Board composition and firm performance of large Latin American firms: An exploratory view

Latin American Business Review

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 1-19

  Santiago Castro, Marisela ^a   Baek, H Young ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PAN AMERICAN   (United States)

^b NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

American depository receipt; Board composition; Firm performance; Outside directors

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011454623     PISSN: 10978526     EISSN: 15286932     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1300/J140v04n02_01     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Agrawal, Anup and Knoeber, Charles R. (1996). “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders,”Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 377-97.
2. Alderfer, Clayton P. (1986). “The Invisible Director on Corporate Boards,”Harvard Business Review, Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 38-58.
3. Barnhart, Scott W., Marr, Wayne M. and Rosenstein, Stuart (1994). “Firm Performance and Board Composition: Some New Evidence,”Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 329-40.
4. Baysinger, Barry D. and Butler, Henry N. (1985). “Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition,”Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 101-24.
5. Brickley, James A., Coles, Jeffrey L. and Jarrell, Gregg A. (1997). “Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board,”Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 189-220.
6. Brickley, James A., James S. Linck and Jeffrey L. Coles (1999). “What Happens to CEOs after they Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Initiatives,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 341-77.
7. Byrd, John W. and Hickman, Kent A. (1992). “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 195-221.
8. Calvo, Guillermo A., Leiderman, Leonardo and Reinhart, Carmen M. (1996). “Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in the 1990s,”Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 123-39.
9. Denis, David J. and Sarin, Atulya (1999). “Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded Corporations,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 187-223.
10. Fama, Eugene F. (1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 21, pp. 288-307.
11. Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C. (1983a). “Separation of Ownership and Control,”Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 301-25.
12. Gilson, Stuart C. (1990). “Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders. Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default,”Journal ofFi-nancial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 355-87.
13. Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Weisbach, Michael S. (1991). “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance,”Financial Management, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 101-12.
14. Jensen, Michael C. (1986). “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,”The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 323-9.
15. Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,”Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-69.
16. Kaplan, Steven N. (1994). “Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 3, pp. 510-46.
17. Kaplan, Steven N. and Reishus, David (1990). “Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 389-410.
18. Klein, April (1998). “Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure,”Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41, No.1, pp. 275-303.
19. La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio (1997). “Legal Determinants of External Finance,”Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 1131-50.
20. La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei (1999). “Corporate Ownership Around the World,”Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 471- 517.
21. La Porta, Rafael et al. (1998). “Law and Finance,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1113-55.
22. Mehran, Hamid (1995). “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 163-84.
23. Mishra, Chandra S. and Nielsen, James F. (2000). “Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large Bank Holding Companies,”Financial Management, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 163-84.
24. Pearce, J. A. and Zahra, S. (1991). “The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: Associations with Corporate Performance,”Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 135-53.
25. Peng, Mike, Keven Au and Denis Wang (2001). “Interlocking Directorates as Corporate Governance in Third World Multinationals: Theory and Evidence from Thailand,”Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 18, pp. 161-81.
26. Reid, M. “Inside Story.”Economist (The), December 6 1997, S7-S9.
27. Rosenstein, Stuart and Wyatt, Jeffrey G. (1990). “Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 175-91.
28. Sargent, John and Ghaddar, Suad (2001). “International Success ofBusiness Groups as an Indicator of National Competitiveness: The Mexican Example,”Latin American Business Review, Vol. 2, No. 3/4, pp. 97-121.
29. Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1986). “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 461-88.
30. Weisbach, Michael S. (1988). “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 431-60.