Economic effects of political institutions, with special reference to constitutions

Why Constitutions Matter

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 167-212

  Berggren, Niclas ^a   Kurrild Klitgaard, Peter ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85071020751     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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