Identifying potential provider and environmental contamination on a clinical biocontainment unit using aerosolized pathogen simulants

Health Security

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2018, Pages 83-91

  Drewry, David G ^a   Sauer, Lauren M ^b   Shaw Saliba, Kathryn ^b   Therkorn, Jennifer ^a   Rainwater Lovett, Kaitlin ^a   Pilholski, Thomas ^a   Garibaldi, Brian T ^b  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

Aerosols; Hospital preparedness response; Personal protective equipment

Indexed keywords

FLUORESCENT DYE;

ANALYSIS; DISEASE TRANSMISSION; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; GAS MASK; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HUMAN; OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE; PREVENTION AND CONTROL; PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT; STATISTICS AND NUMERICAL DATA; THEORETICAL MODEL; UTILIZATION;

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; FLUORESCENT DYES; HEALTH PERSONNEL; HUMANS; INFECTIOUS DISEASE TRANSMISSION, PATIENT-TO-PROFESSIONAL; MODELS, THEORETICAL; OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE; PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT; RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES;

EID: 85045151357     PISSN: 23265094     EISSN: 23265108     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1089/hs.2017.0064     Document Type: Article

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