The Effects of Experience, Ownership, and Knowledge on IPO Survival: Empirical Evidence from Germany

Review of Accounting and Finance

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 13-33

  Audretsch, David B ^a   Lehmann, Erik E ^b  

^a CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corporate Governance; Entrepreneurship; Firm Survival; New Economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993009164     PISSN: 14757702     EISSN: 17587700     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/eb043435     Document Type: Review

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