PROMISE: A framework for truthful and profit maximizing spectrum double auctions

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 109-117

  Yang, Dejun ^a   Zhang, Xiang ^b   Xue, Guoliang ^b  

^a Department of Geology and Geological Engineering   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT; PROFITABILITY; REUSABILITY;

COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; DOUBLE AUCTION; NOVEL TECHNIQUES; OPTIMAL AUCTION; PROFIT MAXIMIZATION; SECONDARY USERS; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84904419004     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFOCOM.2014.6847930     Document Type: Conference Paper

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