Organization structure and credibility: Evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the Glass-Steagall Act

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 475-516

  Kroszner, Randall S ^a   Rajan, Raghuram G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Credibility; Firewalls; Firm organization; Glass Steagall Act; Universal banking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031206133     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00022-6     Document Type: Article

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