Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Australian Journal of Management

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 2017, Pages 692-707

  Hamada, Kojun ^a  

^a NIIGATA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Innovation; joint ownership; patents; property rights approach; R D investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 85032339218     PISSN: 03128962     EISSN: 13272020     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0312896216686152     Document Type: Article

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