The global reorganization of legitimate violence: Military entrepreneurs and the private face of international humanitarian law

International Review of the Red Cross

Volumn 88, Issue 863, 2006, Pages 459-490

  Cockayne, James ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84991555056     PISSN: 18163831     EISSN: 16075889     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1816383106000701     Document Type: Article

References (119)

1. The phrase is that of Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, Basic Books, New York, 1983, p. 187.
2. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, trans. Allan H. Gilbert, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1965, Ch. XII.
3. Cf. Max Weber, “Politik als Beruf” (Politics as a vocation), repr. in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1958, p. 78.
4. See, e.g., Peter W. Singer, “War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law”, Columbia Journal of Trans-national Law (Spring 2004).
5. See Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to 1760 A.D., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1986, pp. 410–11
6. Karl Marx, Capital, New World Paperbacks, London, 1972, vol. III, pp. 860–1
7. M. Dobb, “A reply. From feudalism to capitalism”, in R. Hilton (ed.), The transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, New Left Books, London, 1976, pp. 57–97.
8. Mann, above note 5, pp. 420–1
9. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 100.
10. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1974, pp. 24–29
11. P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, Clarendon, Oxford, 1929.
12. M. H. Mills and C. H. Jenkinson, “Rolls from a sheriff's office of the fourteenth century”, English Historical Review (1928), p. 43
13. Giddens, above note 6, p. 179.
14. Giddens, above note 6, pp. 99–100, 150.
15. Harold Berman, Law and Revolution in the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 276
16. Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgren, “The Recruitment and Training of Administrative and Technical Personnel”, in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1975, pp. 456–561, 471, 475–80.
17. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1978, p. 42.
18. Mann, above note 5, pp. 422–3, 431–2.
19. Georges Duby, The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Centuries, trans. Howard Clarke, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978, p. 261
20. Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1952, p. 118.
21. Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1994, p. 103.
22. For a different perspective on the relationship between trial by court and by combat, see Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, trans. B. Einhorn, intro. and ed. C. Arthur, Ink Links, London, 1978, p. 118.
23. See Charles Tilly, Capital, Coercion and European States, AD 990–1990, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, Mass., 1990, pp. 100–2.
24. Capital, Coercion and European States, AD 990–1990, p. 30.
25. Mann, above note 5, pp. 431–2.
26. Samuel E. Finer, “State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military” in Tilly, above note 16, p. 115.
27. See Farewell Address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 January 1961
28. Final TV Talk 1/17/61 (1), Box 38, Speech Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961, Eisenhower Library; National Archives and Records Administration.
29. See Stein Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe”, in Tilly, above note 16, pp. 562–600.
30. The term is that of Spruyt, above note 14, pp. 84–86
31. see also Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Result”, in Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology, Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York, 1988, p. 27.
32. For an analysis of protection bargains in contemporary state-formation, see Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002.
33. Mann, above note 5, p. 431.
34. Tilly, above note 16, pp. 83–84
35. Herfried Münkler, “The wars of the 21st century”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 849 (March 2003), p. 14.
36. Otto Hintze, in F. Gilbert (ed.), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Oxford University Press, New York, 1975, p. 200.
37. Cf. Giddens, above note 6, pp. 151–2.
38. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, ed. Robert Hurley, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp. 87, 89.
39. Pashukanis, above note 15, p. 136.
40. Cf. Spruyt, above note 14, p. 165.
41. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, Verso, London, 1994, p. 129.
42. Mann, above note 5, p. 473.
43. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, p. 472.
44. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations.
45. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, p. 473.
46. Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1994
47. see also Janice Thomson, “Sovereignty in Historical Perspective: The Evolution of State Control over Extraterritorial Violence”, in James Caporoso (ed.), The Elusive State, Sage Press, New York, 1989, pp. 227–54
48. Janice Thomson, “State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism”, 24 International Studies Quarterly (1990), pp. 23–48.
