under VI. 3.b.
24. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to S/RES/1026 (1995) of 30 November 1995, Doc. S/1995/1031 (1995).
25. S/RES/1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995.
26. S/RES/1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995.
27. Cf. also to Szasz, see note 16.
28. Cf. ILM 35 (1996), 2232 et seq.
29. S/RES/1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, see also J. Friedrich in this Volume on Kosovo.
30. S/RES/1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, see also M. Benzing in this Volume on East Timor.
31. See under V. 1.; Szasz, see note 16, 759.
32. Cf. as an example of a successful treaty-based solution L. Keller in this Volume on Cambodia, where the 1991 Paris Agreement constituted a sound treaty basis for the state building process.
33. As to the meaning of this paragraph reference is made to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of 28/29 January 2000; 18/19 February 2000, 30 June/1 July 2000 and 18/19 August 2000; text in Official Journal BiH No. 11/2000, 17/2000, 23/2000 and 36/2000 respectively. See also the commentaries to these decisions by C. Stahn, “Die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei ethnischen Volksgruppen in den bosnischen Teilrepubliken – Neue Hoffnung für das Friedensmodell von Dayton? Zugleich eine Anmerkung zur dritten Teilentscheidung des bosnischen Verfassungsgerichts vom 1. Juli 2000 im Itzetbegovic-Fall, ZaöRV 60 (2000), 663 et seq.;
34. I. Winkelmann, “Der Bundesstaat Bosnien-Herzegowina”, in: W. Graf Vitzthum/ I. Winkelmann, Bosnien-Herzegowina im Horizont Europas, 2003, 59 et seq., (64 et seq.).
35. F. Ni Aolain, “The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis”, Mich. J. Int’l L. 19 (1997/98), 957 et seq. (971).
36. G. Nystuen, “The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, state versus Entities”, Revue des Affaires Européennes 7 (1997), 394 et seq. (398).
37. See under II.
38. Cf. for further details on the former and actual constitutions E. Sarcevic, Die Schlußphase in der Verfassungsgebung von Bosnien und Herzegovina, 1996; Stahn, see note 32, 664 et seq.
39. “Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Official Gazette of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 2/92.
40. W. Graf Vitzthum/ M. Mack, “Multiethnischer Föderalismus in Bosnien-Herzegowina”, in: W. Graf Vitzthum (Hrsg.), Europäischer Föderalismus, 2000, 81 et seq.; S. Yee, “The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, EJIL 7 (1996), 176 et seq.; cf. also Aolain, see note 33, 968.
41. In the RS, i.e. the majority of the Serbs is clearly a consequence of the ethnic cleansing, since before the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 only 54.3 per cent Serbs lived in this territory, while at the time of the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement the percentage was 96.8 per cent (cf. Decision no. 5/98 of 1 July 2000, http://www.ustavnisud.ba).
42. Cf. A. Eide, “The Role of the Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and its Working Groups in the Prevention of Conflicts”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001), 25 et seq., (28).
43. Cf. see under VI. 2 a. and see for more details in this context R.C. Slye, “The Dayton Peace Agreement: Constitutionalism and Ethnicity”, Yale J. Int’l L. 21 (1996), 459 et seq.
44. Before the conflict, the percentage of Serbs was about 17.6 per cent it was reduced to 2 per cent during the conflict.
45. Cf. the decisions of the Constitutional Court of 28/29 January 2000; 18/19 February 2000, 30 June/1 July 2000 and 18/19 August 2000; text in Official Journal BiH No. 11/2000, 17/2000, 23/2000 and 36/2000 respectively. See also the commentaries to these decisions by Stahn, see note 32, Winkelmann, see note 32, 64 et seq.
46. It has been rightly stated that beginning with this decision the Constitutional Court became the “engine” of the – however slow – integration process; W. Graf Vitzthum, “Staatsaufbau in Südosteuropa, Bosnien-Herzegowina als Paradigma außengestützter Staatsbildung”, in: J.A. Frowein/ K. Scharioth/ I. Winkelmann/ R. Wolfrum, Verhandeln für den Frieden, Negotiating for Peace, Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, 2003, 823 et seq. (834).
47. ILM 31 (1992), 1497.
48. Cf. to the international law on self-determination M.P. Scharf, “Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings”, Den. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 31 (2003), 373 et seq.; cf. also for new approaches concerning self-determination G.J. Simpson, “The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age”, Stanford J. Int’l L. 32 (1996), 255 et seq.
49. C. Bildt, “Europe and Bosnia, Lessons of the Past and Paths for the Future”, Revue des Affaires Européennes 7 (1997), 450 et seq. (454).
