Bounded rationality in the centipede game

Episteme

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 262-280

  Sperry Taylor, Ashton T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010686579     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2011.0021     Document Type: Article

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