Higher-order epistemic attitudes and intellectual humility

Episteme

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 205-223

  Hazlett, Allan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010682298     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2012.11     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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