Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 146, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 159-177

  Jackman, Henry ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Conceptual analysis; Experimental philosophy; Intuitions; Language

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350437827     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9249-6     Document Type: Article

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