Upgrading security at nuclear power plants in the newly independent states

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 28-39

  Bukharin, Oleg ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 33747488644     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709708436663     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. In addition, there are three dual-use plutonium production reactors still in operation in the closed cities of Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26, and two tritium production reactors in Chelyabinsk-65. There are also tens of smaUer-power research and propulsion reactors. Sabotage of these reactors, however, would be less damaging because of their much smaller inventories of radioactivity and lower power.
2. Abel Gonzales “Chernobyl—Ten Years After,” IAEA Bulletin, 3/1996, p. 9.
3. In the West, a shutdown of a plant could cost the operating utility up to one million dollars a day; replacing a plant would require billions in investment. Nuclear power is an important component of the NIS energy sector. Nucleargenerated electricity accounts for approximately 13 and 33 percent of total generation in Russia and Ukraine, respectively (up to 40 percent in Russia’s north-west). Lithuania’s Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP) produces over 85 percent of that nation’s electricity (over half of which is exported). The Metzamor-2 reactor, restarted in October 1995 (after the shutdown in 1989), is virtually the only source of electricity in Armenia. In Kazakstan, the BN-350 reactor in Actau provides fresh water and electricity to the Mangyshlak peninsula, an industrialized region on the Caspian sea.
4. Sources of tens of curies of radioactivity represent a significant hazard to human health.
5. Destruction of a reactor and its containment from outside (e.g., in an air raid) would also release radioactivity. Such a threat, however, is outside of the scope of the design- basis threat Defense of a plant against an external militaiy threat is the responsibility of the national government
6. In the Chernobyl accident, damage and heating of the reactor fuel (up to 2000° C.) resulted in complete or partial evaporation of volatile nuclides: 100 percent inert gases, 50 to 60 percent Iodine-131 (45 MCi), 50 percent cesium. (“Chernobyl and Its Consequences,” Project Polyn database, RSC Kurchatov Institute, 1996.)
7. Hydrogen would be produced in zirconium-water (steam) reactions (Zr+ 2H2O ZrO2 + 2H2+ 140 kCa/mole). Oxidation of zirconium (20 t in a typical core) would release 10 kg/sec of hydrogen and large amounts of heat
8. Anatoli Dyatlov, “26 April 1986,” Nuclear Engineering International (April 1996), pp. 18-22.
9. Of all Soviet-designed power reactors, only VVER-1000 reactors have Western-type containment; VVER-440/230 and RBMK reactors do not have a structure designed to contain an accident; and VVER-440/213 reactors have a pressure suppression structure.
10. A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), which could potentially result in a complete de-watering of the core, is the principal concern of reactor safety experts. The possibility ofa LOCA is minimized by the use of redundant and highly-reli-able front-line systems and equipment. Dedicated safety systems, such as the emergency core cooling system, are employed to mitigate a LOCA should it occur. These defenses, however, would fail if an adversary equipped with explosives had access inside the reactor containment where both the primary and emergency cooling equipment (piping, pumps, tanks, etc.) could be easily destroyed.
11. Even if a reactor were shut down successfully, core damage still could occur over time if a long-term heat removal capability were lost (this situation is known as “Loss of the heatsink”). Indeed, approximately 200 MWt heat is produced in a 1,000-MWe reactor by the decay of fission products immediately after the shutdown, and several hours may elapse until the heat production rate drops to a safe level of a fraction of a percent of the full power rate.
12. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Vital Equipment/Ana Guidelines Study: Vital Area Committee Report,” NUREG-1178 (Washington, D.C.: NRC, February 1988), p. 6-1.
13. Jukka Laaksonen, “VVER-1000: Considering its strengths and weaknesses,” Nuclear Engineering International (May 1994), pp. 21-23.
14. Allen Brown, “International RBMK Project: Engineering and Analysis Aspect,” Nuclear Engineering International (October 1994), pp. 41-43.
15. For example, the core of the Metzamor-1 unit in Armenia survived a five-hour long blackout during the 1982 fire.
16. In a Babcock & Wilcox reactor, the core temperature would become unacceptable after less than one hour; in a Westinghouse reactor, there would be severe core damage in less than three hours. (Jukka Laaksonen, “It ain’t necessarily so: reassessing VVER-440 safety,” Nuclear Engineering International (September 1992), pp. 22-25.)
17. “Explosives and Demolitions,” Field Manual 5-25 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. 1967).
18. Tero Vaijoranta and Kristian Maunula, “Reassessing VVER-440 Physical Protection; Strengths and Challenges,” Paper presented at the conference “Nonproliferation and Control of Nuclear Materials in Russia,” Moscow, May 1996.
19. John Stewart, John Davidson, Cynthia Fulwiler, Harvey Jones, and Sarah Mullen, “Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report,” NUREG-0459 (Washington, D.C: NRC, March 1979).
20. Budennovsk is located approximately 200 km from Chechnya’s capital Grozny. The distance between Grozny and the nearest nuclear power plants (the Zaporozhye and Novovoronezh NPP in Ukraine and Russia) is approximately 1,000 km.
21. Gennady L. Lezhikov, Head of the Main Information Center of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Statistical Information on Crime and its Use in Crime Control,” presented at 9th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Officers, Cairo, April 29-May 8, 1995.
22. Author’s correspondence with Lithuanian nuclear experts in September 1996 (names withheld by request).
23. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Mafia, in Uniform: The ‘Criminalization’ of the Russian Armed Forces” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1995).
