Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research

Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research

Volumn , Issue , 2018, Pages 1-318

  Scharpf, Fritz W ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85047029718     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780429500275     Document Type: Book

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