Social science knowledge and induced institutional innovation: An institutional design perspective

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 249-272

  Ruttan, Vernon W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84991224328     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137406000403     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. Acemoglu, D. (2005), ‘Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitution’, Journal of Economic Literature, 53:1025–1048.
2. Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91: 1369–1401.
3. Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz (1973), ‘The Property Right Paradigm’, Journal of Economic History, 33: 16–27.
4. Almond, G. A. (1993), ‘The Early Impact of Downs': An Economic Theory of Democracy on American Political Science’, in B. Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation, and Choice, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
5. Allen, R. C. (1982), ‘The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth-Century Enclosures’, Economic Journal, 92: 937–953.
6. Aoki, M. (1996), ‘Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing’, Japanese Economic Review, 47: 1–19.
7. Becker, G. S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8. Becker, G. S. (1993), ‘The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior’, Journal of Political Economy, 101: 385–409.
9. Binswanger, H. P. and V. W. Ruttan (eds) (1978), Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Development, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
10. Binswanger, H. P., R. E. Evenson, C. A. Florencio, and B.N.W. White (eds) (1981), Rural Household Studies in Asia, Singapore: University of Singapore Press.
11. Binswanger, H. P. and K. Deininger (1997), ‘Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in Developing Countries’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 1958–2005.
12. Boettke, P. J. and C. J. Coyne (2005), ‘Methodological Individualism, Spontaneous Order and the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57: 145–158 (Special Issue).
13. Bohm, P. (1985), ‘Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments’, in A. V. Kneese and J. Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. I, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 395–460.
14. Cavallo, D. and Y. Mundlak (1982), ‘Agriculture and Economic Growth in an Open Economy: The Case of Argentina’, Research Report No. 36, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
15. Cernea, M. (2005), ‘Sociological Knowledge and Induced Development’, Outline for a Social Science Conference, Bibliotheca Alexandriana, Alexandria, Egypt, 30 May-1 June 2005.
16. Cleaver, H. M. Jr. (1972), ‘The Contradictions of the Green Revolution’, American Economic Review, 62: 177–186.
17. Coase, R. H. (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1–44.
18. Commons, J. R. (1950), The Economics of Collective Action, New York: Macmillan.
19. Constant, E. W. (1980), The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
20. Crocker, T. D. (1966), ‘The Structure of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems’, in H. Wolozin (ed.), The Economics of Air Pollution, New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 61–86.
21. Dahlman, C. J. (1980), The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Dalrymple, D. G. (2006), ‘Social Science Knowledge as a Public Good’, in M. W. Cernea and A. H. Kassam (eds), Researching the Culture in Agri-Culture: Social Research for International Development, Cambridge: CABI Publishing, pp. 431–446.
23. Dales, J. H. (1968a), ‘Land, Water and Ownership’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 1: 791–804.
24. Dales, J. H. (1968b), Pollution, Property and Prices, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
25. Davis, L. E. and D. C. North (1971), Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. De Janvry, A. (1973), ‘A Socioeconomic Model of Induced Innovations for Argentine Agricultural Development’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87: 410–435.
27. Demsetz, H. (1964), ‘The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights’, Journal of Law and Economics, 7: 11–26.
28. Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row.
29. Elster, J. (1989), Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2003), ‘Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies’, Economia (Fall): 41–102.
31. Evenson, R. E. and D. Gollin (2003), ‘Assessing the Impact of the Green Revolution, 1960 to 2000’, Science (2 May): 758–762.
32. Feeney, D. (1982), The Political Economy of Productivity: Thai Agricultural Development 1880–1975, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
33. Field, A. J. (1981), ‘The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe’, Explorations in Economic History, 18: 174–198.
34. Fusfeld, D. R. (1980), ‘The Conceptual Framework of Modern Economics’, Journal of Economic Issues, 14: 1–52.
35. Grief, A. (1994), ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’, Journal of Political Economy, 102: 912–950.
36. Hahn, R. W. and R. N. Stavins (1991), ‘Incentive Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?’, Ecological Law Quarterly, 18: 1–42.
37. Harsanyi, J. C. (1960), ‘Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science’, Behavioral Science, 5: 136–145.
38. Hayami, Y. and M. Kikuchi (1981), Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to Institutional Change, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
39. Hayami, Y. and M. Kikuchi (2000), A Rice Village Saga: Three Decades of Green Revolution in the Philippines, London: Macmillan Press.
40. Hayami, Y. and V. W. Ruttan (1985 [1971]), Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
41. Hayek, F. A. (1967), ‘The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design’, in F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 96–105.
42. Hayek, F. A. (1978), ‘The Ativism of Social Justice’, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 57–68.
43. Headstrom, P. and R. Swedberg (1998), ‘Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay’, in P. Hedstrom and R. Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. Hicks, J. (1969), A Theory of Economic History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
45. Hurwicz, L. (1972), ‘Organizational Structures for Joint Decision Making: A Designer's Point of View’, in M. Tuite, R. Chisholm and M. Radnor (eds), Interorganizational Decision Making, Chicago: Aldine, pp. 37–44.
