State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 9, Issue , 2005, Pages 579-614

  von Bogdandy, Armin ^a   Häußler, Stefan ^a   Hanschmann, Felix ^a   Utz, Raphael ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85181874978     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. The difference between state building and nation building is not always appreciated. Simon Chesterman uses only the term state-building, because, he claims, nation-building is specific to post-colonial situations. James Dobbins and his co-authors at RAND solve the problem in an equally sweeping, but opposite fashion by declaring all US involvements in post-conflict reconstruction, from Germany to Iraq, to have been exercises in nation-building. Francis Fukuyama acknowledges that there is a distinction between state-building and nation-building but his usage of both terms would suggest that he regards nation-building as a term employed in the language of politics describing what he – in academic discourse – calls state-building. See J. Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2003; S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, 2004; F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2004; J. Hippler (ed.), Nation-Building: Ein Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung?, 2004.
2. R.I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, in: R.I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 2003, 1 et seq.
3. Ibid., 5-7.
4. Ibid., 5; E.K. Jenne, “Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State”, in: Rotberg, see note 2, 219 et seq. (219-223).
5. On the various causes, see C.A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States”, Foreign Aff. 82 (2003), 32 et seq.
6. For the latter, P. Minnerop, Paria-Staaten im Völkerrecht?, 2004.
7. R. Gordon, “Saving Failed States: Sometimes A Neocolonialist Notion”, Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 12 (1997), 903 et seq. (906).
8. H. Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis”, The Modern Law Review 65 (2002), 377 et seq. (387 et seq.). For the construction of passive victims and the heroic and good-hearted “agents of freedom, order, democracy, liberalisation transparency, humanitarianism and human rights”, see also, A. Orford, “Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers”, Australian Yearbook of International Lawyers 19 (1998), 1 et seq. (2 et seq.); A. Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism”, EJIL 10 (1999), 679 et seq. (699).
9. W. Pfaff, “A New Colonialism”, Foreign Aff. 74 (1995), 2 et seq. “In the absence of an alternative”, Pfaff writes, this new colonialism “must be considered.” See also, P. Johnson, “Colonialism’s Back – and Not a Moment Too Soon”, New York Times of 18 April 1993, 22 (including the more traitorous subtitle “Let’s Face it: Some Countries Are just Not Fit to Govern Themselves”)
10. H. Richardson, “Failed States, Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations”, Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 10 (1996), 1 et seq. (8 et seq.). On the interdependencies between international law and colonialism, see also Gordon, see note 8, 903; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 2005.
11. The “building” terminology carries an association with a technocratic understanding of society, see K.W. Deutsch, “Nation-Building and National Development”, in: K.W. Deutsch/ W.J. Foltz (eds), Nation-Building, 1966, 1 et seq. (3).
12. Fukuyama, see note 1, ix.
13. M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 1984, 91. On “capacity”, see Fukuyama, see note 1, 7.
14. M. Canovan, “Sleeping Dogs, Prowling Cats, and Soaring Doves: Three Paradoxes of Nationhood”, in: M. Seymour (ed.), The Fate of the Nation-State, 2004, 19 et seq. (22).
15. D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 1991, 64-99.
16. On the idea of the nation and the relevant literature, see R. Utz, in this Volume.
17. M. Glenny, The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy, 1990 provides an overview of the situation at the beginning of the 1990s. He does, however, point to corruption as one of the central problems in Eastern European societies, and it features in almost all analyses of state failure now. Crocker, see note 6, 34; Fukuyama, see note 1, 10. On the important example of a national consensus and its importance in the political and economic transition, see T. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, 1991; F. Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Post-Communist Politics in its First Phase, 1994.
18. Canovan, see note 15, 20-21. See also M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 1996, 16-26, 68-74.
19. On this, see Utz, see note 17.
20. For descriptions see L. Silber/ A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 1995; M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, 1994.
21. Charlesworth, see note 9, 382 et seq. For the inextricable links between “state failure” and the effects of colonial or military interventions, see also, Richardson, see note 11, 16 et seq., who examines the situations in Haiti and Rwanda.
22. On this and the relevant literature, see Utz, see note 17.
23. L. Greenfeld, “Is Modernity possible without Nationalism?”, in: Seymour, see note 15, 38 et seq.
24. On the problematic distinction between “modern” and “pre-modern”, “civilized” and “uncivilized” societies and its usage in international law, see Anghie, see note 11.
