Auc2Reserve: A Differentially Private Auction for Electric Vehicle Fast Charging Reservation (Invited Paper)

Proceedings - 2016 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications, RTCSA 2016

Volumn , Issue , 2016, Pages 85-94

  Xiang, Qiao ^a,e   Kong, Linghe ^b,c   Liu, Xue ^b   Xu, Jingdong ^d   Wang, Wei ^a  

^a TONGJI UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

^d NANKAI UNIVERSITY   (China)

^e YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

electric vehicle; mechanism design; privacy; smart grid

Indexed keywords

CHARGING (BATTERIES); COMPETITION; DATA PRIVACY; ECONOMICS; ELECTRIC AUTOMOBILES; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION NETWORKS; ELECTRIC VEHICLES; EMBEDDED SYSTEMS; INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS; MACHINE DESIGN; REAL TIME SYSTEMS; VEHICLES;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVS); INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SMART GRID;

SMART POWER GRIDS;

EID: 84994482742     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/RTCSA.2016.19     Document Type: Conference Paper

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