Many faces of rationality: Implications of the great rationality debate for clinical decision-making

Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice

Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2017, Pages 915-922

  Djulbegovic, Benjamin ^a,b,c   Elqayam, Shira ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA   (United States)

^c H LEE MOFFITT CANCER CENTER AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

^d DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CLINICAL DECISION MAKING; CLINICAL PRACTICE; EMOTION; EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE; GOAL ATTAINMENT; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HUMAN; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MORALITY; PATIENT CARE; PRACTICE GUIDELINE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; MANAGEMENT; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; THINKING;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; CLINICAL DECISION-MAKING; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; EMOTIONS; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; POLICY MAKING; PROBLEM SOLVING; THINKING;

EID: 85031906678     PISSN: 13561294     EISSN: 13652753     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jep.12788     Document Type: Article

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