25. L. Anderson, “Antiquated before they can Ossify: States that Fail Before they Form,” Journal of International Affairs 58 (2004), 1 et seq. (11).
26. M. Reisman, “Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea”, AJIL 98 (2004), 516 et seq. (524 et seq.).
27. In more detail, Richardson, see note 11, 13; M. Trachtenberg, “Intervention in Historical Perspective”, in: L. Reed/ C. Kaysen (eds), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, 1993, 15-36.
28. On the concept of habitus, see P. Bordieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 1977, 78 et seq. Some of the factors undermining the acceptance of law as a normative order in modern civil society have already been described by G. W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), 1999, §§ 148, 244, 245, 258.
29. This has been called “instructive law” by a former Soviet prosecutor, see F. Neznansky, The Prosecution of Economic Crimes in the USSR, 1954-1984, 1985, 32-37, quoted in: R. Sharlet, “Citizen and State under Gorbachev and Yeltsin”, in: S. White et al., Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, 1994, 109 et seq. (110).
30. On this, see R.M. Cutler, “Soviet Dissent under Khrushchev: An Analytical Study”, Comparative Politics 13 (1980), 15 et seq.; A.K.R. Kiralfy, “Campaign for Legality in the USSR”, ICLQ 6 (1957), 625 et seq. For a more general overview, see J.N. Westwood, Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-1992, 1993, 411-414. For a particularly interesting treatment of legal theory in East Germany, see S. Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945-1989, 1992, 171-176, 267-273.
31. Silber/ Little, see note 21, 32-33. For the memorandum prepared at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 in reaction to the perceived imbalance of the constitution and voicing national grievances, see B. Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up, 1980-92, 1993, 49-52.
32. Silber/ Little, see note 21, 87 et seq.
33. See on Somalia C. Philipp, in this Volume.
34. R. Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict, 2004, 187-207.
35. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 1999, 62 et seq.
36. M. Seymour, “Collective Rights in Multi-Nation States: From Ethical Individualism to the Law of Peoples”, in: Seymour, see note 15, 105 et seq., 125-127. On this, see also W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 1995.
37. See, for example, L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 1992, 8-12; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1991, 7.
38. Greenfeld argues that a nation encompassing the entire globe is theoretically possible and cites the example of the United States as the model coming closest to such a self-imagination which has important ramifications on the notion of universal values pursued by the United States. See Greenfeld, see note 38, 7 et seq. Anderson clearly establishes demarcation as a central aspect of the national imagination. See Anderson, see note 38, 7.
39. On this, see Utz, see note 17; Greenfeld, see note 38, 10.
40. Greenfeld, see note 38, 46 et seq.
41. Ibid., 10.
42. L. Gelb/ J.A. Rosenthal, “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus”, Foreign Aff. 82 (2003), 2 et seq.; T. Carothers, “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror”, Foreign Aff. 82 (2003), 84 et seq. See also C. Rice, “Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice”, 18 January 2005, available at . One of the first sentences in the National Security Strategy of the United States reveal the interconnections between “failed states” and security threats: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Cf. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1, available at
43. Rice, see note 43.
44. Fukuyama, see note 1, 99.
45. Ibid., 113.
46. Rice, see note 43.
47. See the case study Iraq by R. Wolfrum, in this Volume.
48. ‘Semantic democracy’ is a variation on the theme of ‘semantic constitution’ by Karl Loewenstein. See K. Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre, 1959, 153. For the legal status of the US forces in Iraq after the election see case study Iraq, ibid. See also A. Arato, “Interim Imposition”, Ethics and International Affairs 18 (2004), 25 et seq.
49. Michael Reisman has described this kind of imperial propagation of democracy and liberal values as a “democratic Trotzkysm” that “ignore[s] the persistent force of nationalism, culture, religion, language, and other powerful – and manipulable – focuses on identity.” Cf. Reisman, see note 27, 523.
50. Richardson, see note 11, 12.
51. M. Griffin, “Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy through its Accreditation Process, and should it?” N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. Pol. 32 (1999/2000), 725 et seq. (757-761); T. Stein, “Demokratische Legitimierung auf supranationaler und internationaler Ebene”, ZaöRV 64 (2004), 563 et seq.
