The case for universal full-scope safeguards on nuclear material

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 69-80

  Schaper, Annette ^a  

^a Frankfurt am Main Research Center Transformations of Political Violence   (Germany)

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EID: 85010628709     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709808436708     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. The work for this paper has benefited greatly from discussions with Harald Muller, William Walker, PRIF’s nonproliferation group, and members of the German Foreign Office. Scott Parrish and two anonymous reviewers have made very useful suggestions and have taken great care in the editing process. The author wishes to thank them all. The opinions of this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the German government. Parts of this paper are derived from a larger study, Annette Schaper, A Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons - What to Cover? How to Verify? PRIF Reports, No. 48, July 1997.
2. Oleg Bukharin, “Upgrading Security at Nuclear Power Plants in the Newly Independent States,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Winter 1997), p. 28.
3. for an overview on the security of the Russian nuclear complex sec: Oleg Bukharin, “Security of Fissile Materials in Russia,” Annual Review of Energy and Environment 21 (1996), pp. 467-496.
4. R. Jeffrey Smith, “More Nuclear Disarmament Beyond START II is Expected,” The Washington Post, January 23, 1997, p. A4.
5. For a detailed study of the problem of excess plutonium and its disposition see, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1994)
6. NAS, CISAC, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1995).
7. William Potter, “Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat Of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States,” Arms Control Today 25 (October 1995), pp. 9-16.
8. Annette Schaper, “Nuclear Smuggling in Europe - Real Dangers and Enigmatic Deceptions,” paper presented at the forum on Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards and Countermeasures, Como, Villa Olmo, spon-sored by the EU Joint Research Center, June 11 -13,1997, proceedings (forthcoming)
9. Vladimir A. Orlov, “Accounting, Control, and Physical Protection of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons in The Russian Federation: Current Situation and Main Concerns,” paper presented at the International Seminar on MPC & A in Russia and N1S, Bonn, sponsored by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 7-8, 1997.
10. Department of Defense, 1997 Annual Defense Report, Chapter 7: “Cooperative Threat Reduction” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997)
11. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Letter Report, GAO/NSIAD-96-222, 09/27/96).
12. For assessments see: Jessica E. Stem, “U.S. Assistance Programs for Improving MPC & A in the Former Soviet Union,” The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Winter 1996), p. 17.
13. Oleg Bukharin, “U.S. Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Safeguards,”The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Fall 1994), p. 30.
14. Aleksander Rumyantsev, “The Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Substances in Russia,” Yademy Kontrol English Digest 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-8.
15. Elina Kirichenko, “Evolution of the Russian Nonproliferation Export Controls,” The Monitor 2 (Summer 1996), p. 8.
16. For this purpose, the International Science and Technology Center has been created with the objective of funding civilian projects with international collaboration involving scientists from the Russian nuclear weapons complex. See: The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), January -December 1995 - Second Annual Report, (Moscow: ISTC, 1996)
17. for the activities of the IAEA see: Sven Thorstensen, Nuclear Material Accounting and Control: Coordinating Assistance to Newly Independent States - An Overview of IAEA-Supported Activities to Help Former Soviet Republics Establish State Systems Of Accounting and Control, IAEA Bulletin (January 1995), p. 29.
18. for the activities of the Europeans see: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Substances - Implementation of the guidelines laid down in the communication from the Commission of 7 September 1994, (COM(94)383) and in the Conclusions of the Essen European Council, COM (96) 171 (Brussels, 19 April 1996)
19. Commission of the European Communities, DG XVII, EURA-TOM-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control (Luxembourg, March 31, 1997)
20. see also, Todd Perry, “Stemming Russia’s Plutonium Tide: Cooperative Efforts to Convert Military Reactors,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Winter 1997), p. 104.
21. The disposition efforts are still in their infancy. The still most advanced disposition project is the proposed French-German-Russian cooperation on the fabrication of MOX from disarmament material whose technical feasibility has been demonstrated by several studies and whose acceptance has been endorsed by a meeting of the P-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group in November 1996.
22. See Ann MacLachlan, “French, Germans and Russians aim for 1998 decision on MOX plant,” Nuclear Fuel, December 2, 1996.
23. National Academy of Science and German-American Academic Council (GAAC), U.S.-German Cooperation in the Elimination of Excess Weapons Plutonium, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, July 1995).
24. The idea of making use of the abandoned German MOX facility at Hanau which would have secured maximum transparency was not pursued because of lacking public acceptance. See: Annette Schaper, “Using Existing European MOX Fabrication Plants for the Disposal of Plutonium from Dismantled Warheads,” in: William G. Sutcliffe, ed. Selected Papers from Global 95, (UCRL-1D-124105, Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, June 1996), p. 197.
25. Department of Energy, Trilateral Initiative on Verifying Excess Weapon Origin Fissile Materials, (Press Statement, November 8, 1996)
26. Bruno Pel-laud, “International Verification of US and Russian Materials Released for Storage and Disposition,” paper presented at the International Policy Forum: Management & Disposition of Nuclear Weapons Materials, Landsdowne, Virginia, February 12, 1997.