50. The difficulties in nominating ministers is demonstrated in an exemplary manner with regard to the minister of Defence of the central state: only in March 2004 was it possible to nominate a Minister of Defence for the central state, which could be realized only with the active involvement of the HR Ashdown. Since the defence of a state is an original power of the central state, the fact, that nearly ten years after the creation of the state BiH only the entities disposed over an army and a minister for Defence is a revealing sign for the separatist move of the entities. Cf. M. Martens, “Normalität im Dreivölkerstaat”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 7 August 2004, 8.
51. See under VI. 3.
52. Nystuen, see note 34, 406.
53. See under VI. 2. b.
54. Cf. under VI. 4. d.
55. Cf. for details C. Steiner/ N. Ademovic, “Kompetenzstreitigkeiten im Gefüge von Dayton”, in: Vitzthum/ Winkelmann, see note 32, 109 et seq.
56. Cf. Winkelmann, see note 32, 59 et seq.
57. Cf. M. Ducasse-Rogier, “Recovering from Dayton: From ‘peace-building’ to ‘state-building’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Helsinki Monitor 15 (2004), 76 et seq. (78).
58. Ibid.
59. A. Borden/ R. Caplan, “The former Yugoslavia: the war and the peace process”, SIPRI Yearbook 1996, 203 et seq. (229).
60. Cf. inaugural speech of HR Ashdown, 27 March 2002, text on , section ‘Speeches by OHR principals’.
61. Under VI. 4.
62. See in this context also A. Seibert-Fohr, in this Volume.
63. Annex 7 to the DPA.
64. Annex 6 on Human Rights, Art. XIII.
65. For the practice of these organs cf. Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Digest, Decisions on Admissibility and Merits: 1996-2002, 2004; M. Nowak, “Die Menschenrechtsbestimmungen des Abkommens von Dayton in der Praxis”, in: W. Benedek/ O. König/ C. Promitzer (eds), Menschenrechte in Bosnien und Herzegowina: Wissenschaft und Praxis, 1999, 29 et seq.; H. Alefsen, “Menschenrechtsschutz in Bosnien und Herzegowina: Aus der Sicht der internationalen Gemeinschaft”, ibid., 51 et seq.; P.C. Szasz, “The Protection of Human Rights through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia”, AJIL 90 (1996), 301 et seq.; R. Ay-bay, “A New Institution in the Field: The Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, NQHR 15 (1997), 529 et seq.; K. Oellers-Frahm, “Die Rolle internationaler Gerichte im Friedensprozeß in Bosnien und Herzegowina nach dem Abkommen von Dayton”, in: V. Götz/ P. Selmer/ R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber amicorum Günther Jaenicke – Zum 85. Geburtstag, 1998, 263 et seq.
66. Cf. N. Matz, in this Volume.
67. Annex 10 to the Dayton Peace Agreement.
68. Annex 10, Art. V.
69. Cf. J. Friedrich on Kosovo, and M. Benzing on East Timor, in this Volume. See also J.A. Frowein, “Die Notstandsverwaltung von Gebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen’, in: H.W. Arndt/ F.L. Kniemeyer/ D. Kugelmann/ W. Meng/ M.Schweitzer Völkerrecht und deutsches Recht, 2001, 43 et seq.
70. Cf. in this sense B. Hombach, “Zukunftsstrategie Stabilitätspakt”, Internationale Politik 11 (2000), 36 et seq.; Bildt, see note 47.
71. Ibid.
72. Decision of 7 August 2000 Amending the Law on Filling a Vacant Position of the Member of the Presidency of BiH, .
73. See for details ; cf. also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 7 August 2004, see note 48, reporting that in spring 2004 the HR Ashdown removed 59 members of the political leadership of the RS because of their lacking co-operation with the ICTY. In March 2005, HR Ashdown even dismissed the Bosnian member of the Presidency of the central state, Dragan Covic, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 30 March 2004, 3, reviving the discussion and critics on the competencies of the HR.
74. Cf. Doc. S/1997/979 of 16 December 1997. On the basis of the Bonn decisions, respectively “Bonn powers”, the newly appointed HR Westendorp in 1998 set into force temporarily a whole series of draft laws, such as the law on citizenship, the customs tariffs schedule, the law on foreign investment, the laws on the flag and on the coat of arms of BiH, the laws on privatization of banks and enterprises and on telecommunications, the common currency, the uniform licence plates system and later also the common driving licence. The removal of officials trying to obstruct the peace process took place in particular in the context of creating conditions for return of displaced persons.
75. S/RES/1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996.
76. For more details see Stahn, see note 32, 663 et seq. (669, 670).
77. In 2002 two documents were issued in this context: one document on ‘Jobs and Justice’ (availabe at ) and one on the ‘OHR Mission Implementation Plan’ (available at ).
78. CF. Vitzthum, see note 44, 839.
79. Ibid., 835.
80. According to the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) held on 8 and 9 December 1995, the HR is the chairman of the Steering Board of the PIC and is funded by the budget of the PIC., cf. text of the conclusions in ILM 35 (1996), 225 et seq., (229).
