Corrigendum to “Defining the Functional Resonance Analysis space: combining Abstraction Hierarchy and FRAM” (Reliability Engineering and System Safety (2017) 165 (34–46) (S0951832016302514) (10.1016/j.ress.2017.03.032));Defining the functional resonance analysis space: Combining Abstraction Hierarchy and FRAM

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

Volumn 165, Issue , 2017, Pages 34-46

  Patriarca, Riccardo ^a   Bergström, Johan ^b   Di Gravio, Giulio ^a  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Complexity; Fractality; Functional resonance; Knowledge representation; Systemic approach

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; FERROELECTRIC RAM; FRACTALS; KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION; RAILROAD ACCIDENTS; RESONANCE; RISK ASSESSMENT;

ABSTRACTION HIERARCHY; COMPLEXITY; FRACTALITY; FUNCTIONAL RESONANCE; FUNCTIONAL RESONANCE ANALYSIS METHODS (FRAM); LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION; RELIABILITY ENGINEERING; SYSTEMIC APPROACH;

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS;

EID: 85016136583     PISSN: 09518320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2017.08.015     Document Type: Erratum

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