27. Harald Muller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995).
28. National Academy of Sciences and German-American Academic Council (GAAC), U.S.-German Cooperation in the Elimination of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, April 20,1996.
29. At the time being, production of military plutonium in Russia still takes place because the production reactors simultaneously produce energy and the spent fuels must be reprocessed for technical reasons. See Perry, “Stemming Russia’s Plutonium Tide.”
30. Numbers for totals, inside weapons, and U.S. declared excess derived from David Albright, Frans Berkout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
31. This is primarily a political irreversibility. One hundred percent technical irreversibility is not possible; but it can be approached by some disposition methods.
32. See IAEA Safeguards Glossary (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1987).
33. IAEA Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, Model Protocol Additional to Existing Safeguards Agreements Between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, May 15, 1997.
34. IAEA, “IAEA Board of Governors Approves Strengthened Measures to Verify Nuclear Weapons Pact” (Press release PR 97/9, May 16, 1997)
35. the proposals made by the IAEA are described in: Suzanna van Moyland, Verification Matters: The IAEA’s Programme ‘93+2’, VERTIC Report 10 (January 1997).
36. For a short description of problems during its negotiations see: Annette Schaper, “Detection of Non-Declared Activities Towards Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Proceedings of the Workshop on Science and Modem Technology for Safeguards in Arona (Italy), 28-31 October, 1996 (Ispra, 1997), p. 341.
37. “Statement by the Utilities Employing Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Industry in Germany on the IAEA Programme 93+2,” press statement, June 3, 1996.
38. Among the disputed problems were: the conformity of the reforms with domestic law, especially where access to private property was concerned; implications for the verification agreements between the IAEA, EURATOM, and the NNWS members of the EU; the protection of industrial secrets, and the lack of specific managed access provisions similar to those in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
39. French declaration: Measures that France Intends to Apply for the Implementation of the 93+2 Programme, May 13, 1997 (unofficial English translation from French);
40. British declaration: Implementation in the UK of Measures Provided for in the Programme 93+2 Model Protocol, May 13, 1997.
41. Chinese declaration: Statement by China on its Contribution to the Implementation of “Programme 93+2”, May 15, 1997 (translation from Chinese);
42. Russian declaration: Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Special Session of the IAEA Board of Governors, May 15, 1997 (unofficial translation from Russian).
43. “Statement by the Utilities Employing Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Industry in Germany”; Representatives of the German nuclear industry, in-terview with the author, December 1997.
44. Naoaki Usui, “Oyama says Japan will discuss International Plutonium Management,” Nucleonics Week, March 4, 1993.
45. Shinichiro Izumi, “International Management of Plutonium,” Plutonium 12 (Winter 1996), p. 3.
46. Fred McGoldrick, “US Fissile Material Initiatives,” Proceedings of the Symposium on International Nuclear Safeguards, Vienna, March 14-18, 1994, p. 17.
47. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, “Genpan 10-Point Initiative for Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Declaration, Bonn, 15 December 1993.
48. Summary in: Nuclear Proliferation News 5, June 10, 1994.
49. Naoaki Usui, “Western Countries Will Make Plutonium Inventories Public,” Nucleonics Week, January 26, 1995.
50. The U.S. figures have been published by: Department of Energy, “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 to 1994” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996). The Japanese figures are published annually since 1995: “Info-clip: Plutonium Inventories in Japan,” Plutonium 11 (Autumn 1995), p. 15. EU members do not necessarily have national nuclear material accountancy, this authority has been transferred to EURATOM. EURATOM does not make legal dis-tinctions between transfers within the territory of one member state and transfers that cross inner EU borders. However, the GPM explicitly speak of “Governments” and “national figures.” But it also contains the reservation that EU members “will implement this guideline in the light of its legal obligations under the EURATOM Treaty.”
51. In agreement with already existing legal obligations, such as the EURATOM Treaty, safeguards agreements with the IAEA, the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, and others.
52. IAEA, Research Reactor Core Conversion Guidebooks (IAEA-TECDOC-643, April 1992), Vols. 1-5.
53. In this area, the U.S. RERTR program has spent about $50 million, and the German AF-Program DM 51.1 million. An exception are new reactors that make already use of the new results: e.g., that use the denser fuel but not with LEU but again with HEU. The only one would be the newly planned new research reactor FRM-II at Garching. See Annette Schaper, “Der geplante Forschungsreaktor in Garching - Rückfall in alte Sünderzeiten deutscher Nichtverbreitungspolitik?” HSFk-Standpunkle 3 (March 1996)
54. Hans-Jürgen Didier and Richard Bätz, “Die Garchinger HochfluBneutronenquelle ist im Bau,” Atomwirtschaft 42 (March 1997), p. 166.
55. A naval reactor core conversion program would be also a most convincing argument in favor for phasing out the civilian use of HEU altogether, including the planned German reactor in Garching. As a consequence, a ban on all HEU production could become a realistic prospect.