52. T.J. Farer, “The promotion of democracy: International Law and Norms”, in: E. Newman/ R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy. Between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 32 et seq. (52-53).
53. T. Marauhn, “Konfliktfolgenbewältigung in Afghanistan zwischen Utopie und Pragmatismus”, AVR 40 (2002), 480 et seq. (510); R. Ben Achour, “La contribution de Boutros Boutros-Ghali à l’émergence d’un droit positif de la démocratie”, in: Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Disciplurumque Liber, Vol. II, 1998, 909 et seq.
54. R. Harbour, “Towards Democracy: United Nations Involvement in Electoral Processes”, International Geneva Yearbook IX (1995), 61 et seq.
55. M.A. Osman, The United Nations and Peace Enforcement. Wars, Terrorism and Democracy, 2002, 167 et seq., 201 et seq. With regard to “failed states” Richardson observes at least three current models of involvement and active participation for the United Nations: “governance assistance, delegation of governmental authority, and the most radical option – direct U.N. trusteeship, which would resurrect the old trusteeship system and apply it to failed states.” Cf. Richardson, see note 11, 3. For the old trusteeship system of the League of Nations, see also: Gordon, see note 8, 940 et seq., as well as N. Matz, in this Volume.
56. On resentment and the relevant literature, see Utz, see note 17. The risks in a foreign policy context have recently been pointed out by D. Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order, 2004.
57. For a remarkable statement by the judiciary, see Supreme Court of Canada, /Reference re Quebec Secession,/ [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
58. D. Weinstock, “Four Kinds of (Post-)nation-building”, in: Seymour, see note 15, 51 et seq. (53).
59. Ibid. See also J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 1998, 225 et seq. Originally, the term has been coined by Dolf Sternberger. See D. Sternberger, “Verfassungspatriotismus”, in: Schriften, Vol. X, especially 17 et seq., 24, 30 et seq.
60. But see J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation: Politische Essays, 1998, 94-96, 114.
61. K. Loewenstein, see note 49, 138 et seq.
62. See Arato, see note 49, 25 et seq., 28.
63. Ibid., 29.
64. M. Seymour, “Collective Rights in Multi-nation States: From Ethical Individualism to the Law of Peoples”, in: Seymour, see note 15, 105 et seq.
65. Dignity and intelligibility are central elements in Walter Bagehots famous discussion of the monarchy in his treatment of the English constitution, first published in 1867. See, W. Bagehot, The English Constitution, 1937, 4, 32.
66. Ibid., 4.
67. See Loewenstein, see note 49, 153 et seq.
68. The linkage of collective identity to psychological processes of individual citizens appears advisable in order to avoid problematic essentializations, U. Neumann, “Wissenschaftstheorie und Rechtswissenschaft,” in: A. Kaufmann/ W. Hassemer (eds), Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart, 6th edition, 1994, 422, 430 et seq.; this parallels methodic individualism, H. Albert, “Methodischer Individualismus und historische Analyse,” in: K. Acham/ W. Schulze (eds), Teil und Ganzes, 1990, 219.
69. On the following, see O. Angelucci, Zur Ökologie einer europäischen Identität, 2003, 33 et seq., 53et seq., which bases itself on the theory of social identity (foundational: H. Tajfel, Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology, 1981) and the theory of social representation (foundational: S. Moscovici, La Psychanalyse, son image et son public, 1961).
70. This terminology is well established, e.g. D. Cerruti/ W. Rudolph (eds), Un’anima per l’Europa. Lessico di un’identità politica, 2002.
71. It seems almost impossible to predict the number of years before a collective identity is established. The decade would probably be a proper unit of measurement. But Angelucci, see note 70, 160 et seq., 163 et seq., shows that demonstrable changes can occur during a period of five years.
72. On this philosophy, see J. Habermas, “Geschichtsbewußtsein und posttraditionale Identität,” in: J. Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, 173 et seq., 1987; see Sternberger, see note 60; see also J.H.H. Weiler, “Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg,” in: K. Nicolaidis/ R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision, 2001, 63 et seq.
