Securing compliance with disarmament treaties: Carrots, sticks, and the case of North Korea

Global Governance

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 17-40

  Dorn, A Walter ^a   Fulton, Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 0031286852     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00301003     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. A review of the structures and functions is provided in table form in A. Walter Dorn and Ann Rolya, "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the IAEA: A Comparative Overview," IAEA Bulletin 3 (1993): 44.
2. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII.C.
3. See A. Walter Dorn and Douglas Scott, "The Compliance Provisions in the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Summary and Analysis," Occasional Paper no. 2, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Programme for Strategic and International Studies (PSIS), Geneva, 1995.
4. Article VIII:36, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
5. Article XII, CWC.
6. Statement to the thirty-eighth session of the general conference, cited in Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief No. 27 (Southhampton, U.K.: third quarter 1994), p. 29.
7. "Friendless in North Korea," Globe and Mail, 1 January 1992, p. A10.
8. Statement of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 12 March 1993, attached as Annex 7, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419.
9. In Resolution GOV/2636, 25 February 1993.
10. Statement of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 12 March 1993, included as Annex 7, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419.
11. BOG Resolution GOV/2645, 1 April 1993.
12. Security Council Resolution 825(1993), 11 May 1993.
13. Andrew Mack, "A Nuclear North Korea: The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal 11, no. 2 (summer 1994):27-35.
14. David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September-October 1994): 48.
15. Board Resolution GOV/2742, 10 June 1994.
16. IAEA Doc. GOV/2742, 10 June 1994.
17. Statement of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," 12 March 1993, attached to IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419 as Annex 7.
18. Paul Lewis, "UN Sanctions Would Ban Arms Trade with North," New York Times, 16 June 1994, p. A12.
19. Patrick E. Tyler, "Hole in the Wall Around North Korea," New York Times, 21 June 1994, p. A4.
20. The DPRK had sponsored terrorist activities in the past, including assassinating South Korean cabinet ministers and blowing up a Korean Air Lines passenger jet.
21. Robert S. Greenberger, "Shattered Hopes," Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1994, p. A1.
22. R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Weighs N. Korean Incentives," Washington Post, 17 November 1993. A copy of the joint declaration and the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North" can be found in UN Doc. CD/1147, 15 March 1992.
23. "US Warships Sail off North Korea. State Dept. Denies Any Link with Talks," Washington Times, 23 September 1994.
24. The Agreed Framework is summarized in the Newsbrief of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation 28:4. A Confidential Minute to the Agreed Framework was also signed, but its contents have been kept secret.
25. IAEA press release 94/45, 20 October 1994.
26. UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/64, 4 November 1994.
27. Security Council press release SC/5930, 4 November 1994.
28. "2 Experts Rap Clinton for Faith in N. Korea," Washington Times, 19 July 1994.
29. INFCIRC/422, 19 October 1993, p. 2. It is ironic, however, that the DPRK would often use the IAEA as a medium to convey their demands to the United States and the UN.
30. IAEA press release 92/25, 15 May 1992.
31. Alexandre Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Future of the North Korea Nuclear Program," Korea and World Affairs 19, no. 1 (spring 1995):40-66.
32. Mack, "A Nuclear North Korea," p. 34.
33. Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Future of the North Korea Nuclear Program," p. 66.
34. Mack, "A Nuclear North Korea," p. 32.
35. Ibid.
36. The IAEA does not verify the NPT; rather, it verifies only one aspect of the commitment made under the NPT - the nondiversion of declared materials from peaceful purposes. This is an essential prerequisite of treaty verification but not a comprehensive undertaking.
37. An extensive official account of the developments up to this point are given in the IAEA director-general's report, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/419, 8 April 1993. This report was also reproduced in UN Docs. A/48/133 and S/25556, 12 April 1993. The report includes twelve annexes, including relevant IAEA resolutions and the correspondence with the DPRK.