Intertemporal aggregation and incentives

European Accounting Review

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 643-657

  Arya, Anil ^a   Glover, Jonathan ^b   Liang, Pierre Jinghong ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85044181626     PISSN: 09638180     EISSN: 14684497     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0963818042000216857     Document Type: Article

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