73. This can be demonstrated by comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany, in which the identity-forming role of the Basic Law seems rather important. See J. Gebhardt, “Verfassungspatriotismus als Identitätskonzept der Nation”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 14/93 (1993), 31 et seq. (33 et seq.); M.R. Lepsius, Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen, 1990, 63, 77 et seq.; H. Rausch, “Politisches Bewußtsein und politische Einstellungen im Wandel,” in: W. Weidenfeld (ed.), Die Identität der Deutschen, 1983, 119, 130. On the relevant role of the Federal Constitutional Court, see the articles in G.F. Schuppert/ C. Bumke, Die Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung, 2000; U. Haltern, “Integration als Mythos”, Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 45 (1997), 31 et seq.; J. Isensee, “Die Verfassung als Vaterland”, Allmanach 71, 1988.
74. See Anderson, see note 38; K. Deutsch, Nationenbildung – Nationalstaat – Integration, 1972; E. Gellner, Nationalismus und Moderne, 1995; E. Hobsbawm, Nationen und Nationalismus, 2nd edition, 1992; H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte, 2nd edition, 1995.
75. J.F. Lyotard, Das postmoderne Wissen, 4th edition, 1999, 63 et seq., 112; J.F. Lyotard, Der Widerstreit, 2nd edition, 1989, 12, 251 et seq.
76. On the difficulties of such constructions, especially in a European context, see F. Hanschmann, “‘Geschichtsgemeinschaft’. Ein problematischer Begriff und seine Verwendung im Staats- und Euoparecht”, Rechtsgeschichte 5 (2004), 150 et seq.
77. On the functions of preambles, see P. Häberle, Europäische Verfassungslehre, 2001-2002, 273 et seq.; H. Dreier, “Präambel”, in: H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz, Vol. I, 1996, Nr. 8 et seq.; J. Isensee, “Staat und Verfassung,” in: J. Isensee/ P. Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts Vol. I, 2nd edition, 1995, § 13, Nr. 4 et seq.; C. Starck, “Präambel”, in: H. v. Mangoldt et al. (eds), Das Bonner Grundgesetz, Vol. 1, 1999, Nr. 29 et seq.; H.D. Treviranus, “Preamble”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 2 (1997), 1097 et seq.; A. von Bogdandy, “Preamble”, in B. de Witte (ed.), Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, 2003, 3-10.
78. J.H.H. Weiler, “To be a European citizen: Eros and civilization”, in: J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 1999, 324, 338 et seq.; U. Haltern, “Europäischer Kulturkampf”, Der Staat 37 (1998), 591 et seq. (620); M. Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates, 1998, 257, 348.
79. See Angelucci, see note 70, 44 et seq.
80. Ibid., 40.
81. C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 6th edition, 1996, 26 et seq., 29 et seq., 50 et seq.
82. See accounts of the often dubious historical practices in K. von Beyme, Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes, 1968, 7 et seq.; J Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution Making”, in: J Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy, 1998, 97, 100 et seq.
83. K. Hopkins, “Assessing the World’s Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International Law and its part in the South African Transformation”, Miami U. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 10 (2001-2002), 241 et seq. (250-254); on the policy of the United States see A. Klotz, “Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and U.S. sanctions against South Africa”, International Organization 49 (1995), 451 et seq.
84. See A. Isert, Die Homeland-Politik in Südafrika: Die Entwicklung und Kontrolle der territorialen, demographischen, politischen und ökonomischen Ressourcen der Großen Apartheid zwischen 1950 und 1990, 1997; E. Klein, “South African Bantustan Policy”, in: Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 4 (2000), 477 et seq.
85. On the ideological foundation of Apartheid theory and all-white nationalism see J.P. Brits, Op die vooraand van apartheid: Die rassevraagstuk en die blanke politiek in Suid-Afrika, 1939-1948, 1994, 83 et seq.; H. Giliomee/ L. Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation-Building, 1991, 35.
86. As in the ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter; H. Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction, 2000, 111 et seq.
87. H. Klug, “Historical Background”, in: M. Chaskalson et al. (eds), Constitutional Law of South Africa, 4th revision, 1999, 2-13 et seq; R.J. Goldstone, “The South African Bill of Rights”, Tex. Int’l L. J. 32 (1997), 451 et seq.
88. For an overview of the process see Klug, see note 88, 93 et seq.
89. This does not mean, however, that international support was discouraged. The United Nations were explicitly asked to coordinate the activities of international observers of the process, see Report of the Secretary-General on the question of South Africa, Doc. S/1994/717 of 16 June 1994, 31.