24. In a May 1996 example, a transport of vitrified high-level waste to the Gorleben repository in Germany took place “Under conditions analogous to civil war.” The shipment required protection by 20,000 riot police at a cost of $33 million. The property damage totaled $66 million. Some of the violent tactics used by the protesters were the destruction and bombing ofrailways, setting fires, blocking roads, cutting power lines, and fighting with police and firefighters. (Nuclear Fuel, May 20, 1996, p. 10.)
25. Radio Baltica (8:50 AM, Moscow time, 14 February 1992).
26. John Davidson and Roberta Warren, “Development and Maintenance of a Design Basis Threatfor Use in Designing Nuclear Safeguards” (Washington, D.C: NRC, November 1994).
27. An example at hand is the assassination attempt on the President of Georgia Eduard Shevarnadze in which terrorists detonated a car-bomb near Shevarhadze’s motorcade on August 29, 1995. (“Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995,” (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of State, April 1996), p. 10.)
28. The assumed number of adversaries is almost arbitrary. Potential NIS adversaries appear to have no manpower constraints. However, the larger the group size the more difficult it would be to maintain operational security.
29. The capability of the group to operate in more than one team is very important. Ideally, the adversary would want to have an assault/demolition unit(s) to get to and destroy the targets, and a security team(s) to create diversions, delay re-enforcement, and neutralize the reactor security force.
30. Report on Activities of the Federal Regulator of Russia on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 1993, RD-03-02-93 (Moscow: Gosatomnadzor, 1993), pp. 60-61.
31. According to a U.S. counter-terrorism expert “You can go over the fences, both fences, in under 30 seconds, set the alarm off and still not get detected.” (“Red Cell,” Documentary film, S. C. Cranford and John Wieseman, eds., L.O.T.I. Group Production, 1993.) It should be noted that an assessment would be assured with a digital video-capture system that allows an alarm station operator to freeze frames one second before the alarm, at the moment of the alarm, and one second after; author’s communication with Michael Warren, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1996.
32. Heikki Aulamo, Jouko Marttila, Heikki Reponen, “The full stories on Armenia and Beloyarsk,” Nuclear Engineering International (July 1995), pp. 32-33.
33. Whenever possible, engagement should occur at choke or hard points located inside buildings but outside of vital areas.(Author’s communication with Bryan Dettman and Michael Warren, B. A. Dettman & Associates, January 1997.)
34. Initial sets of targets could be determined by evaluating a range ofsabotage scenarios and plant responses. The analysis could be further refined on the basis of statistical models such as the probabilistic safety analysis.
35. Report on Activities of the Federal Regulator…, pp. 60-61.
36. A wide variety of sensors are manufactured domestically. In Russia, Eleron is a major producers of intrusion detection systems of various types. In Ukraine, manufacturing of microwave detectors was started in Kharkiv.
37. G. Spies, et al, “People-Related Problems Affecting Security in the licensed Nuclear Industry”, NUREG-0768 (Washington, D.C: NRC, March 1981).
38. G. Spies, “Red Cell.”
39. A table-top exercise for a given attack scenario is an analytical game in which refereed “adversaries” and “responders” use floor plans and actual time-lines to simulate maneuvers and engagements. A force-on-force exercise is a realistic war-game at the actual plant site. Typically, a force-on-force exercise is preceded by a table-top exercise.
40. There is considerable corruption and crime in the Russian armed forces, including MVD and other security forces. (Graham RTurbiville, Jr., Mafia in Uniform …, p. 5.)
41. It should be noted that at some sites not all potential targets are inside vital areas.
42. For example, the three-PWR-unit Palo Verde plant in the United States is run by 2,400 personnel and uses 600 contractors. In the future, these numbers will be ’ reduced to 1,800 and 100 respectively. In contrast, at a similar NIS plant approximately 6000 people have access to the protected area. (Janet Wood, “Palo Verde,” Nuclear Engineering International (May 1996), pp. 43-46.)
43. Tero Varjoranta and Kristian Maunula, “Reassessing VVER-440 Physical Protection; Strengths and Challenges.” Finnish experts also observe that access control is particularly difficult for a plant with two reactors sharing much of their auxiliary equipment. During reloading, a large number of support personnel have access to the shut-down unit. The other unit continues to operate and is more vulnerable to insider sabotage.
44. In addition to managing background investigations, the KGB had a network of informants. For example, as indicated in a KGB memo (February 21, 1979, No. 346-a) to the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB was fully informed about construction flaws at the Chernobyl 4 unit. (As presented in “Chernobyl Bibliography. Construction Flaws” (http://www.spu.edu/depts/library/third/chemobyl-bib.html).)
45. The plant’s management and Rosatomenergo (Minatom’s utility organization) are directly responsible for reactor security. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provides armed guards. Organization of reactor security also is coordinated with Minatom’s Second Main Directorate (Physical Protection) and the Federal Security Service.
46. It appears that individual facilities may have different design basis threats. Whether such a practice assures consistency ofdesign basis threats across the nuclear industry and their timely upgrades is not known. The arrangement for development, maintenance and validation of the design basis threat appears very different from that for the nuclear power industry in the United States, where these functions are implemented by the U.S. NRC.
47. Assistance activities are conducted according to a “Coordinated Technical Support Plan” prepared by the donor countries under the auspices of the IAEA.
48. In fact, the task of fissile materials protection might be in many respects easier. At a nuclear power plant adversaries would achieve their goals by reaching the intended targets. At a fissile material facility, they would also have to escape. Accordingly, the security forces and law-enforcement agencies could be able to prevent an adversary from escaping by mounting a cordon operation or by conducting a hot pursuit and recovery of stolen materials.