U.S. assistance programs for improving MPC&A in the former soviet union

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 17-32

  Stern, Jessica E ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 85008776565     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709608436620     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. The author wishes to thank the Council on Foreign Relations, the Hoover Institution, and the MacArthur Foundation for funding this research; Nicholas Bums and Chip Blacker, for providing encouragement to pursue these subjects.
2. Jerry Dzakowiz, for constant support Matthew Bunn and Frank von Hippel, for providing tutorials and the constant motivation to do more The members of the MPC&A and Nuclear Smuggling Interagency Working Groups, for insights on how government works
3. The many Russian and U.S. government officials who consented to be inter-viewed and provided comments on this chapter, The members of the MPC&A and Nuclear Smuggling Interagency Working Groups especially
4. William Alberque and Kate Baur Bricker of the Department of Energy Tatiana Krasnopevtseva, for helping to formulate and translate questions for interviews in Moscow
5. John Shields, William Potter, Richard Combs, and Laura Holgate for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this study. Tatiana Krasnopevtseva
6. President Clinton’s Address to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Conference, Tatiana Krasnopevtseva Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 2, 1995.
7. As is explained below, beginning with the FY 96 budget request, U.S.-NIS MPC&A projects for nuclear materials will no longer by funded by the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) budget. They will instead be funded out of Depart, ment of Energy (DOE) funds. Conceptually, however, MPC&A remains part of Nunn-Lugar and must be addressed in any comprehensive treatment of the Nunn-Lugar initiative. MPC&A for warheads remains a DOD Nunn-Lugar program.
8. Author’s interview with a U.S. government official, December 1995 (name withheld).
9. Author’s interview with unidentified Minatom official. Much of the material in this chapter is based on interviews in Moscow between November 3 and 15, 1995 with Minatom, GAN, and Russian uclear Security officials who asked not to be identified by name.
10. Mark Hibbs, Physical Protection Reportedly Eroding atMinatom’s 10 ‘Closed Cities’ in Russia, Nucleonics Week, January 2, 1995, p. 13.
11. Author’s conversation with Gozatomnadzor official, who requested not to be identified, No-vember 8, 1995.
12. Author’s interview with Minatom official, who requested not to be identified, November 7, 1995.
13. Even the best possible inventory system (with no system of allowed losses) would not solve the problem of the determined, well-informed thief who knows to spread his thievery out over a long period of time, always staying within the technical limits of the accounting system. According to the Head of the Department of Arms Control and Nonproliferation of Russia’s Federal Intelligence Service (SVR), General Gaennady Evstafiyev, who was interviewed by the author for this study, No accounting system can detect losses of less than one percent of the total inventory. This is why it is important to install a comprehensive MPC&A system, that is, one that includes not only accounting, but also systems to detect attempts to remove even small amounts of nuclear material.
14. Author’s interview with a senior member of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s National Security Council staff, No accounting system can detect losses of less than one percent of the total inventor November 1995.
15. David Osias, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, August 22, 1995.
16. Author’s interview with a U.S. government official, Subcommittee on European Affairs December 1995 (name withheld).
17. David Osias, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, August 22, 1995.
18. Stanislav Lunev, Russia’s Nuclear Safety Problems, Prism, Part 1, Volume 1, Number 22, October 20, 1995.
19. Author’s interview with a U.S. government official, Prism December 1995 (name withheld).
20. Author’s interview with an unidentified Minatom official Prism on November 14, 1995.
21. The figure of 600 storage sites for 1989 is from the testimony of Gordon Oehler, the Director of the Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Prism January 31, 1995
22. S. Hrg. 10435, p. 4. In an August 1995 discussion with U.S. officials, General Maslin noted that there had been 200 sites in 1991.
23. Vladimir Orlov, A Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Exists in Russia, Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 44, June 25, 1995, p. 14.
24. Kurt Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991), p. 125. Conversations between Ashton Carter and Senators Nunn and Lugar in the formulation of this book were a major factor behind the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar program.
25. Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, Nuclear Materials Trafficking: an Interim Assessment, Transnational Organized Crime, 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 206-238.
26. Several technical aspects of the nuclear smuggling problem have been muddled in press reports. One of these is the distinction between nonfissile radioactive isotopes and fissile material used to make nuclear weapons. The former include medical isotopes which, although extremely toxic, cannot be used to create a nuclear detonation in a bomb. A second important distinction, relating to the isotopic purity of fissile material, is between weapons-grade material and so-called weapons-usable material, which could be used, albeit less efficiently, in a nuclear weapon. Strictly speaking, HEU is uranium that has been enriched to greater than 20 percent U-235. Weapons-grade HEU refers to HEU that has been enriched to 90 percent U-235 or higher. U.S. and Russian bomb designers typically use weapons- grade fissile material in order to ensure a high degree of weapon reliability and efficiency, which also allows design of smaller weapons more easily transported by plane or in a missile warhead. However, HEU enriched to between 20 and 90 percent U-235, according to unclassified IAEA data, can also be used in a weapon, although a lower level of enrichment will require a larger amount of material to make a detonable weapon, resulting in a proportionately heavier and larger weapon. Similarly, weapons-grade" plutonium typically contains no more than seven percent Pu-240. However, relatively less pure plutonium, including reactor-grade plutonium, can be used to make a bomb, albeit with an assured yield of only one to a few kilotons for a simple, Nagasakitype design, and a higher, but still reduced yield for more sophisticated designs. An understanding of these distinctions helps place the smuggling problem in some perspective: it is not as bad as many journalists would have the public believe, but it is far worse than many Russian government officials are willing to admit.