81. Cf. in this context R. Wilde, “Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor”, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 7 (2001), 455 et seq., who monitors the lack of accountability of international actors in the process of after-conflict state-building; also R. Wilde, “The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser when International Organizations Administer Territory”, Proceedings of the ASIL, 95th Meeting, 2001, 251 et seq. (254).
82. Cf. On this issue more in detail R. Utz in this Volume who refers to the concept of ressentiment as a strong impediment to the nation building process.
83. Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision 9/00 of 3 November 2000, homepage of the constitutional court ; and ZaöRV 61 (2001), 173 et seq.
84. Cf. also C. Stahn, “International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges ahead”, ZaöRV 61 (2001), 107 et seq., (166 et seq.); critical with regard to the responsibility also Vitzthum, see note 44, 828 and 842.
85. P.A. Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” AJIL 95 (2001), 7 et seq.
86. S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993. From the abundant bibliography on the ICTY see in particular V. Morris/ M.P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993, and A. Cassese, “Yugoslavia: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 4 (2000), 1608 et seq. with further bibliographical indications.
87. Cf. R. Wolfrum in this Volume.
88. For the text of the Statute see .
89. Under V. 2.
90. Nystuen, see note 34.
91. DPA, Annex 2, Article V and Annex 5.
92. For the arbitral awards see Doc. S/1997/126 in ILM 36 (1997), 396, and Final Award of 5 March 1999, at ; cf. Oellers-Frahm, see note 63; M. Baros, “The Arbitral Tribunal’s Award for the Dispute over the Inter-entity Boundary in the Brcko Area”, Journal of Armed Conflict Law 3 (1998), 233 et seq.; P.C. Farrand, “Lessons from Brcko”, Emory International Law Review 15 (2001), 529 et seq.; M.G. Karnavas, “Creating the Legal Framework of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a model for the region and other postconflict countries”, AJIL 97 (2003), 111 et seq.; C. Schreuer, “The Brcko Final Award of 5 March 1999”, LJIL 12 (1999), 575 et seq.
93. Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 7 December 1999, in: ILM 39 (2000), 879; cf. R. Wilde, “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration”, AJIL 95 (2001), 583 et seq. (595).
94. Cf. ILM 35 (1996), 76/77et seq. and 170 et seq. for the Agreement and Interim Statute for the City of Mostar, cf. also Wilde, see note 91, 583 et seq. (590); F. Pagani, “L’administraton de Mostar par l’Union Européenne”, AFDI 42 (1996), 234 et seq.
95. Text of the Statute .
96. M. Martens, “Versöhnung durch Dekret”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 23 July 2004, 10.
97. F.O. Hampson, “Can Peacebuilding Work?”, Cornell Int’l L. J. 30 (1997), 701 et seq.
98. Cf. Frowein, see note 67, 43 et seq.
99. Cf. under V.1 on the “consensus” in the treaty-making process.
100. Cf. to the example of Cambodia, in this Volume.
101. Cf. A. von Bogdandy et al., in this Volume, who use the term “elite con-sens” which in a first time after a conflict is certainly needed but which should not constitute the ultimate basis for the reconstruction of the state.
102. Cf. K. Oellers-Frahm, see note 63, 277 referring to a decision of the Human Rights Chamber in which the lack of co-operation in enforcing decisions of the Chamber is qualified as a violation of article 8 ECHR.
103. Cf. Vitzthum, see note 44, 832.
104. Ibid., 839; cf. also Borden/ Caplan, see note 57, 231.
105. Cf. also Ducasse-Rogier, see note 55, 80.
106. Cf. Aolain, see note 33, 969, 970.
107. Vitzthum, see note 44, 839.
108. J.A. Schear, “Bosnia’s Post-Dayton Trauma”, Foreign Pol’y 104 (1996), 87 et seq. (94).
109. Aolain, see note 33, 993.
110. Aolain, see note 33, 968.
111. Vitzthum, see note 44, 840.
112. Bildt, see note 47, 455.
113. See under VI. 4. b., cf. Doc. S/1997/979 of 16 December 1997, Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference.
114. Cf. Vitzthum, see note 44, 839.
115. Ducasse-Rogier, see note 55, 84.
116. Speech of Wolfgang Petritsch to the UN Security Council, New York, 8 November 1999.
117. Cf.under X.
118. Aolain, see note 33, 963.
119. Cf. J.R. Hooper/ P.R.Williams, “Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension”, Den. J. Int’l L.& Pol’y 31 (2003), 355 et seq.; P.R. Williams/ F. Jannotti Pecci, “Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination”, Stanford J. Int’l L. 40 (2004), 347 et seq.
120. Hooper/ Williams, see above, 360 et seq.; Williams/ Jannotti Pecci, see above, 355 et seq.