Vagueness has no function in law

Legal Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 387-417

  Sorensen, Roy ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924557523     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s1352325201704041     Document Type: Article

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