Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 121-153

  Makinson, David ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

AGM; Belief revision; Conditional plausibility measures; Conditional probability; Cores; Hosiasson Lindenbaum; Hyper revisionary probability; Kolmogorov; Popper; Proto probability; Ratio rule; R nyi; Screened revision; van Fraassen

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952593482     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-011-9176-4     Document Type: Article

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