Vagueness and the law

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 95-108

  Soames, Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85058731250     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203124352     Document Type: Chapter

References (15)

1. Endicott, T. (2000) Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Endicott, T. (2005) “The Value of Vagueness,” in V. K. Bhatia, J. Engberg, M. Gotti and D. Heller, eds., Vagueness in Normative Texts, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 27–48.
3. Fara, D. G. (2000) “Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness,” Philosophical Topics 28: 48–81.
4. Fine, K. (1975) “Vagueness, Truth, and Logic,” Synthese 30: 265–300.
5. Hart, H. L. A. (1958) “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review 71: 593–629.
6. Shapiro, S. (2006) Vagueness in Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Soames, S. (1999) Understanding Truth, New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Soames, S. (2003) “Higher Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates,” in J. C. Beall, ed., Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in S. Soames (2009) Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9. Soames, S. (2009) “Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law,” in S. Soames, Philosophical Essays, Volume 1, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Soames, S. (2010) “The Possibility of Partial Definition,” in R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi, eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature and Its Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in S. Soames (2009) Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
11. Soames, S. (2011) “What Vagueness and Inconsistency Tell Us about Interpretation,” in A. Marmor and S. Soames, eds., The Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31–57.
12. Sorenson, R. (2001) “Vagueness Has No Function in Law,” Legal Theory 7: 387–416.
13. Tappendon, J. (1993) “The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Toward a Unified Treatment,” Journal of Philosophy 90: 551–77.
14. Williamson, T. (1994) Vagueness, London: Routledge.
15. Williamson, T. (1996) “Knowing and Asserting,” Philosophical Review 105: 489–523.