On the instability of Bitcoin without the block reward

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn 24-28-October-2016, Issue , 2016, Pages 154-167

  Carlsten, Miles ^a   Kalodner, Harry ^a   Narayanan, Arvind ^a   Weinberg, S Matthew ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MINERS;

ARRIVAL TIME; BLOCK-CHAIN; SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE;

ELECTRONIC MONEY;

EID: 84995503376     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978408     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

1. Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 21(1):40-55, 1997.
2. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Econometrica, 68(5):1127-1150, 2000.
3. E. Androulaki, G. O. Karame, M. Roeschlin, T. Scherer, and S. Capkun. Evaluating user privacy in bitcoin. In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2013.
4. S. Arora, E. Hazan, and S. Kale. The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-algorithm and applications. Theory of Computing, 8(1):121-164, 2012.
5. P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, and R. E. Schapire. The nonstochastic multiarmed bandit problem. SIAM Journal of Computing, 32(1):48-77, 2002.
6. A. Blum and Y. Mansour. From external to internal regret. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 8:1307-1324, 2007.
7. N. T. Courtois and L. Bahack. On subversive miner strategies and block withholding attack in bitcoin digital currency. CoRR, abs/1402.1718, 2014.
8. I. Eyal. The miner's dilemma. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 IEEE Symposium on, pages 89-103. IEEE, 2015.
9. I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 436-454. Springer, 2014.
10. K. Hill. Bitcoin is not broken. Forbes, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/06/bitcoin-is-not-broken/#55d4a8812568.
11. N. Houy. The economics of bitcoin transaction fees. Working Paper GATE 2014-07. halshs-00951358., 2014.
12. B. Johnson, A. Laszka, J. Grossklags, M. Vasek, and T. Moore. Game-theoretic analysis of ddos attacks against bitcoin mining pools. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Bitcoin Research, 2014.
13. J. A. Kroll, I. C. Davey, and E. W. Felten. The economics of bitcoin mining, or bitcoin in the presence of adversaries. In Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2013.
14. N. Littlestone and M. K. Warmuth. The weighted majority algorithm. Inf. Comput., 108(2):212-261, 1994.
15. L. Luu, J. Teutsch, R. Kulkarni, and P. Saxena. Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2015.
16. A. Miller and R. Jansen. Shadow-bitcoin: scalable simulation via direct execution of multithreaded applications. In Proceedings of the eighth workshop on Cybersecurity Experimentations and Test (CSET), 2015.
17. M. Möser and R. Böhme. Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of bitcoin transaction fees. In Workshop on Bitcoin Research, pages 19-33, 2015.
18. S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2008.
19. K. Nayak, S. Kumar, A. Miller, and E. Shi. Stubborn mining: Generalizing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack. In IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016.
20. R. Peter. A transaction fee market exists without a block size limit. 2015.
21. M. Rosenfeld. Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems. CoRR, abs/1112.4980, 2011.
22. A. Sapirshtein, Y. Sompolinsky, and A. Zohar. Optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2016.
23. M. Vasek, M. Thornton, and T. Moore. Empirical analysis of denial-of-service attacks in the bitcoin ecosystem. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Bitcoin Research, 2014.