The interaction between decision and control problems and the value of information

Accounting Review

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 561-574

  Arya, Anil ^a   Glover, Jonathan C ^a   Sivaramakrishnan, K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Control problem; Decision problem; Double moral hazard; Value of information

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031286965     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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