TPAHS: A truthful and profit maximizing double auction for heterogeneous spectrums

Proceedings - 15th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, 10th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and Engineering and 14th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, IEEE TrustCom/BigDataSE/ISPA 2016

Volumn , Issue , 2016, Pages 27-33

  Zhou, Tianqi ^a   Chen, Bing ^a   Zhu, Chunsheng ^b   Zhai, Xiangping ^a  

^a NANJING UNIVERSITY OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Double auction; Profit maximizing; Spectrum auction; Truthfulness

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; DATA PRIVACY; EFFICIENCY; PROFITABILITY; SIGNAL INTERFERENCE; SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO; SPURIOUS SIGNAL NOISE; WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

DOUBLE AUCTION; INTERFERENCE GRAPHS; SIGNAL TO INTERFERENCE PLUS NOISE RATIO; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; SPECTRUM HETEROGENEITIES; SPECTRUM UTILIZATION; TRUTHFULNESS; WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS;

BIG DATA;

EID: 85015247294     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/TrustCom.2016.0042     Document Type: Conference Paper

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