Evolutionary analyses of tacit communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's game experiments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 218-237

  Kim, Yong Gwan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030269213     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0084     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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