Defeaters and higher-level requirements

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 220, 2005, Pages 419-436

  Bergmann, Michael ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52649182613     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. See W. Alston, 'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology', repr. in his Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Cornell UP, 1989), pp. 185-226, at pp. 209-11
2. P. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge UP, 1989), pp. 173-6
3. R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Scepticism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), p. 64
4. See L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard UP, 1985), pp. 34-45, for a widely appreciated defence of the prima facie plausibility of this requirement
5. See E. Sosa, 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective', repr. in his Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge UP, 1991), pp. 270-93, at p. 293
6. See A. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard UP, 1986), pp. 200-2
7. See A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 359-66
8. See esp. my 'Internalism, Externalism, and the No-Defeater Condition', Synthese, 110 (1997), pp. 399-417
9. 'Externalism and Scepticism', Philosophical Review, 109 (2000), pp. 159-94
10. 'Externalist Justification Without Reliability', Philosophical Issues, 14 (2004), pp. 35-60
11. See K. DeRose, 'Contextualism: an Explanation and a Defense', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 187-205