International control of nuclear proliferation: Beyond carrots and sticks

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 40-52

  Mitchell, Ronald B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84991509446     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709708436692     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Workshop on Science and Modem Technology in Safeguards held in Arona, Italy, from October 28-31, 1996, and sponsored by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. The article benefited greatly from comments received from Clay Moltz and two anonymous reviewers. Research support was provided through a Summer Research Award from the University of Oregon.
2. Bates Gill, Kensuke Ebata, and Matthew Stephenson, “Japan’s Export Control Initiatives: Meeting New Proliferation Challenges,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), p. 30.
3. Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), p. 56.
4. For a critical view of recent nonproliferation policy approaches, see Henry Sokolski, “Viewpoint: Next Century Nonproliferation: Victory is Possible,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1996).
5. For a more general critique of policies that are not based on sanctions, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is The Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,” International Organization 50 (Summer 1996).
6. Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, “Analytical Framework,” in Thomas Bernauer, Jozef Goldblat, and Dieter Ruloff, eds., Soliciting Cooperation From Critical States: The Politics Of Positive Incentives In Arms Control (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, forthcoming), pp. 39-40;
7. Leonard Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).
8. For recent discussions of “causes for optimism” regarding the unexpected reversal of some states’ nuclear programs and the contrary-to-prediction slowness of nuclear proliferation by others, see Richard Kokoski, Technology And The Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3
9. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 1
10. Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs And Nonproliferation Revisited," in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread And What Results (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1993), p. 111.
11. See, for example, the papers presented in David Cortright and George Lopez, Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks: The Use of Economic Sanctions and Incentives as a Means of Halting the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Goshen, IN: The Fourth Freedom Forum and The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 1993)
12. William J. Long, “Trade And Technology Incentives And Bilateral Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (March 1996)
13. A. Walter Dorn and Andrew Fulton, “Securing Compliance With Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks, And The Case Of North Korea," Global Governance 3 (January 1997).
14. For recent works on the role of norms in defining national interests and international relations, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests In International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996)
15. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992)
16. Richard Price, “The Genealogy Of The Chemical Weapons Taboo,” International Organization 49 (Winter 1995)
17. Audie Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality And U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa,” International Organization 49 (Summer 1995)
18. Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter?,” International Organization 51 (Winter 1997).
19. On the influence of ideas and information, see Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities And International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46 (Winter 1992)
20. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, And Political Change, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
21. Finnemore, National Interests In International Society, pp. 28-31.
22. Models in the rational choice/game theoretic tradition tend to take both the preferences of the relevant actor and the structure of the choices available to an actor as “the givens of a situation, and, for purposes of analysis, we assume that they don’t change much in the short run. In short, we take people as we find them” (Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997)), pp. 16-17.
23. This framework has been developed within a larger research project examining policy strategies across a range of international issue areas. See Ronald B. Mitchell, “Strategies of International Social Control: Changing Incentives, Opportunities, Or Values,” paper presented at International Studies Association Conference held at San Diego, CA, 18-20 April, 1996.
24. Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76 (March/April 1968)
25. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis Of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, And Their Correlates (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961)
26. Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation And The Social Definition Of Pollution (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1984)
27. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., “Selecting Strategies of Social Control Over Organizational Life,” in Keith Hawkins and J.M. Thomas, eds. Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984).
28. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is The Good News About Compliance….”
29. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies And Institutions,” in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986)
30. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History And Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
31. Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going By The Book: The Problem Of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), p. 100.
32. Although Iraq may have been “undeterrable,” its experience may have deterred other states with weaker nuclear ambitions. See Les Aspin cited in David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 88.
33. For an excellent, in-depth analysis of remunerative strategies with a special focus on the North Korea and Ukraine cases, see the articles in Bernauer, Goldblat, and Ruloff, eds. Soliciting Cooperation… also Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives….”
34. John K. Stranlund, “Public Mechanisms To Support Compliance To An Environmental Norm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28 (March 1995), p. 206.
35. Potential proliferant may overstate the extent to which they were likely to proliferate
36. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending The Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 111.
37. Long, “Trade And Technology Incentives….”
38. Steven E. Miller, “The Former Soviet Union," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 114.
39. John M. Shields and William C. Potter, “Cooperative Assistance: Lessons Learned and Directions for the Future,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds. Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and N1S Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 387
40. Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” in Bernauer, Goldblat, and Ruloff, eds. Soliciting Cooperation…, pp. 116,134.
41. Indeed, initial Belarusian expectations of large-scale compensation that would benefit indigenous enterprises “have now been muted” Vyachaslau E. Paznyak, “Nunn-Lugar Program Assessment: The Case of Belarus,” in Shields and Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, p. 170.
42. Michael H. Newlin, “Export Controls and the CTR Program,” in Shields and Potter, eds. Dismantling the Cold War, pp. 294,299.
43. Thomas Bernauer, Jozef Goldblat, and Dieter Ruloff, “Conclusions,” in Bernauer, Goldblat, and Dieter, eds., Soliciting Cooperation…
44. Bernauer, Brem, and Suter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 116. Kazakstan’s decision to dismantle its inherited nuclear weapons was “reinforced,” if not determined, by the compensation it received.