27. Often overlooked are the many cases of stolen medical isotopes and other radiation sources. These incidents are discounted because radioisotopes cannot be used to make detonable nuclear devices; MPC&A programs cannot possibly address the threat they pose. But they can be used by terrorists to draw attention to their cause, to wreak havoc, and to terrorize civilians.
28. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the Chechen group who took more than 1, 000 hospital patients hostage in June 1995, has claimed credit for placing a packet of radioactive cesium in Izmailovski Park in Moscow, a popular recreation spot for families, frequented by tourists as well as by Muscovites. Cesium-137, a radioactive isotope used in the treatment of cancer, is a waste product of nuclear reactors with a relatively long half life, and areas contaminated with it require extensive clean-up. It can be absorbed into the food chain and is carcinogenic. Cesium is used in industry in photoelectric cells, for measuring the thickness or density of materials, and in gamma-radiography. A related concern is the possibility of terrorism directed against nuclear power plants or other civilian facilities. Dzhokar Dudaev, leader of the rebellious republic of Chechnya, has frequently threatened to attack Russian nuclear power plants or to commit other acts of nuclear terrorism. The Russian government formed an interagency group to address concerns about nuclear terrorism, including Dudaev’s threats. The group ordered that additional safeguards be put in place at power plants, for example, but the effort was not serious, according to a Minatom official who requested anonymity. An intelligent terrorist could easily circumvent the beefed-up controls, he said.
29. William Potter, Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the PostSoviet States, Arms Control Today 25 (October 1995), pp. 9-16. Experts speculate that the 0.8 gram cache of 87 percent enriched HEU seized in Germany may have come from the same source as die consignments seized in Prague, which were of similar isotopic content.
30. Thieves of nuclear materials tend to be amateurs who have no specific buyer in mind. As General Gaennady Evstafiyev, the head of the Department of Arms Control and Nonproliferation of Russia’s Federal Intelligence Service (SVR), has observed, As a rule, the thieves hide the material with extreme care, often for a long time, and only then do they begin to search for a buyer. General Gaennady Evstafiyev, Yademaya Mafiya v Rossii. Pravda I Mify, (Nuclear Mafia in Russia: Truth and Myths) Vek, September 22-28, 1995, pp. 1-10.
31. Author’s interview with a Minatom official, November 14, 1995.
32. James Wyllie, Iran—Quest for Security and Influence, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1, 1993, p. 311.
33. In 1994, nearly 600 kilograms of HEU were subsequently airlifted from this poorly secured site to safe storage in the United-States in a joint U.S.-Kazakstani operation dubbed Project Sapphire. For a complete description of this operation, the events that surrounded it, and the possible Iranian connection.
34. William Potter, Project Sapphire: A Study of U.S.-Kazakstani Cooperation for Nonproliferation, paper prepared for the conference on The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Donor and Recipient Country perspectives, at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California, August 20-22, 1995. Mark Hibbs, Kazakhs Say Iran Sought LEU for WER Fuel, Not ‘Sapphire’ HEU, Nuclear Fuel, July 17, 1995, p. 11-12.
35. Ankara Anatolia, in English, 10:15 GMT, October 6, 1993, as reported in an unclassified cable, serial TA06 10103193
36. Istanbul Turkiye, in Turkish, October 7, 1993, as reported in an unclassified cable, serial NC0910082 693. Details of this incident are also based on a conversation by the author with Ozgen Acar, an editorial and special investigative reporter for Cumhuriyet, a major Turkish daily paper.
37. Reuters World Service, Iraq, Iran secretly buying on nuclear market, January 18, 1996;
38. Reuters World Service, Iran Objects Over German Nuclear Charges, January 25, 1996.
39. The U.S. government has a comprehensive program to combat nuclear smuggling in addition to programs to enhance fissile materials protection, but space limitations preclude discussion of anti-smuggling initiatives in this paper
40. Beginning with the FY 96 budget request, MPC&A projects for nuclear materials will no longer be funded out of DOD’s Nunn-Lugar CTR budget. Instead, they will be funded by DOE. As of January 1996, MPC&A projects paid for by DOD funds include: 1 the Lab-to-Lab program for FY 95, which was funded by 15 million transferred from DOD to DOE in a onetime, top-line transfer; 2 Govemment-to-Gov- emment MPC&A projects through FY 95, which were funded by 30 million allocated to DOD between FY 92 through FY 94 for the (then) Nunn-Lugar MPC&A program; and 3 some of the non-Russian NIS MPC&A projects. DOE is now the Executive Agent for the entire MPC&A effort for nuclear materials. Warhead transport and security remain a Nunn-Lugar program, however. Author’s interviews with DOD and DOE officials, November 1995.32 Information provided by a DOE official, December 1995.