46. Hurwicz, L. (1996), ‘Institutions as Families of Game Forms’, Japanese Economic Review, 47: 113–132.
47. Hurwicz, L. (1998), ‘Issues in the Design of Mechanisms and Institutions’, in E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour (eds), Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 29–56.
48. Ishikawa, S. (1981), Essays on Technology, Employment and Institutions in Economic Development, Tokyo: Kinokuniya.
49. Jones, E. L. (1995), ‘Culture and its Relationship to Economic Change’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151: 269–285.
50. Joskow, P. L., R. Schmalensee, and E. M. Bailey (1998), ‘The Market for Sulphur Dioxide Emissions’, American Economic Review, 88: 669–685.
51. Kikuchi, M. and Y. Hayami (1980), ‘Inducements to Institutional Innovations in an Agrarian Community’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 29: 21–36.
52. Knight, F. H. (1952), ‘Institutionalism and Empiricism in Economics’, American Economic Review, 42.
53. Koppel, B. M. (ed.) (1995), Induced Innovation Theory and International Agricultural Development: A Reassessment, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
54. Krueger, A. O. (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society’, American Economic Review, 64: 291–303.
55. Lal, D. (1998), Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture, and Politics on Long-Run Economic Performance, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
56. Levine, R. (2005), ‘Law, Endowments and Property Rights’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 61–88.
57. Marx, K. (1913), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Chicago: Kerr, pp. 11–12.
58. Marx, K. (1936 [1906]), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, ed. F. Engels, New York: Modern Library (Charles H. Kerr).
59. Marx, K. (1963), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, New York: International Publishers.
60. Nelson, R. R. (2005), Technology, Institutions and Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
61. Nelson, R. R. and S. L. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
62. Nerlove, M. (1974), ‘Household and Economy: Toward a New Theory of Population and Economic Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, 82(11): S200-S218.
63. North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton.
64. North, D. C. (1994), ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, American Economic Review, 84: 359–368 (1993 Nobel Award Lecture).
65. North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1970), ‘An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World’, The Economic History Review, 22: 1–17.
66. North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973), The Rise of the Western World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
67. Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
68. Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press.
69. Olson, M. (2000), Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, New York: Basic Books.
70. Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
71. Ostrom, E. (1992), Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, San Francisco: ICS Press.
72. Ostrom, E. (2000), ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’, Journal of Economic Perspective, 14: 137–158.
73. Rosenberg, N. (1982), ‘Marx as a Student of Technology’, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34–54.
74. Runge, C. F. (1981a), ‘Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63: 595–606.
75. Runge, C. F. (1981b), ‘Institutions and Common Property Externalities: The Assurance Problem in Economic Development’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
76. Runge, C. F. (1999), ‘Stream, River, Delta: Induced Innovation and Environmental Values in Economics and Policy’, WP 99–2, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Minnesota, St Paul.
77. Ruttan, V. W. (1982), Agricultural Research Policy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
78. Ruttan, V. W. (2001), Technology, Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation Perspective, New York: Oxford University Press.
79. Ruttan, V. W. (2003), Social Science Knowledge and Economic Development, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
80. Ruttan, V. W. and Y. Hayami (1984), ‘Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation’, Journal of Development Studies, 20: 203–223.
81. Sameulson, P. A. (1948), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 80, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
82. Schotter, A. (1981), The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
83. Schultz, T. W. (1964), Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven: Yale University Press.
84. Schultz, T. W. (1975), ‘The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria’, Journal of Economic Literature, 13: 822–846.
85. Sen, A. K. (1967), ‘Isolation and the Social Rates of Discount’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81: 112–124.
86. Smith, P. H. (1974), Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict Among Elites, 18801955, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
87. Smith, P. H. (1969), Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change, New York: Columbia University Press.
88. Stavins, R. N. (1998), ‘What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowances Trading’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12: 69–88.
89. Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker (1977), ‘De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum’, American Economic Review, 67: 76–99.
90. Tan, E. S. (2005), ‘Ideology, Interest Groups, and institutional Change: The Case of the British Prohibition of Wages in Kind’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 1: 175–191.
91. Taylor, R. E. (1989), Ahead of the Curve: Shaping New Solutions to Environmental Problems, New York: Environmental Defense Fund.
92. Tietenberg, T. (2002), ‘The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned?’, in E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, and E. U. Welser (eds), The Drama of the Commons, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
93. Tollison, R. D. (1982), ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’, Kyklos, 35: 575–602.
94. Tullock, G. (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft’, Western Economic Journal, 5: 224–232.
95. Whitehead, A. N. (1925), Science and the Modern World, New York: Macmillan.
96. Wittfogel, K. A. (1957), Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven: Yale University Press.