56. Often the terms SSAC and MC & A are used synonymously. The precise meanings are: the SSAC is a legal body and an instrument that defines the technical and practical MC & A measures.
57. The IAEA views itself as well prepared for this task. See Svein Thorstensen, “Fissile Material and Verification - IAEA Capability and Infrastructure for Verification of Fissile Material,” Presentation at the Cut-Off Convention Workshop, Toronto, Canada, January 17-18, 1995.
58. Source of this paragraph: Alexander N. Rumyantsev, “Establishing a SSAC in Russia: structural, organizational, budgetary and political problems,” paper presented at the International Seminar on MPC&A in Russia and N1S, Bonn, sponsored by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 7-8, 1997.
59. Yuriy Volodin, “Russian Efforts to Improve Regulation and Maintenance of the Account, Control and Safeguards of Nuclear Materials at Nuclear Installations,” paper presented at the International Seminar on MPC&A in Russia and NIS, Bonn, sponsored by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswiirtige Politik, April 7-8, 1997. Volodin is a Gosatomnadzor official. In this paper, the SSAC is called State MC & 5 A system.
60. In the United States, the isotopic composition of fissile materials is classified as long as the material is in warhead component form. As soon as this form is modified, the masses and isotopic composition can be revealed. See J.T. Markin, W.D. Stanbro, “Policy and Technical Issues for International Safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States,” in International Nuclear Safeguards 1994 (Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna, March 14-18, 1994, Vol. 2), p. 639. In Russia in contrast, the isotopic composition of disarmed materials remains classified.
61. Indications in this direction can be seen in the Tengen smuggling case: In 1994, a smuggled sample of plutonium from Russia was detected in Tengen (Germany) that originated in Russia and apparently has been enriched in Plutonium-239 with centrifuges. Since Russian warheads are said to be constructed in a way that does not take into account later dismantling, it might be assumed that some Russian warheads consist of enriched plutonium. See Schaper, “Nuclear Smuggling in Europe - Real Dangers and Enigmatic Deceptions.”
62. Oleg Bukharin, “Integration of the Military and Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycles in Russia,” Science & Global Security 4 (1994), p. 385.
63. Gennadiy Pshakin, “Methods to Cope With Material Protection Problems in Russia and the CIS: How to Draw a Line Between Civilian and Military Sector,” paper presented at the International Seminar on MPC&A in Russia and NIS, Bonn, sponsored by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 7-8, 1997.
64. J.T. Markin et al., “Policy and Technical Issues for International Safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States.”
65. IAEA, “A Cut-Off Treaty and Associated Costs - An IAEA Secretariat Working Paper on Different Alternatives for the Verification of a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off Treaty and Preliminary Cost Estimates Required for the Verification of these Alternatives,” paper presented at the Workshop on a Cut-Off Treaty, Toronto, Canada, January 17-18,1995.
66. Fred McGoldrick (U.S. Department of State) stated in 1994: “Some argue that the benefits of safeguards in nuclear weapon States are not commensurate with the costs. I think they are, and many share this view.”
67. See Fred McGoldrick, “U.S. Fissile Material Initiatives - Implications for the IAEA,” Proceedings of the Symposium on International Nuclear Safeguards, Vol. 1. (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, March 14-18, 1994), pp. 17f, 20.
68. Kinkel,“German 10-Point Initiative for Nuclear Nonproliferation.” For the significance of this proposal and the reaction of the NWS.
69. see: Harald Muller, “Transparency in Nuclear Arms: Toward a Nuclear Weapon Register,” Arms Control Today 24 (October 1994), p. 3.
70. Stefan Keller, “Some Striking Similarities and Some Telling Dissimilarities Between a Cutoff Convention and a CTBT,” contained in the appendix to Schaper, A Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons.
71. Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, especially Chapter 15.
72. William Walker, “Reflections on Nuclear Transparency and Irreversibility: The Re-Regulation of Partially Disarmed States,” Background paper for the Conference on the Fissile Material Cutoff sponsored by the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Schlangenbad, Germany, July 25-27,1997.
73. Vladislav N. Misharin, “IAEA Safeguards in the Former USSR,” The Monitor 1 (Spring 1995), p. 4.
74. Ambassador Sha Zhukang, “China’s Position on the Cutoff Convention,” paper presented at the Workshop on “Fissile Material and Tritium - How to Verify a Comprehensive Production Cutoff and Safeguard all Stocks”, sponsored by UNIDIR and INESAP, Geneva, Switzerland, June 29-30, 1995.
75. Jörg H. Gösele, Hans. Herman Remagen, Gotthard Stein, “A German view on safeguards beyond 1995,” in Proceedings of the Symposium on International Nuclear Safeguards, Vol. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, March 14-18,1994), p. 701.
76. Hartmut Blankenstein, “Political Considerations on the Future of Safeguards,” Proceedings of the 17th Annual Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, (Aachen, Germany, 9-11 May 1995), p. 21.
77. Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, p. 456.