Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: Theorems and simulations

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 574-612

  Schurz, Gerhard ^a   Thorn, Paul D ^a  

^a HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85016700262     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020312000184     Document Type: Article

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