45. William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakstani Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” in Shields and Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, p. 361
46. Mikhail Ustiugov, “Kazakh Power Play: Rich In Oil And Gas, Kazakhstan Nonetheless Wants Nuclear Power And Prestige,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 (July-August 1996)
47. John W.R. Lepingwell, “Kazakhstan and Nuclear Weapons,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (February 19 1993)
48. “Report: First FY 1995 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union,” The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 1 (Summer 1995), p. 21.
49. Amy E. Smithson, “North Korea,” in Bernauer, Goldblat, and Ruloff, eds., Soliciting Cooperation…," p. 107
50. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, Annual Report (Korea: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 1995), p. 21.
51. For an extensive chronology of the development of the Agreed Framework, see General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).
52. Siegwart Lindenberg and Bruno S. Frey, “Alternatives. Frames, and Relative Prices: A Broader View of Rational Choice Theory,” Acta Sociologica 36 (Fall 1993), p. 197
53. Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics, p. 16-17.
54. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
55. Reiss, “Selecting Strategies…”
56. Mastanduno, Economic Containment, pp. 326-327.
57. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; http://www.acda.gov/factshee/conwpn/wassenaa.htm, 1997)
58. Nuclear Energy Agency, The Regulation Of Nuclear Trade: Non-Proliferation, Supply, Safety, vol. 1 (Paris: OECD, 1988)
59. Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Steven Elliott-Gower, “Multilateral Export Control Organizations,” in Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Steven Elliott-Gower, eds. International Cooperation On Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prospects For The 1990s And Beyond (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994).
60. Amy Sands, “The Impact Of New Technologies On Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Reiss and Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation…," p. 260.
61. David A. Schwarzbach, “Iran’s Nuclear Puzzle,” Scientific American 276 (June 1997), p. 63.
62. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs…,” p. 114.
63. Sands, “The Impact Of New Technologies…,” p. 271
64. Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives And Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle.
65. Barbara Connolly and Martin List, “Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” in Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, eds. Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 1996), p. 275.
66. Bernauer, Brem, and Suter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” p. 139.
67. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 58
68. Miller, “The Former Soviet Union;”
69. Dorothy S. Zinberg, The Missing Link? Nuclear Proliferation And The International Mobility Of Russian Nuclear Experts (New York: United Nations, 1995).
70. Miller, “The Former Soviet Union,” p. 109.
71. The U.S. government plans to spend over $1 billion in its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, with approximately half of that going to Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine (Defense Technology Information Center, How CTR Works (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense; http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/pubs/ctr/how.html, 1997)). On the CTR program more generally, see Shields and Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War.
72. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat And Response.
73. An excellent account of this policy is provided by Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives….”
74. Bardach and Kagan, Going By The Book, p. 248.
75. On assurance strategies, see Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
76. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990), p. 38.
77. Paul Wapner, “Environmental Activism And World Civic Politics,” World Politics 47 (April 1995), p. 337.
78. Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, “The Dialectics Of Corporate Deterrence,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 31 (November 1994), pp. 360.
79. For an excellent discussion of how normative forces have effectively eliminated the use of nuclear (and chemical) weapons as an American policy option, see Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
80. Finnemore, National Interests In International Society, p. 29.
81. Edmundo Fujita, The Prevention Of Geographical Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones And Zones Of Peace In The Southern Hemisphere (New York: United Nations, 1989)
82. Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History And Assessment,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997).
83. It is also worth noting that political exigencies will make the adoption of remunerative strategies unlikely in response to recalcitrant proliferants.
84. Finnemore, National Interests In International Society, p. 29
85. Price, “The Genealogy Of The Chemical Weapons Taboo.”
86. The effectiveness of such strategies will always, by definition, be difficult to determine: since normative strategies operate by leading states to redefine their interests, and since interests have theoretical primacy over regimes as determinants of state behavior, compliance will tend to be attributed to a happy coincidence of state interests with regime norms rather than the influence of regime policies.
87. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995)
88. Ronald B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution At Sea: Environmental Policy And Treaty Compliance (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994)
89. Peter Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, Institutions For The Earth: Sources Of Effective International Environmental Protection, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993)
90. Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for Environmental Aid.
91. For a summary of arguments regarding the role of regime transparency and mechanisms for improving transparency, see Ronald B. Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems In International Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (March 1998).
92. For recent discussion of the virtues of transparency in the proliferation arena, see Charles W. Nakhleh, “Viewpoint: Addressing the Implications of the Japanese Fuel Cycle Through Transparency,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997).
93. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News About Compliance….”
94. Fred C. Ikle, “After Detection-What?” Foreign Affairs 39 (January 1961), p. 208-220.
95. Bernauer, and Ruloff, “Analytical Framework,” pp. 32-33.
96. Axelrod, and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation…,” and Martin, Coercive Cooperation….
97. For the seminal work on “tit-for-tat” as a strategy for overcoming cooperation problems, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution Of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).