41. Mark Hibbs, Russia Improving Protection for Sensitive Nuclear Sites, Nucleonics Week, March 30, 1995, p. 12.
42. These include the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering Institute, Obninsk
43. The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automatics ELERON the Kurchatov Institute; Arzamas-16 Chelybinsk-70
44. Avangard, Penza-19, Sverdlovsk- 45, and Zlatoust-36 dismantlement facilities
45. Tomsk-7. Recent bureaucratic decisions have slowed work at the dismandement sites, however. Information provided by Department of Energy, November 1995.
46. Arzamas-16 is located in a closed city straddling Nizhny Novgorod oblast and Udmurtia Republic. The first joint Lab-to-Lab project was initiated at this laboratory, which Russian scientists jokingly refer to as Los Arzamas, because it was partially modeled on Los Alamos. Public Affairs Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos Works with Russian on New Systems to Track Nuclear Materials, January 16, 1994.
47. Author’s tour of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk, Could easily be slipped into a thief s pocket November 13.
48. These disks, which weigh approximately five grams, could easily be slipped into a thief s pocket. There are tens of thousands of them at the site, totaling about eight metric tons of HEU and about 800 kilograms of plutonium.
49. Los Alamos National Laboratory Public Information Group News Release, U.S., Russian Scientists Demonstrate Nuclear Materials Security System at Russian Power Institute, September 21, 1995.
50. Author’s interview with a DOE official.
51. Penny Morvant, Gosatomnadzor Ceases Military Inspections, OMRI Daily Digest 1, No. 179, September 14, 1995, and Statute on Nuclear Radiation Safety Updated, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 2, 1995, p. 4.
52. Karpov Research and Development Institute of Physics and Chemistry, Obninsk; Institute of Nuclear Physics, Gatchina; Moscow Institute of Physics and Engineering, United Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna; Tomsk Polytechnical University Nikel Combine, Norilsk.
53. Author’s conversation with DOD officials, November 1995.
54. Interview with General Maslin in Yademy Kontrol, reprinted in The Monitor (University of Georgia, Spring, 1995), p. 13.
55. In addition, beginning in FY 1996, the Department of State assumed responsibility for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), as well as for several projects related to export control assistance to Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
56. Author’s conversation with DOE officials, November 1995.
57. This critique and the events surrounding the balkanization of Nunn-Lugar are explained in detail in Rose Gottemoeller, The Nunn-Lugar Program and Presidential Priorities in Nuclear Policy, prepared for conference on The Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Donor and Recipient Country Perspectives, at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California, August 20-22, 1995.
58. Information provided by DOD and DOE officials, November and December 1995 and February 1996.
59. General Gaennady Evstafiyev, Yademaya Mafiya v Rossii. Pravda I Mify. Mark Hibbs, Europeans Term ‘Worthless’ Minatom Claim that No HEU or Pu is Missing, Nuclear Fuel, March 27, 1995, p. 12.
60. General Gaennady Evstafiyev. The IAEA defines a significant quantity as eight kilograms of elemental plutonium and 25 kilograms of HEU enriched to at least 20 percent U-235.
61. Ukaz President Rossiskoi Federatsii, O pervoocherednyx merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu systemu i sokhrannosti yademykh materuyalov, (Decree of the President of the Russian Federa-tion on Emergency Measures to Perfect a System of Secure Storage of Nuclear Materials) September 15, 1994.
62. Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation, On Priority Projects for 1995 to Develop and Implement the State Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, January 13, 1995, no. 34.
63. Author’s interview with Minatom official, November 14, 1995. This official refrained from blaming the smuggling problem on German provocateurs or on journalists exaggerating the problem to sell newspapers. Nor did he employ another tactic in vogue among officials interviewed by this author, as well as in official statements in the press—deflecting attention to the problem by focusing on Western failings in the nonproliferation arena, such the West’s alleged responsibility for die Pakistani, Israeli, South African, and Iraqi nuclear programs. This mid-level Minatom official was so determined that the urgency of the MPC&A problem be communicated that he asked to read over the author’s written translation of interviews to ensure that no important points had been missed.
64. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), p. 96.
65. Author’s interview with a senior member of President Boris Yeltsin’s National Security Council staff, November 1995.
66. Alexei Yablokov, Atomic Energy Ministry Mixed Up Its Own Interests With National Ones, Izvestia, June 2, 1995, p. 3.
67. John Holdren, Nobel Lecture Delivered on Behalf of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 1995.
68. John Holdren, Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft in the Former Soviet Union: Outline of a Comprehensive Plan, unpublished proposal submitted to Senator Richard Lugar, November 1995.
69. Secretary William Perry, Speech before the National Press Club, January 5, 1995. Secretary Perry was referring to the entire Nunn-Lugar effort. He said, It’s neither Russian aid, nor is it unilateral Russian disarmament. Indeed, for the United States, Nunn-Lugar is defense by other means, a particularly effective way to protect ourselves against nuclear weapons that were once aimed at our cities.