Career concerns with exponential learning

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 425-475

  Bonatti, Alessandro ^a   Hörner, Johannes ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Career concerns; career paths; experimentation; reputation; up or out

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010850243     PISSN: 19336837     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/TE2115     Document Type: Article

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