49. C. van Vollenhoven, The Framework of Grotius' Book De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Noord-Hollandsche uitgeversmaapschappij, Amsterdam, 1932, p. 103.
50. Spruyt, above note 14, pp. 170–1.
51. This orientation is ultimately and most clearly reflected in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed on December 26, 1933, which states, “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”
52. Richard S. Horowitz has demonstrated the role that treaties of friendship and commerce played in transforming the internal rule structures of Siam, China and the Ottoman Empire in “International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of World History, vol. 15, no. 4 (December 2004).
53. See Stuart Banner, “Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia”, 23(1) Law and History Review, vol. 23, no. 1 (2005), p. 95.
54. See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, pp. 61–80.
55. Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th edn, Frank Cass and Co., London, 1965, p. 15.
56. Anthony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate System of the League of Nations”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 24 (2002), p. 513
57. see also Anthony Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law”, in Harvard Journal of International Law, vol. 40 (1999), pp. 1–81.
58. See, e.g., US–Tunisia, Treaty of Peace and Friendship, August 28, 1797
59. printed in Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 2, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1931.
60. See James Cockayne, “Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (Book Review)”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 1 (2004), pp. 203–10.
61. See generally Montgomery Sapone, “Have Rifle With Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence”, California Western International Law Journal, vol. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 32–33.
62. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague Convention No. V), 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2310–2331
63. See Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Art. 13(4) (applying the Convention to supply contractors and members of labour units)
64. Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Art. 13(4)
65. Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art. 4(4) (granting certain contractors PoW status).
66. See the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131, UN GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, p. 11, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965)
67. GA Res. 2465, UN GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, p. 4, UN Doc. A/7218 (1968), para. 8 (“the practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act”, calling on Governments to outlaw mercenarism through national legislation)
68. Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, p 123, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State”
69. characterized by the ICJ as reflecting customary international law in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14, pp. 187–92 (June 27) (Merits))
70. Declaration on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, GA Res. 3103, UN GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, p. 142, UN Doc. A/9030 (1973), par. 5 (“The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of Colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and these mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals”)
71. GA Res. 51, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., 78th mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/44/51 (1989) (referring to the 1988 attempted invasion of Maldives)
72. GA Res. 31, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., 83rd mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/49/31 (1995) (emphasizing the vulnerability of small states to the external threat of mercenaries and “[c]ondemning all such acts of aggression”)
73. GA Res. 33, UN GAOR, 45th Sess., 44th mtg. p. 17, UN Doc. A/Res/45/33 (1990)
74. GA Res. 79, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., 78th mtg. p. 34, UN Doc. A/Res/44/79 (1989)
75. GA Res. 89, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., 74th mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/46/89 (1992).
76. Resolution 239 (1967), UN Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2, 1967 (condemning “any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries… with the objective to overthrow the governments of the United Nations”; calling on governments “to ensure that their territory as well as their nationals are not used for the planning of subversion, recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries”)
77. UNSC Res. 289 (Nov. 1970) (demanding withdrawal of mercenaries from Guinea)
78. UNSC Res. 405, 32 UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/INF/33 (1977) (in light of the invasion of Benin, condemning states that continued to permit and tolerate the recruitment of mercenaries “with the objective of overthrowing the Government of Member States”, and calling upon all states to take all “necessary measures” to prevent the use of their territory by mercenaries or recruiters so as to prevent “the planning of subversion and recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of any Member State.”)
