Is there adverse selection in the credit market?

Venture Capital

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 215-238

  Cressy, Robert ^a   Toivanen, Otto ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Finland)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Bank loans; Collateral; Credit markets; Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011195653     PISSN: 13691066     EISSN: 14645343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13691060110052104     Document Type: Article

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