90. On the process and its public perception see generally H. Corder, “Towards a South African Constitution”, The Modern Law Review 57 (1994), 491 et seq.; D. Thürer, “Vom paradigmatischen Einfluss des Völkerrechts auf das Staatsrecht”, in: K. Weber/ N. Wimmer (eds), Vom Verfassungsstaat am Scheideweg, 2005, 385, 391.
91. Republic of South Africa (ed.), Debates of Parliament (Hansard) 16 (1990), 1 et seq.
92. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
93. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; on the legal significance of the set of constitutional principles see Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judgment of 6 September 1996 (Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996), CCT 23/96.
94. See Klug and Goldstone, see note 88.
95. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (ed.), Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 7th Vol., 1998-2002; for an overview on the process see A. Boraine, A Country Unmasked, 2000.
96. L.S. Graybill, “South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Ethical and theological perspectives”, Ethics & International Affairs 12 (1998), 43 et seq.
97. With the exception of the early challenge brought against the legality and legitimacy of the TRC provisions brought under constitutional law in the AZAPO case, Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judgment of 25 July 1996 (AZAPO and others v President of the RSA and others), CCT 17/96. The high number of applications nevertheless speaks for a success of the TRC also in this respect, see http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/; on “usable past”, see Utz, see note 17.
98. E.g. Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judgment of 6 June 1995 (S v Makwanyane), CCT 3/94, at 308; Judgment of 25 July 1996 (AZAPO and others v President of the RSA and others), CCT 17/96, para 19, 22 et seq.; Judgment of 18 April 1997 (President of the RSA and another v Hugo), CCT 11/96, at para 41; Judgment of 7 October 1997 (Harksen v Lane NO and others), CCT 9/97, at para. 51; Judgment of 4 October 2000 (Government of RSA and others v Grootboom and others), CCT 11/00; Judgment of 4 September 2003 (Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community and others), CCT 19/03; Judgment of 29 July 2004 (Minister of Finance and others v Van Heerden), CCT 63/03; Judgment of 1 October 2004 (Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers), CCT 53/03; Judgment of 11 March 2005 (Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and another), CCT 27/04, at para. 58 et seq.; Judgment of 13 May 2005 (President of RSA and another v Modderklip Boerdery and others), CCT 20/04.
99. See Thürer, see note 91, 392; E. Afsah/ A.H. Guhr, in this Volume.
100. A. Their/ J. Chopra, “The road ahead: political and institutional reconstruction in Afghanistan”, in: S. Barakat (ed.), Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan, 2004, 93 et seq. (95).
101. A. Cottey, “Afghanistan and the new dynamics of intervention: counter-terrorism and nation building”, in: SIPRI (ed.), Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2003, 167 et seq. (169-171).
102. R. Grote, “Separation of Powers in the New Afghan Constitution”, ZaöRV 64 (2004), 897 et seq. (904-914).
103. For structure and history of the Loya Jirga see B. Shah, “Loya Jirga and the Present Day Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies 20 (2000), 146 et seq.
104. See Afsah/ Guhr, see note 101.
105. B.R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2nd edition, 2002.
106. For this proposition and the following analysis of the Afghan constitutional process, see Afsah/ Guhr, see note 101.
107. A. Saikal, “The United Nations and Democratization in Afghanistan”, in: Newman and Rich, see note 53, 320 et seq. (329-332).
108. See Afsah/ Guhr, see note 101.
109. See Saikal, see note 109, 332 et seq.
110. S. Anstötz, “Zypern: Vor EU-Beitritt und “Wiedervereinigung”?”, in: D. Blumenwitz/ G. Wehner (eds), Völkerrechtliche Fragen der Friedenssicherung (Pol-educ 3), 2003, 149 et seq.
111. See also the Report of the Secretary-General of 1 April 2003, Doc. S/2003/398.
112. B. Schoch, “Zypern wird EU-Mitglied – und der Konflikt?”, Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 14/2003, 9 et seq.
113. R. Wolfrum, “Föderalismus als Beitrag zur Friedenssicherung: Überlegungen zu einer Verfassung für Zypern und den Sudan”, in: M. Brenner et al. (eds), Der Staat des Grundgesetzes – Kontinuität und Wandel, 2004, 1245 et seq. (1251-1253, 1262-1263).
114. See Cottey, see note 103, 184.