79. See also UNSC Res. 226, UN SCOR, 1306th mtg. (1966)
80. S.C. Res. 239, UN SCOR, 1367th mtg. (1967)
81. UNSC Res. 241, UN SCOR, 1378th mtg. (1967).
82. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, initialled Libreville, July 1977, entered into force 22 April 1985, reprinted in Gino J. Naldi (ed.), Documents of the Organization of African Unity, Mansell, London and New York, 1992, p. 58.
83. See also OAU Doc. ECM/Res. 5 (III) (1964) (Addis Ababa)
84. OAU, Resolution on the Activities of Mercenaries, AHG/Res. 49 (IV) (1967)
85. OAU Doc. ECM/ Res. 17 (VII) (1970) (Lagos)
86. OAU, Declaration on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa (June 23, 1971), all reprinted in Robert E. Cesner, Jr. and John H. Brant, “Law of the Mercenary: An International Dilemma”, Capital University Law Review, vol. 6 (1990), pp. 363–6.
87. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
88. See the discussion in ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1987, at para. 1806 et seq.
89. See Sandline International Inc. v. Papua New Guinea, in (1999) 117 ILR, pp. 552–65, 565–93 (in the Queensland Supreme Court). Sandline employees were sworn in as members of PNG armed forces, thereby circumventing rules against mercenarism.
90. See James Cockayne, Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2006.
91. See generally International Alert, The Mercenary Issue at the UN Commission on Human Rights: The Need for a New Approach, International Alert, London, 2001.
92. See Claude Voillat, “Private Military Companies: A Word of Caution”, Humanitarian Exchange, no. 28 (2005), p. 33.
93. API Art. 1(4).
94. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949
95. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Art. 154
96. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, 7 December 1978, Art. 1(1).
97. See especially API, Arts 86, 87
98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), entered into force 1 July 2002, Article 28.
99. A good introduction is provided by Bjørn Møller, “Privatisation of Conflict, Security and War”, DIIS Working Paper no. 2005/2, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2005.
100. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society”, International Organization, vol. 44 (1990), pp. 479–526.
101. On arbitration see D. Sturzaker, “The Sandline affair: illegality and international law”, International Arbitration Law Review, vol. 3 (2000), p. 164.
102. Herbert Howe, “Private security forces and African stability: the case of Executive Outcomes”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (1998), pp. 307–31
103. Pratap Chatterjee, “Mercenary Armies and Mineral Wealth”, Covert Action Quarterly Magazine (Fall 1997)
104. Pratap Chatterjee, “Guarding the Multinationals, DSL and the International Private “Security” Business”, Multinational Monitor, 1 March 1998.
105. Hamit Bozarslan, “Kurdistan: économie de guerre, économie dans la guerre”, in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin (eds.), Économie des guerres civiles, Hachette, Paris, 1996, p. 137.
106. Cf. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Transnationality, War and the Law, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., April 2006, p. 19.
107. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999.
108. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, above note 66, p. 19.
109. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05–184, Supreme Court of the United States of America, 29 June 2006. The recent Military Commissions Act (2006) indeed points to Hamdan being used as the occasion for US Congress to remove detainees' access to stronger legal protections, such as US constitutional rights and habeas corpus remedies.
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94–1-A, ICTY, 15 July 1999, repr. in (1999) 38 International Legal Materials, vol., p. 1518.
111. See Cockayne, above note 54. In 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell famously described NGOs in Afghanistan as a “force multiplier” and an important part of the US “combat team”: Colin Powell, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, 26 October 2001.
112. See Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, Zed Books, London, 2001.
113. See Birgitte Refslund Sørensen, “Violence and humanitarian assistance: Reflections on an intricate relationship”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (September 2006), pp. 14–19.
114. See James Cockayne, “Islam and international humanitarian law: from a clash to a conversation between civilizations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 847, September 2002, pp. 597–626.
115. On this topic see Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, above note 66.
116. See especially Anita Ramasastry and Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law, FAFO Report 536, FAFO, Oslo, 2006.
117. For examples of the early adaptation of doctrines of command responsibility to such situations, see U.S. v. Krauch et al. (“IG Farben case”, case 6), TWC VIII, pp. 1081–1210 at pp. 1124, 1126
118. Prosecutor v. Musema, T.Ch, 27 January 2000, Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-96–13.
119. Cf. A. C. Cutler, “Globalization, the rule of law, and the modern law merchant: Medievel or late capitalist associations?”, Constellations, vol. 8 (2001), pp. 480–502.