An Investigation into the Economics of Extending Bank Powers

Journal of Emerging Market Finance

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 125-156

  Rajan, Raghuram G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85007683181     PISSN: 09726527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/097265270200100201     Document Type: Article

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